Purdue University

Purdue e-Pubs
Open Access Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

Spring 2015

Modeling, Empirics and Policy Implications of
Firm Heterogeneity in International Trade
Zeynep Akgul
Purdue University

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons
Recommended Citation
Akgul, Zeynep, "Modeling, Empirics and Policy Implications of Firm Heterogeneity in International Trade" (2015). Open Access
Dissertations. 409.
https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations/409

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.

Graduate School Form 30
Updated 1/15/2015

PURDUE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL
Thesis/Dissertation Acceptance
This is to certify that the thesis/dissertation prepared
By Zeynep Akgul
Entitled
Modeling, Empirics and Policy Implications of Firm Heterogeneity in International Trade

For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Is approved by the final examining committee:
Nelson B. Villoria
Co-chair

Thomas W. Hertel
Co-chair

Chong Xiang
Anson Soderbery

To the best of my knowledge and as understood by the student in the Thesis/Dissertation
Agreement, Publication Delay, and Certification Disclaimer (Graduate School Form 32),
this thesis/dissertation adheres to the provisions of Purdue University’s “Policy of
Integrity in Research” and the use of copyright material.

Approved by Major Professor(s): Nelson B. Villoria and Thomas W. Hertel

Approved by: Gerald E. Shively
Head of the Departmental Graduate Program

4/28/2015
Date

MODELING, EMPIRICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
OF FIRM HETEROGENEITY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty
of
Purdue University
by
Zeynep Akgul

In Partial Fulﬁllment of the
Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy

May 2015
Purdue University
West Lafayette, Indiana

ii

To my beloved husband, Altug

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my advisors, Dr. Nelson B. Villoria and Dr. Thomas W.
Hertel for their dedicated mentoring throughout all the stages of my PhD. Their
endless support and patience helped me overcome the many challenges I faced along
the way. I aspire to have their enthusiasm and expertise in research and feel privileged
to have the chance to work with them.
I would also like to thank my committee members Dr. Chong Xiang and Dr.
Anson Soderbery for their insightful comments and helpful feedback that enriched
this research. My appreciation extends to Dr. David Hummels for his invaluable
suggestions on my research. I would also like to thank Dr. Terrie Walmsley and Dr.
Joan Fulton for the invaluable support they provided to me during the early stages of
my studies. I am greatful to Dr. Gerald Shively and Dr. Kenneth Foster for their
support during my studies. My sincerest thanks and appreciation go to Dr. Badri
Narayanan for generously helping me whenever I needed him. I wish to oﬀer my
gratitude to Ginger Batta, Meghan Alexander and Wendy Kincaid for their kindness
and help throughout my studies. I am extremely greatful to Lou Ann Baugh for
helping me in every step of the PhD program with patience and kindness and ensuring
everything to be smooth during this process.
I would like to acknowledge the generous ﬁnancial support provided by the Center
for Global Trade Analysis for helping me share my research with a broader community
in several occasions including the 2013 Annual Meeting of Applied and Agricultural
Economics Association in Washington, DC, the 17th Annual GTAP Conference in
Senegal and the 22nd Annual GTAP Short Course at Purdue. I am thankful for the

iv
insightful comments by Peter Dixon, Kazuhiko Oyamada, Marinos Tsigas, Jayson
Beckman, Shawn Arita and Fan Zhai that enriched the research in Chapter 2. My
appreciation extends to Alan Spearot for generously sharing his work and data with
me that contributed to the research in Chapter 3. I would also like to acknowledge
the United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service (ERS) for
their continuing ﬁnancial support for the research in Chapter 4. In particular, I would
like to thank Jayson Beckman and Shawn Arita for their collaboration in this work.
I oﬀer my sincerest gratitude to my family at Purdue, Tia McDonald, Azza
Mohamed and Burcu Irfanoglu for making this experience bearable and fun. They
have been with me all along and provided a safe heaven for me in a foreign land.
Special thanks go to my oﬃcemate Ariana Torres and my fellow graduate students
at GTAP, Caitlyn Carrico and Jeﬀrey C. Peters. I would like to thank my family
in Turkey for encouraging me to pursue this opportunity and move to Purdue. I
am greatly indebted to my father Hikmet Akgul and my mother Ayten Akgul for
their unconditional love and support. Many thanks go to my brothers Mehmet Akgul,
Ahmet Akgul and their wives Deniz and Cagla. My sincerest gratitude extends to my
sister Ayse Akgul and her husband Tevﬁk Altinisik for being the best friends a person
could ask for. They have been there for me whenever I needed them. Many thanks go
to my nieces Irmak and Toprak and the newest member of our family Kaan Furkan
for cheering me up with their cuteness. I would also like to thank my cousins Esra
Serdaroglu, Aysegul Eryilmaz and Aysenur Kama for their continuing friendship.
Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Altug, without whom this dissertation
would have never seen the light. Words alone cannot express my gratitude and
appreciation for his support and love in every minute along the way. We started this
journey together and it would have been impossible to ﬁnish it without him by my
side. Thank you Altug for being a wonderful husband and my best friend!

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vii

LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

x

CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

CHAPTER 2. INTRODUCING FIRM HETEROGENEITY INTO THE GTAP
MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Main Mechanisms in Firm Heterogeneity Theory . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3 Modeling Framework of Firm Heterogeneity in GTAP . . . . . . . .
2.3.1 Production Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.1.1 Markup Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.1.2 Productivity Draw of Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.1.3 Firm Proﬁts: Productivity Threshold to Enter Markets
2.3.1.4 Average Productivity in the Industry . . . . . . . .
2.3.2 Endogenous Entry and Exit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.2.1 Industry Proﬁt: Zero Proﬁt Condition . . . . . . .
2.3.2.2 Number of Firms in the Domestic and Export Markets
2.4 Calibration of Fixed Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.5 Closure: Diﬀerences across Armington, Krugman, and Melitz Speciﬁcations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.6 Policy Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.6.1 Impacts on the US . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.6.2 Impacts on Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.6.3 Impacts on the ROW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.6.4 Comparison across diﬀerent Model Speciﬁcations . . . . . .
2.6.5 Welfare Eﬀects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.7 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CHAPTER 3. THEORETICALLY-CONSISTENT PARAMETERIZATION
OF A MULTI-SECTOR GLOBAL MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS
FIRMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 Background on Structural Parameters of the Firm Heterogeneity Model

5
5
8
11
12
16
19
20
24
27
27
31
33
36
40
41
45
48
49
51
56

58
58
64

vi

3.3

3.4
3.5

3.6

3.7

Theoretical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3.1 Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3.2 Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3.3 Aggregate Trade Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3.4 Extensive, Intensive and Compositional Trade Margins
Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Empirical Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5.1 Export Participation: Probit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5.2 Trade Flows: OLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.6.1 Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.6.2 Elasticity of Substitution across Varieties . . . . . . . .
3.6.3 Implications and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Page
69
69
71
74
76
78
81
82
84
87
87
92
94
97

CHAPTER 4. FIRM HETEROGENEITY, FIXED COSTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: THE CASE OF US-EU BEEF TRADE
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 Data and Empirical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3 Policy Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.1 Treatment of Non-Tariﬀ Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.2 Shocks on Policy Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.3 Results under the Firm Heterogeneity Model . . . . . . . . .
4.3.4 Welfare Implications across Model Speciﬁcations . . . . . . .
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.1 Calibration of Fixed Costs and Parametric Restrictions . . .
4.4.2 Simulation Results with Alternative Parameter Values . . .
4.4.3 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99
99
102
105
105
106
109
116
122
123
128
131
131

CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

134

LIST OF REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

136

APPENDICES
Appendix A: Appendices to Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . .
A.1
Derivation of the Zero Proﬁt Condition . . .
A.2
Data Description and Transformation . . . .
A.2.1
Sourced Imports at Market Prices .
A.2.2
Sourced Imports at Agent’s Prices
A.2.3
Trade Data . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix B: Data Appendix to Chapter 3 . . . . . . . .
Appendix C: Sector Aggregation in Chapter 4 . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

141
141
147
148
149
150
152
156

VITA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

157

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

vii

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

2.1

Parameters of the Firm Heterogeneity Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

2.2

Simulation Results for the Manufacturing Sector under Armington, Krugman, and Melitz-like Structures where j ∈ MCOMP COMM for Monopolistically Competitive Industry, and r,s ∈ REG for Regions. . . . . . . . .

42

Welfare Decomposition of Tariﬀ Removal under Armington, Krugman, and
Melitz-like Structures: Equivalent Variation in millions of US$. . . . . .

54

Overview of Structural Parameter Values in the Firm Heterogeneity Literature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

Summary Statistics of the Dataset, Motor Vehicles and Parts, 113 Countries,
for Years 1995-2006. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80

3.3

Zeros in the Motor Vehicles and Parts Industry, 113 Countries. . . . . .

80

3.4

Gravity Estimation Results for Motor Vehicles and Parts (MVH in GTAP),
113 Countries, for Years 1995-2006. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

Corrections in the Gravity Equation for Motor Vehicles and Parts (MVH
in GTAP), 113 Countries, for Years 1995-2006. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

3.6

Elasticities of Substitution between Varieties of Diﬀerent Sources. . . .

92

4.1

Data Aggregation: GTAP Version 9.1 Pre-release. . . . . . . . . . . . .

102

4.2

Key Parameters of the Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

104

4.3

Shocks Imposed on US Beef Imports in the EU under Firm Heterogeneity
and Perfect Competition Models where j ∈ MCOMP COMM for Monopolistically Competitive Industry, and r,s ∈ REG for Regions. . . . . . . . .
108

4.4

Fixed Cost Reduction: Changes in the Export Threshold and Number of
Exporters to the EU Beef Market (%). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.3
3.1
3.2

3.5

110

4.5

Tariﬀ Reduction: Changes in the Export Threshold and Number of Exporters to the EU Beef Market (%). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
111

4.6

Changes in Varieties in the Beef Market under Fixed Cost Reduction and
Tariﬀ Cut Scenarios (%). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

112

viii
Table

Page

4.7

Productivity Growth in the Beef Industry: Domestic, Export and IndustryWide Averages under Fixed Cost Reduction and Tariﬀ Cut Scenarios
(%). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
113

4.8

Change in the Production of Each Sector under Fixed Cost Reduction and
Tariﬀ Reduction Scenarios (%). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

115

Change in the Supplier Prices of Each Sector under Fixed Cost Reduction
and Tariﬀ Reduction Scenarios (%). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

115

4.10 Welfare Eﬀects of Two Scenarios under Firm Heterogeneity: Equivalent
Variation in millions of US$. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

118

4.11 Welfare Eﬀects of Two Scenarios under Perfect Competition: Equivalent
Variation in millions of US$. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

121

4.12 Parameter Values for the Beef Industry used in the Sensitivity Analysis.

127

4.13 Welfare Eﬀects under Alternative Parameter Values (Elasticities are ﬁtted
to Arita et al. (2015)): Equivalent Variation in millions of US$. . . . .

128

4.14 Changes in the Value of Beef Exports under Alternative Parameter Values
(Elasticities are ﬁtted to Arita et al. (2015)), $US millions. . . . . . . .

129

4.15 Changes in Average Productivity in the Beef Industry under Alternative
Parameter Values (Elasticities are ﬁtted to Arita et al. (2015)), % Change.

130

4.16 Welfare Eﬀects under Alternative Parameter Values (Elasticities are ﬁtted
to di Giovanni et al. (2011)): Equivalent Variation in millions of US$. .

130

A.1 List of Variables and Value Flows Used in This Paper, where i ∈
ENDW COMM for endowments, i ∈ TRAD COMM for intermediate inputs, j ∈
MCOMP COMM for monopolistically competitive industry, and r,s ∈ REG for
regions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

141

B.1 List of Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

153

C.1 Sector Aggregation: GTAP Version 9.1 Pre-release. . . . . . . . . . . .

156

4.9

ix

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
2.1

2.2
2.3
2.4
4.1

Page

Production Structure in the Monopolistically Competitive Industry with
Firm-level Heterogeneity where i ∈ ENDW COMM for Endowment Inputs, i
∈ TRAD COMM for Intermediate Inputs, j ∈ MCOMP COMM for Monopolistically Competitive Industry, and r,s ∈ REG for Regions. . . . . . . . .

13

Productivity Threshold, Firm Entry/Exit and the Decomposition of Industry Productivity in the US. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

Productivity Threshold, Firm Entry/Exit and the Decomposition of Industry Productivity in Japan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

Productivity Threshold, Firm Entry/Exit and the Decomposition of Industry Productivity in the ROW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

Parameter Space for the Beef Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A.1 Transformation of the Data Base: Sourcing Imports by Agent where i ∈
TRAD COMM, j ∈ PROD COMM, r,s ∈ REG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

125
151

x

ABSTRACT
Akgul, Zeynep PhD, Purdue University, May 2015. Modeling, Empirics and Policy
Implications of Firm Heterogeneity in International Trade. Major Professors: Nelson
B. Villoria and Thomas W. Hertel.
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are essential computational tools
for trade policy analysis. While traditional CGE models based on the Armington
assumption of national product diﬀerentiation have been successfully applied to various
policy scenarios, they also have signiﬁcant limitations in explaining the ﬁrm-level
information prevalent in the recent international trade literature. The pioneering work
of Melitz (2003) has provided a ﬁrm heterogeneity theory that can help address the
shortcomings of Armington-based CGE models by introducing additional productivity
mechanisms and extensive margin eﬀects. Incorporation of ﬁrm heterogeneity in
mainstream CGE models oﬀers great potential to improve computational policy
analysis. Even though there have been some eﬀorts to incorporate ﬁrm heterogeneity
into CGE modeling, a readily accessible Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)
implementation is currently not available. This dissertation addresses this gap by a
combination of theory, calibration, estimation and simulation to develop and implement
a ﬁrm heterogeneity module executed within the GTAP environment.
Chapter 2 presents the newly developed ﬁrm heterogeneity module with a stylized
tariﬀ removal scenario and compares the model predictions with those of monopolistic
competition and perfect competition frameworks previously established in the standard
GTAP model. Chapter 3 proposes a theoretically-consistent way to parameterize
the ﬁrm heterogeneity module with a focus on the elasticity of substitution across

xi
varieties. Results show that the elasticity values that are consistent with the ﬁrm
heterogeneity theory are considerably lower than Armington elasticities used in the
standard GTAP model. Finally, Chapter 4 applies this newly developed module and
parameterization to policy analysis in order to investigate the implications of reducing
non-tariﬀ measures associated with the beef hormone ban imposed by the European
Union on imports from the United States based on the negotiations taking place for
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement. The ﬁrm
heterogeneity module predictions of welfare changes in the United States are distinctly
diﬀerent from those predicted by the standard GTAP model. This is explained by
the endogenous productivity and variety eﬀects implied by the ﬁrm heterogeneity
theory. Results also suggest that the choice of policy instrument is an important
factor in determining which one of these eﬀects dominates in the ﬁnal welfare outcome.
This dissertation introduces the ﬁrst implementation of ﬁrm heterogeneity into the
standard GTAP model which I hope will serve as a powerful tool for policy analysis
with improved abilities in tracing out the productivity changes and entry/exit of ﬁrms
following trade liberalization episodes.

1

CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW

As globalization continues to bring countries together, international trade gains
momentum and new trade challenges begin to emerge. There is a worldwide convergence of interests on policies that would address those modern trade problems.
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Agreement (TTIP) and the Transpaciﬁc
Partnership Agreement (TPP) are two major examples of ongoing eﬀorts to design
new international trade policies which will have signiﬁcant implications for global
welfare and the global trade architecture (Petri et al., 2012; ECOYRS, 2009; CEPR,
2013). The ability to accurately predict the outcomes of these international trade
policies will help improve policy designs and potentially increase worldwide economic
gains.
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are essential computational tools
used extensively in trade policy analysis (Devarajan S. and Robinson, 2002). They
facilitate policy analysis by laying out the main mechanisms that govern trade-induced
economic changes in a tractable fashion. The traditional approach in CGE studies
is to model trade based on the Armington (1969) assumption of national product
diﬀerentiation. While this approach has provided many insights into static welfare
eﬀects of trade policies as well as other economic outcomes, it also has signiﬁcant
limitations in explaining the ﬁrm-level information prevalent in the recent international
trade literature.
Stylized facts documented in this literature show that (i) there is signiﬁcant
heterogeneity across ﬁrms with respect to their products, productivities, markets they
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serve, costs they incur etc. (Eaton et al., 2004); and (ii) exporting is a rare event
accomplished by only a small subset of ﬁrms that are larger and more productive than
non-exporters (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Bernard et al., 2003; Bernard and Jensen,
2004). The pioneering work of Melitz (2003) has provided a modeling framework that
can explain those empirical ﬁndings by consideration of ﬁrm heterogeneity. This novel
trade model gives new insights about the underlying mechanisms at play in trade
liberalization scenarios where trade improves aggregate productivity by stimulating
eﬃcient ﬁrms to expand into export markets while simultaneously forcing ineﬃcient
ﬁrms to exit the industry. This results in a unique productivity channel through which
trade aﬀects welfare.
Armington-based CGE models fail to capture these important ﬁrm-level mechanisms. As a result, they do not account for trade growth due to changes in the number
of varieties traded, i.e. extensive margin, or account for productivity growth due
to compositional changes within the industry. Consequently, welfare predictions of
Armington-based CGE models can be inaccurate. Incorporating the ﬁrm heterogeneity
theory into Armington-based CGE models can overcome those shortcomings and
strengthen computational policy analysis.
There have recently been some eﬀorts to incorporate Melitz (2003) into CGE
modeling (Zhai, 2008; Dixon et al., 2015; Balistreri et al., 2011; Balistreri and Rutherford, 2012; Oyamada, 2013). While each of these studies illustrate the workings of
ﬁrm heterogeneity in computational policy analysis under stylized models, a readily
accessible, policy-oriented CGE model has not been made available yet. The Global
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) provides an Armington-based CGE model often used
by policy makers and research institutions. In order to improve its explanatory power
and versatility, it is highly desirable to incorporate the ﬁrm heterogeneity theory into
the GTAP model.

3
Implementing ﬁrm heterogeneity into GTAP is a multi-dimensional task which requires not only a working multi-region, multi-sector CGE model but also a theoreticallyconsistent parameterization. Pinning down the structural parameters is paramount for
policy analysis, as quantitative results heavily depend on parameter values. However
previous ﬁrm heterogeneity CGE models have often used Armington elasticities that
are not appropriate in a ﬁrm heterogeneity model (Dixon et al., 2015). The traditional
gravity equation that delivers Armington elasticities do not control for the impact
of ﬁrm self-selection into export markets which is the main micro mechanism for
productivity and variety induced gains from trade. In the absence of ﬁrm behavior the
resulting coeﬃcient estimates confound the demand-side eﬀects with the supply-side
eﬀects resulting in inaccurate elasticities. In order to be consistent with the underlying
ﬁrm heterogeneity theory, there is a need for new elasticity parameters that distinguish
between the demand-side and supply-side eﬀects.
This dissertation contributes to the international trade literature by addressing the
above issues through the incorporation of ﬁrm heterogeneity into the GTAP model,
the determination of parameter values consistent with the underlying theory, and an
application of the developed module to policy analysis based on a case study in the
context of TTIP.
Chapter 2 presents the modeling and implementation of ﬁrm heterogeneity theory in
the GTAP model. The new mechanisms are illustrated with a stylized scenario in which
a tariﬀ removal policy is analyzed. Switches between diﬀerent model speciﬁcations
are incorporated to allow for comparisons with the results from a monopolistically
competitive model based on Krugman (1980) and a perfectly competitive model based
on the Armington (1969) assumption of national product diﬀerentiation. The results
are contrasted with the monopolistically competitive and perfectly competitive GTAP
modules. This comparison shows that incorporation of ﬁrm heterogeneity allows

4
for additional economic forces to come into play. In particular, in addition to the
traditional allocative eﬃciency and terms of trade eﬀects of Armington as well as the
variety and scale eﬀects of monopolistic competition, the theory of ﬁrm heterogeneity
incorporates endogenous productivity eﬀects to welfare change.
Chapter 3 explores a host of issues related to the parameterization of the newly
proposed ﬁrm heterogeneity model. A method to obtain structural parameters that
are theoretically consistent with ﬁrm heterogeneity models is presented with a focus
on the elasticity of substitution across varieties. The intensive and extensive margins
of trade are distinguished in a multi-sector, multi-country ﬁrm heterogeneity model
resulting in two estimating equations. The elasticity of substitution consistent with
the theory of ﬁrm heterogeneity is obtained based on these equations and the shape
parameter estimates of Spearot (2015). Results show that the elasticity values that are
consistent with the ﬁrm heterogeneity theory are considerably lower than Armington
elasticities used in the standard GTAP model.
Chapter 4 mobilizes the model of Chapter 2 and the parameters of Chapter 3 in
an applied policy analysis study that focuses on the hormone ban imposed by the
European Union (EU) on beef imports from the United States (US) in the context of
TTIP negotiations. The ban on hormone-treated beef sales in the EU has become
a critical issue in the debate over the rules and regulations concerning agricultural
trade policies. Chapter 4 investigates the implications of a possible reduction of
this ban by using two alternative policy instruments: ﬁxed export costs and tariﬀ
equivalents of the hormone ban. A unique aspect of this study is that it takes ﬁrmlevel heterogeneity and extensive margin eﬀects prevalent in the monopolistically
competitive beef market into account. Important productivity and variety eﬀects are
observed under ﬁrm heterogeneity which results in diﬀerent welfare implications of
the same policies compared to the Armington-based GTAP model.

5

CHAPTER 2. INTRODUCING FIRM HETEROGENEITY INTO THE GTAP
MODEL

2.1 Introduction
Traditional Computable General Equilibrium models (CGE) rely on the Armington
(1969) assumption of national product diﬀerentiation (e.g. GTAP) to distinguish
preferences between domestic and imported products. Changes in trade ﬂows in these
models are conditioned by pre-existing trade shares; therefore, they can only capture
the trade adjustments that occur due to changes in export volumes. This is at odds
with the empirical trade literature that highlights the contribution of new varieties in
export markets to explain the expansion of trade following trade liberalization episodes
(Hummels and Klenow, 2005; Chaney, 2008). The ﬁrm heterogeneity trade model
proposed in the pioneering work of Melitz (2003) combines trade volume changes with
expanding varieties as a result of trade liberalization by capturing the self-selection of
ﬁrms into export markets based on their respective productivity levels. The resulting
framework is solidly supported by empirical evidence (Eaton et al., 2004; Bernard et al.,
2006). Including ﬁrm-level heterogeneity in CGE models can improve their ability
to trace out trade and welfare implications of trade policies which were previously
unexplored in traditional models.
There have recently been some important eﬀorts to incorporate Melitz (2003) into
CGE modeling (Zhai, 2008; Dixon et al., 2015; Balistreri et al., 2011; Balistreri and
Rutherford, 2012; Oyamada, 2013). However, a readily accessible GTAP implementation with ﬁrm heterogeneity has not yet become available. Our paper addresses this
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gap by incorporating ﬁrm heterogeneity into the GTAP model, calibrating it to the
GTAP Data Base V8 (Narayanan et al., 2012) and illustrating this framework with a
stylized scenario. A comparison with the Armington-based standard GTAP model,
as well as a GTAP-based model of monopolistic competition allows us to shed light
on the new elements which the Melitz model brings to bear on trade liberalization
impacts.
One of the stylized facts shown by micro-level data is that there is signiﬁcant
variation across ﬁrms of the same industry. In particular, ﬁrms vary by their productivity, size, proﬁtability, the number of markets served and responses to trade
shocks (Bernard et al., 2003; Eaton et al., 2004; Bernard et al., 2007; Balistreri et al.,
2011; Melitz and Treﬂer, 2012). Moreover, only some ﬁrms export and they tend to
be larger and more productive than non-exporters (Balistreri et al., 2011; Bernard
et al., 2003; Bernard and Jensen, 1999). These stylized facts are captured by Melitz
(2003) who examines the intra-industry reallocation eﬀects of international trade in
the context of a model with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous ﬁrms. In
his framework, opening the economy to trade or increasing the exposure to trade
generates a redistribution of production across ﬁrms within the industry based on the
productivity diﬀerences of ﬁrms. In particular, ﬁrms with higher productivity levels
are induced to enter the export market; ﬁrms with lower productivity levels continue
to produce for the domestic market and the ﬁrms with the lowest productivity levels
are forced to exit the industry. These inter-ﬁrm reallocations generate a growth in
the aggregate industry productivity which increases the welfare gains of trade. This
channel is a unique feature of the ﬁrm heterogeneity model (Zhai, 2008). The main
premise of the Melitz model is that aggregate productivity can change even though
there is no change in a countrys production technology. As opposed to the allocative
eﬃciency gains in the ﬁrm heterogeneity model, aggregate productivity changes in
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traditional trade models with homogeneous ﬁrms and Armington assumption are
brought about by changes in ﬁrm-level technology.
Melitz (2003) builds on Krugmans (1980) monopolistic competition framework
to model trade; while it draws from Hopenhayn (1992) to model the endogenous
self-selection of heterogeneous ﬁrms. Likewise, we build on Swaminathan and Hertels
(1996) monopolistically competitive GTAP model where variety eﬀects (changes in
the number of ﬁrms and hence distinct varieties oﬀered) and scale eﬀects (changes in
output per ﬁrm) are captured. We draw from the work of Zhai (2008) in modeling
certain features of ﬁrm heterogeneity such as teasing out productivity thresholds for
market entry and calibration of ﬁxed export costs, etc. This allows us to endogenize
aggregate productivity in the monopolistically competitive sectors of the model,
thereby capturing the intra-industry reallocation of resources in the wake of trade
liberalization.
In contrast to Zhai (2008) we assume endogenous ﬁrm entry and exit. This
extension allows tracing out the direct eﬀect of changes in the productivity threshold
on entry and survival in export markets. Another simpliﬁcation in Zhai (2008) is the
assumption of no sunk-entry costs of production in the monopolistically competitive
industry. In contrast, our model incorporates ﬁxed entry costs following Swaminathan
and Hertel (1996), we assume that ﬁxed costs are only comprised of value added inputs
which are calibrated using the zero proﬁts condition. An additional contribution of
our model is the decomposition of the welfare implications of trade policy. This is
an extension of the existing GTAP welfare decomposition (Huﬀ and Hertel, 2000),
which now includes, in addition to allocative eﬃciency and terms of trade eﬀects,
scale, variety, and endogenous productivity eﬀects derived from the ﬁrm heterogeneity
model.
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In addition to the ﬁrm heterogeneity model, we also explore other model structures
to highlight how trade policy impacts diﬀer across various frameworks. These include
monopolistically competitive GTAP model motivated by Krugman (1980) and perfectly
competitive GTAP model motivated by the standard GTAP model with Armington
(1969) assumption. Occasionally, we refer to them as Armington (1969) and Krugman
(1980) models. However, the reader should keep in mind that even though these GTAP
modules are motivated by Armington (1969) and Krugman (1980), they do not exactly
follow the same structure as these seminal works. We bring the main features of these
theories into applied work. In addition, we make some changes where necessary since
numerical implementation of highly theoretical models requires making additional
assumptions and extensions to the original structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides a brief introduction to the theory of ﬁrm heterogeneity. Section 2.3 details the implementation of
ﬁrm heterogeneity theory into the standard GTAP model. Section 2.4 describes the
data requirement for the ﬁrm heterogeneity model. Alternative closure rules for model
switches are discussed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 illustrates this framework with a
stylized trade liberalization scenario. Section 2.7 concludes the paper.

2.2 Main Mechanisms in Firm Heterogeneity Theory
In this framework, we assume that there can be two types of industries: monopolistically competitive industries with heterogeneous ﬁrms that produce diﬀerentiated
varieties and perfectly competitive industries with identical ﬁrms that produce homogeneous products which are assumed to be diﬀerentiated only at national scale. The
characteristics of the standard GTAP model industries are retained in the perfectly
competitive industries where a representative ﬁrm produces at constant returns to
scale technology. The characteristics of ﬁrms in the monopolistically competitive
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industry, on the other hand, are quite diﬀerent than the standard GTAP model and
this warrants a detailed discussion concerning the treatment of production, cost, and
especially productivity at the ﬁrm level.
The presence of ﬁrm heterogeneity in an industry is characterized by a continuum
of ﬁrms each producing a unique variety that is an imperfect substitute in demand to
other varieties. Therefore, in what follows we use ﬁrms and varieties interchangeably.
While ﬁrms are free to enter or exit, entering the market requires covering ﬁxed costs
that are associated with expenses made during initial development of the diﬀerentiated
variety. The existence of ﬁxed costs is a large impediment for start-up ﬁrms; however,
it also creates potential scale economies in the monopolistically competitive industry.
Until each ﬁrm makes a commitment to enter the industry and pays these ﬁxed costs,
there is no information about their eﬃciency. Hence ﬁrms are assumed to be identical
before entering the industry. Once they enter, their productivity levels are revealed
and we observe that productivity is heterogeneous across ﬁrms within the industry.
In this context, productivity is deﬁned as how much a ﬁrm can produce per
composite input. It is inversely related to the marginal cost of production; therefore, a
high-productivity ﬁrm is the one producing a similar variety at a lower marginal cost
which follows from the simpliﬁcation of Melitz (2003). Firm productivity is assumed to
be identically and independently distributed with productivities following the Pareto
distribution. Each ﬁrm draws its productivity out of this distribution and ﬁnds out
where they stand on the productivity spectrum.
Once they know their productive capabilities, ﬁrms are now able to choose whether
or not to operate in the market. The decision to produce depends on the potential
for making proﬁts given the productivity of the ﬁrm and the ﬁxed costs they have
already incurred. Firms are assumed to face symmetric ﬁxed costs, while they diﬀer
with respect to their productivity. Thus, production is carried out only by ﬁrms
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that are productive enough to aﬀord staying in the market given the ﬁxed costs.
High-productivity ﬁrms have a better chance of survival since they produce more
output and earn higher proﬁts by charging a lower price compared to less productive
ﬁrms in the market. The competition in the market, therefore, forces low-productivity
ﬁrms to exit and high-productivity ﬁrms to expand their market shares.
Where does trade stand in this framework? Once a ﬁrm secures its niche in the
domestic market, it has the choice to supply foreign markets as well as satisfying
home demand. The decision to export or not has its own challenges. Just as ﬁrms
incur ﬁxed costs to start producing, they incur ﬁxed costs to start exporting. Fixed
export costs are destination speciﬁc. They may arise due to expenses associated with
distinguishing the ﬁrm’s variety to make it compatible with regional standards in
the destination market. In addition, they may be associated with the expenses of
ﬁnding local dealerships or doing market research on the rules and regulations of
exporting into speciﬁc destinations. For example, automobile companies incur the
costs of redesigning certain features of their models in order to meet the needs of
consumers in the destination market. The battery pack and the number of rows of
seating in Prius 2010 diﬀer between the European and Japanese markets. Another
example can be the keyboard requirements of personal computers in diﬀerent regions.
A Dell sold in the Japanese market has a diﬀerent keyboard design than the same
Dell sold in the US market because consumers speak diﬀerent languages.
Independent of their nature, the very existence of ﬁxed export costs is the reason
why not all ﬁrms export and why ﬁrms self-select into export markets based on
their respective productivity levels. This mechanism works through the endogenous
determination of the productivity threshold to export. Only the ﬁrms with productivity
levels equal to or higher than this threshold ﬁnd it proﬁtable to supply that speciﬁc
market. Hence the distribution of ﬁrms is such that while the most productive ﬁrms
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serve in the export markets, ﬁrms with lower productivity levels supply only the
domestic market, and the lowest-productivity ﬁrms do not produce.
Self-selection of ﬁrms, ﬁrst into the domestic market, then into export markets is
a unique mechanism in the ﬁrm heterogeneity model and oﬀers additional gains from
trade due to improvements in industry productivity through inter-ﬁrm reallocation
of resources. This is a channel that was previously unexplored in trade models. In
conventional theory, trade leads to inter-sectoral reallocation of resources with scarce
resources shifting towards the more proﬁtable industry. However, in ﬁrm heterogeneity,
competition for resources also occurs within the industry where high-productivity ﬁrms
expand their market share and absorb the factors released by low-productivity ﬁrms.
The expansion of high-productivity ﬁrms together with the exit of low-productivity
ﬁrms in the face of trade liberalization, increases the productivity of the industry on
average, generating additional gains from trade.
Everything we have said so far is based on the fact that productivity levels of
ﬁrms are assumed to be constant. Of course, one could argue that trade also leads to
‘learning by exporting’ so that ﬁrms become more productive as they export. This is
plausible and there is a vast literature on the very issue of causality of productivity
and exporting, i.e. whether ﬁrms self-select into export markets due to their initial
productivity levels, or rather ﬁrms become more productive as they export. However,
as with Melitz (2003), we abstract from endogenous changes in ﬁrm productivity levels
in this framework.

2.3 Modeling Framework of Firm Heterogeneity in GTAP
This section describes the theoretical structure of ﬁrm heterogeneity and its implementation into the standard GTAP model. In this paper, we follow the conventions
that were used in previously published work in an eﬀort to facilitate the comparison of
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our methodology with other Melitz-type CGE models. In addition we explicitly show
how to bring the theory into GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson, 1996) by providing
code snippets where applicable. The deﬁnition of variables and value ﬂows used in
the code is presented in Table A.1.

2.3.1 Production Structure
In this section we oﬀer a brief introduction to the production technology in the
ﬁrm heterogeneity module of GTAP. Similar to the standard model, production in the
monopolistically competitive industry is modeled based on a nested structure which
is laid out in Figure 2.1. There are two parts to Figure 2.1: (i) on the left, panel
A, we show the modeling of ﬁxed costs and (ii) on the right, panel B, we show the
production tree. We should note that not all the branches in this ﬁgure represent a
nest. Particularly, only the solid lines specify a nest, while the dashed lines specify
a market clearing condition. This will become clear as we explore the production
structure further below.
The key characteristic that distinguishes production technology in this industry
from the perfectly competitive one is the diﬀerence between the variable and ﬁxed
component of costs. Following Swaminathan and Hertel (1996), we assume that a
portion of the value-added inputs of heterogeneous ﬁrms are devoted to cover ﬁxed costs
and intermediate inputs are not used in this process. These assumptions warrant a
brief discussion about the nature of ﬁxed costs explored in this work. As we mentioned
before, in order to diﬀerentiate their varieties for domestic and export markets, ﬁrms
invest in research and development as well as market research and advertising. Each of
these activities require the employment of labor or capital. Particularly, the equipment
used in the research and development lab is considered as capital, while the ﬁrm hires
labor to advertise their products in foreign markets. A point to note here is that land

14
is not part of the endowment factors that constitute ﬁxed costs merely because land
is only used in the production of unprocessed agricultural goods in GTAP and these
goods are identical as long as they are not processed.
Due to the distinction between ﬁxed and variable costs, total value-added composite,
qva(j,s) in Figure 2.1, has two components: variable value-added, qvav(j,s), and
ﬁxed value-added, qvaf(j,s)1 . Variable value-added is used in the production of the
diﬀerentiated variety and therefore is proportional to output. Demand for variable
value-added increases as ﬁrms expand production. On the other hand, ﬁxed valueadded is incurred only once and is invariant to how much the ﬁrm produces.
The ﬁxed value-added is further split into domestic and export components based
on whether the primary factors are employed to cover ﬁxed domestic costs, qvafd(j,s),
or ﬁxed export costs, qvafx(j,r,s). This is shown at the bottom level of the tree
in Figure 2.1 where both domestic and export components of ﬁxed value-added are
produced by labor and capital according to a CES technology. The same applies
to the variable value-added nest in production. An important thing to highlight is
that substitution elasticity, σV A (ESUBVA(j) in GTAP), between labor and capital is
identical in each of these nests since the labor/capital intensity in ﬁxed and variable
value-added composite are assumed to be the same (Swaminathan and Hertel, 1996).
This simplifying assumption is largely based on the data availability pertaining to the
composition of ﬁxed costs as opposed to variable value-added.
Under certain conditions it can be more appropriate to consider research and
development as more capital intensive and marketing as more labor intensive compared
to production. In that case it becomes necessary to allow for varying labor/capital
intensity across diﬀerent components of the value-added composite. While this can be
achieved in the current model with only minor modiﬁcations, it also requires industry1

Lower-case letters denote percentage change in the upper-case counterparts.
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speciﬁc information that is currently not available in our data base. Therefore, in this
study we restrict ourselves to the assumption of equal intensities.
The domestic and export composites determine the ﬁxed value-added composite
based on their respective weights in total ﬁxed costs which then determine the total
value-added bundle together with variable value-added composite according to their
respective weights in total value-added costs. Note that this aggregation is not based
on a production technology. It just adds up the total factor requirements which
highlights that total value-added is either used as variable input in production or used
as inputs to cover ﬁxed costs of domestic and export markets.
Returning back to Figure 2.1B, we see that output is produced by a combination
of the variable value-added and intermediate input composites at the top level of
the production tree depending on a constant returns to scale technology. We should
emphasize that the assumption of constant returns to scale technology in combining
variable inputs does not mean that we abstract from potential scale economies. The
existence of ﬁxed costs generate internal increasing returns to scale in sales as ﬁrms
expand production. Firms take advantage of falling average costs when they operate
at a larger scale since each additional input brings about a more than proportional
increase in output when ﬁxed costs are present. Hence the economies of scale.
In the lower nest of Figure 2.1B, the intermediate input composite, qf(i,j,s), is
composed of diﬀerentiated and homogeneous goods. Each ﬁrm has the choice to use
a diﬀerentiated variety, qfmc(i,r,j,s), which is produced in the monopolistically
competitive industry or a homogeneous product, qfpc(i,r,j,s), which comes out of
the perfectly competitive industry. We assume that there is no substitution between
these inputs, i.e. σT = 0. For the homogeneous goods we retain the standard GTAP
model assumption of domestic and import distinction where imports are sourced at
the border. However, we also use the information on how much of the homogeneous
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intermediate inputs are actually sourced from particular exporters since the data base
is transformed accordingly. A more detailed discussion about data transformation is
provided in Appendix A.2. Contrary to homogeneous goods, there is no domestic and
imports distinction for diﬀerentiated varieties; therefore, there is no additional nest to
show their composition. Imported varieties are assumed to compete with domestic
varieties at the market based on the corresponding elasticity of substitution, σ.

2.3.1.1 Markup Pricing
Representative ﬁrms operate under constant returns to scale in a perfectly competitive
industry and set their prices equal to their marginal costs. However, ﬁrms in the
monopolistically competitive industry are price setters for their particular varieties
and can aﬀord to set prices higher than their marginal costs. In particular, the optimal
pricing rule for such ﬁrms is to charge a constant markup over their marginal costs. Let
Pir indicate the supply price of product i in the monopolistically competitive industry
in region r, Cir indicate the cost of the input bundle that is used for producing one
unit of output in industry i of country r, and let ϕ
ir indicate the average productivity
of industry i in region r. Optimal pricing in the monopolistically competitive industry
is governed by:
Pir =
where

σi
σi −1

σi Cir
,
σi − 1 ϕ
ir

(2.1)

gives the markup in industry i which is greater than one as σi > 1. This

equation shows that the price set by the representative ﬁrm is higher than its marginal
cost by the amount of the markup in the industry. Since we assume that the elasticity
of substitution across varieties is constant, the markup charged by ﬁrms is also a
constant. There is a negative relationship between the markup and the elasticity of
substitution. As σi increases, varieties of the same product become more similar which
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reduces the power of the ﬁrm to charge a higher markup. Hence the markup decreases
with the elasticity of substitution.
The second component in equation (2.1) is the marginal cost of the representative
ﬁrm captured by the fraction

Cir
.
ϕ
ir

Unit cost of production is normalized by the

average productivity in order to account for the heterogeneity across ﬁrms and the
resulting endogenous productivity changes in the industry. Equation (2.1) reduces to
the familiar pricing rule of Pir = Cir in the perfectly competitive industry since ﬁrms
have identical productivity levels, i.e.ϕ
ir = 1, and, do not have markup power.
Simplifying equation (2.1) and adopting GTAP notation, we obtain:

P Sir = M ARKU Pir M Cir ,

(2.2)

where P Sir is the supply price (excluding taxes and transportation costs), M ARKU Pir
is the constant markup which corresponds to
which corresponds to

Cir
ϕ
ir

σi
,
σi −1

and M Cir is the marginal cost

in equation (2.1).

Since we assume that production occurs under constant returns to scale technology,
average variable cost equals the constant marginal cost of production. Substituting
the average variable cost, AV Cir for M Cir in equation (2.2) we obtain:

P Sir = M ARKU Pir AV Cir .

(2.3)

Total diﬀerentiation of (2.3) yields2 :
psir − avcir = markupir = 0
2

Lowercase letters denote percentage changes in the corresponding uppercase variables.

(2.4)
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According to equation (2.4), changes in the producer price is directly proportional
to changes in average variable cost at constant markup. We implement this in the
code as:
Equation MKUPRICE
#markup pricing (with constant markup) in the monop. comp. ind. j in r#
(all,j,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
ps(j,r) = avc(j,r) + mkupslack(j,r) ;

where ps(j,r) is the price received by the ﬁrm in the monopolistically competitive
industry j in region r, avc(j,r) is the average cost of production in industry j in region
r, and mkupslack(j,r) is a slack variable which is exogenous in the closure. Equation
MKUPRICE determines the level of output per ﬁrm. The slack variable is included in
order to allow for alternative closures for diﬀerent trade policy applications where
ﬁrm-level output is not endogenous. For example, if we want to change the industry
structure to perfect competition, we need to remove the eﬀect of scale economies and
ﬁxed costs. This translates as constant output per ﬁrm and no markup. In the absence
of ﬁxed costs, AV C = AT C = P which is ensured by zero proﬁts condition. Hence
Equation MKUPRICE is simply redundant. Therefore, we eliminate it by ﬁxing output
per ﬁrm and endogenizing mkupslack(j,r). Firm-level output does not change in a
competitive model and mkupslack(j,r) absorbs the diﬀerence between supply price
and average variable cost. Since in a competitive model AV C = AT C = P , the value
of mkupslack(j,r) will be close to zero in equilibrium. The use of slack variables is
revisited in Section 2.5.
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2.3.1.2 Productivity Draw of Firms
Firms are assumed to draw their productivity level, ϕ, from a Pareto distribution with
probability density function, g(ϕ), and the cumulative distribution function, G(ϕ),
expressed as:
γ  ϕmin γ
,
ϕ ϕ
 ϕ γ
min
,
G(ϕ) = 1 −
ϕ
g(ϕ) =

(2.5)
(2.6)

where ϕmin indicates the lower bound of productivity and γ indicates the shape
parameter. We assume that ϕ ∈ [1, ∞) where the minimum productivity, ϕmin , is
one. The shape parameter, γ, is an inverse measure of the ﬁrm heterogeneity. A
higher value means that the ﬁrms are more homogeneous, i.e. ﬁrms have similar
cost structures. We assume that the relationship between the shape parameter and
elasticity of substitution is such that γ > σ − 1. This condition is enforced to ensure
that the size distribution of ﬁrms has a ﬁnite mean (Zhai, 2008). Let ϕ∗ indicate the
productivity threshold of producing in a speciﬁc market. In other words, it is the level
of productivity required to enter the market. The proportion of ﬁrms that have higher
productivity levels than the threshold is given by 1 − G(ϕ∗ ) which is governed by
1 − G(ϕ∗ ) = (ϕ∗ )−γ ,

(2.7)

The ﬁrms that pass the threshold are actively participating in the destinationspeciﬁc market. Hence, we can interpret equation (2.7) as the proportion of successful
entry to the destination market, which is given as

Nirs
Nir

where Nirs is the number of

ﬁrms in industry i that export from source r to destination s, and Nir is the total
number of ﬁrms that produce industry i of region r. We revisit the discussion about
productivity threshold and ﬁrm entry/exit in the following sections.
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2.3.1.3 Firm Proﬁts: Productivity Threshold to Enter Markets
Each ﬁrm with productivity ϕirs makes the following proﬁt from selling variety i on
the r − s market:

πirs (ϕ) = Qirs (ϕ)

Pirs (ϕ)
Cir
− Qirs (ϕ)
− Wir Firs ,
Tirs
ϕirs

(2.8)

for all r, s where Qirs is the sale of product i from source r to destination s, Pirs is
the tax inclusive sale price of product i from r to s, (Pirs = Pir Tirs ), Tirs is the export
tax/subsidy, Cir is the unit price of the composite inputs, Wir is the price associated
with ﬁxed costs and Firs is the input demand for covering ﬁxed costs of exporting
(ϕ)
from r to s. The ﬁrst component, Qirs (ϕ) Pirs
, gives the total revenue, the second
Tirs
ir
component, Qirs (ϕ) ϕCirs
, gives the variable cost and the third component, Wir Firs ,

gives the ﬁxed cost of exporting from r to s. Substituting the optimal demand and
price for each variety, we obtain the maximized proﬁt for each ﬁrm as follows:

πirs


1−σi
σi
σi Tirs Cir
Qirs Pirs
=
− Wir Firs .
σi Tirs σi − 1 ϕirs

(2.9)

Firms in industry i of region r export into region s as long as the variable proﬁt
they make covers the ﬁxed cost of exporting. The ﬁrms with high productivity levels
set a lower price with a higher markup, produce more output; thereby, earn positive
proﬁts. The only ﬁrm that exports on the r − s link and makes zero proﬁts is the
marginal ﬁrm which has a productivity level equal to the productivity threshold.
At that threshold, variable proﬁt only covers the export costs; therefore, the ﬁrm
makes zero economic proﬁt. The condition that determines the zero-cutoﬀ level of
productivity for exporting from region r to s is:
πirs (ϕ∗irs ) = 0.

(2.10)
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Solving equation (2.10) yields the productivity threshold as:

ϕ∗irs

σi 

 1−σ
 σ 1−1
i
Pirs
Wir Firs i
Cir
=
.
σi − 1 σi Tirs
Qirs

(2.11)

Any ﬁrm that has a productivity level below ϕ∗irs cannot aﬀord to produce in that
market, and therefore exits. On the other hand, any ﬁrm that has a productivity level
above ϕ∗irs expands its market share. Total diﬀerentiation of equation (2.11) yields:
ϕ
∗irs = cir +

σi
1
(wir + firs − qirs ).
(pirs − tirs ) +
1 − σi
σi − 1

(2.12)

Equation (2.12) shows that the change in cutoﬀ productivity level depends on the
change in unit cost of production, cir , change in price net of taxes and transportation
costs, pirs − tirs , and change in ﬁxed cost per sale, wir + firs − qirs . The same equation
is used to determine the productivity threshold for export markets as well as the
domestic market with the only diﬀerence being the treatment of ﬁxed costs. While
ﬁxed domestic costs are used for the domestic productivity threshold, ﬁxed export
costs are used to determine the export productivity threshold for export markets.
For the domestic market (r = s), equation (2.12) is implemented as:
Equation PRODTRESHOLDD
# productivity threshold for the domestic market #
(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
aodt(j,r)
= sum{i,TRAD COMM, SVC(i,j,r) ∗ [pf(i,j,r) − af(i,j,r)]}
+ SVAV(j,r) ∗ [pvav(j,r) − avav(j,r)]
+ [MARKUP(j,r)−1] ∗ [fdc(j,r)−qs(j,r,r)]
− MARKUP(j,r) ∗ ps(j,r) + dthreshslack(j,r);

where aodt(i,r) is the productivity threshold for the domestic industry i in region r,
SVC(i,j,r) is the share of intermediate input i in variable costs of j in r, pf(i,r)
is the demand price for composite tradeable i by ﬁrms in industry j of region r,
af(i,r) is the intermediate input i augmenting technical change in industry j of
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region r, SVAV(j,r) is the share of variable value-added cost in variable costs of j
in r, pvav(i,r) is the demand price for composite variable value-added by ﬁrms in
industry j of region r, avav(i,r) is the variable value-added augmenting technical
change in industry j of region r, fdc(i,r) is the ﬁxed cost of production for the
domestic industry i of region r, qs(i,r,r) is the domestic sales of product i in region
r, ps(i,r) is the supply price of product i in region r, and ﬁnally dthreshslack(i,r)
is a slack variable that is exogenous in the closure.
Note that fdc(i,r) is a product of price and demand for ﬁxed value-added
composite. It is implemented in the code as:
Equation FIXEDDC
# fixed domestic costs to enter the monop. comp. industry i in r
(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
fdc(i,r) = pvafd(i,r) + qvafd(i,r);

#

where pvafd(i,r) and qvafd(i,r) are the composite price and demand that is
associated with the domestic component of ﬁxed value-added. As dictated by this
equation, domestic ﬁxed costs increase proportionately with associated price and
demand for ﬁxed factors.
Similar to the domestic market, the productivity threshold for each export market
(r = s) is determined according to equation (2.12). It is implemented in the code as:
Equation PRODTRESHOLDX
# productivity threshold for the export market #
(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
aoxt(j,r,s)
= [1 − DELTA(r,s)]
∗ {sum{i,TRAD COMM, SVC(i,j,r) ∗ [pf(i,j,r) − af(i,j,r)]}
+ SVAV(j,r) ∗ [pvav(j,r) − avav(j,r)]
+ [MARKUP(j,r)−1] ∗ [fxc(j,r,s)−qs(j,r,s)]
− MARKUP(j,r) ∗ [pfob(j,r,s) + tx(j,r) + txs(j,r,s) + to(j,r)]}
+ xthreshslack(j,r,s);

where DELTA(r,s) is called the Kronecker delta which is equal to one when r = s.
It is used in order to calculate the productivity threshold for export markets only.
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aoxt(i,r,s) is the productivity threshold for exporting product i from the source
region r to the destination market s, SVC(i,j,r) is the share of intermediate input
i in variable costs of j in r, pf(i,r) is the demand price for composite tradeable i
by ﬁrms in industry j of region r, af(i,r) is the intermediate input i augmenting
technical change in industry j of region r, SVAV(j,r) is the share of variable valueadded cost in variable costs of j in r, pvav(i,r) is the demand price for composite
variable value-added by ﬁrms in industry j of region r, avav(i,r) is the variable
value-added augmenting technical change in industry j of region r, fxc(i,r,s) is the
ﬁxed cost of exporting from r to s, qs(i,r,s) is the export sales of product i from
region r to s, pfob(i,r,s) is the fob price of product i, tx(i,r) is the destination
generic tax/subsidy, txs(i,r,s) is the tax/subsidy associated with exporting from r
to s, to(i,r) is the output tax/subsidy, and ﬁnally xthreshslack(i,r,s) is a slack
variable that is exogenous in the closure.
Similar to the domestic market, ﬁxed export cost is a product of value added price
and ﬁxed value-added inputs. It is implemented in the code as:
Equation FIXEDXC
# fixed export costs in industry i to enter the export market s
(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
fxc(i,r,s) = pvafx(i,r,s) + qvafx(i,r,s);

#

where pvafx(i,r,s) and qvafx(i,r,s) are the composite price and demand that is
associated with the export component of ﬁxed value-added.
Equation PRODTRESHOLDD and PRODTRESHOLDX give us productivity thresholds at
the ﬁrm-level for the domestic and export markets, respectively. There are two factors
at play in these equations: (i) competition, and (ii) market access. Competition is a
combined eﬀect of the changes in average variable cost and prices. For example, an
increase in average variable cost causes the ﬁrm to lose competitiveness against more
eﬃcient ﬁrms and makes it more costly to enter a new market. Hence it raises the
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productivity threshold for the domestic and export markets. This increase is somewhat
reduced by the possibility of scale economies brought about by larger market access.
For instance, in trade liberalization scenarios, as markets integrate ﬁrms gain access
to a larger market. This increases the potential for exports and reduces ﬁxed export
costs per sale. As a result, productivity threshold declines.
The competition and market access eﬀects determine the change in the productivity
threshold and how diﬀerent ﬁrms respond to this change. For low-productivity ﬁrms the
competition eﬀect dominates since their costs are too high to take advantage of bigger
market access. Hence they exit the market. On the other hand, high-productivity
ﬁrms beneﬁt from the larger market and are able to expand their production and
sales.

2.3.1.4 Average Productivity in the Industry
In equilibrium, only the ﬁrms that have productivity levels above the threshold, ϕ∗irs ,
aﬀord to supply the destination market s. Since only surviving ﬁrms matter for the
industry, aggregate productivity is a weighted average of the productivity levels of the
ﬁrms that make the cut. The distribution of productivity in equilibrium is given by
⎧
⎪
⎨
μ(ϕ) =

g(ϕ)
1−G(ϕ∗ )

⎪
⎩ 0

if ϕ ≥ ϕ∗

(2.13)

otherwise

where g(ϕ) is the probability density of the productivity distribution. μ(ϕ) can
be thought of as a conditional distribution of g(ϕ) on [ϕ∗ , ∞) which refers to the
productivity distribution of ﬁrms that are active in the market. This is another way of
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saying that average productivity of the industry depends only on successful entrants.
Using this conditional distribution, average productivity is determined by:

ϕ
irs (ϕ∗irs ) =


∞
ϕ∗irs

1
 σ−1

ϕσi −1 μ(ϕ)d(ϕ)

1
=
1 − G(ϕ∗irs )

∞
ϕ∗irs

,

(2.14)
 σ 1−1

ϕσi −1 g(ϕ)d(ϕ)

i

,

(2.15)

where ϕ
irs is a CES weighted average of ﬁrm productivity and the weights reﬂect the
relative output shares of ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity levels. Substituting ϕ∗irs
in and using the probability density of Pareto distribution, the average productivity
equation reduces to:


ϕ
irs (ϕ∗irs ) = ϕ∗irs

γi
γ i − σi + 1

 σ 1−1
i

,

(2.16)

where γi > σi − 1. Total diﬀerentiation of equation (2.16) yields:
 = ϕ
∗irs ,
ϕ
irs

(2.17)

 is the percentage change of average productivity of ﬁrms that are active
where ϕ
irs
on the r − s market and ϕ
∗irs is the percentage change in the threshold for exporting
product i from r to s. According to Equation (2.17) there is a one-to-one mapping
between the productivity threshold and average productivity in the market. We use
Equation (2.17) to determine the average productivity in the domestic market and
export markets separately.
For the domestic market (r = s):
Equation AVEPRODD
# average productivity for the domestic market#
(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
aod(i,r) = aodt(i,r);
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where aod(i,r) is the average productivity in the domestic market. For the export
market (r = s),
Equation AVEPRODX
# average productivity for the export market#
(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
aox(i,r,s) = aoxt(i,r,s);

where aox(i,r,s) is the average productivity in the export market. Average productivity in each market contributes to the overall industry eﬃciency depending on their
relative importance for the industry sales. Aggregate industry productivity is then
simply a weighted average of average productivity in the domestic and export markets.
It is implemented in the code as:
Equation AOHET
# computes aggregate productivity of the monop. comp. industry with
het. firms #
(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
ao(i,r) = SHRSMD(i,r,r) ∗ aod(i,r)
+ sum(s,REG, SHRSMD(i,r,s) ∗ aox(i,r,s))
+ prodslack(i,r);

where ao(i,r) is the percentage change in the aggregate productivity of industry
i in region r, SHRSMD(i,r,r) is the share of domestic market in total sales, and
SHRSMD(i,r,s) is the share of each export market in total sales. According to
Equation AOHET, aggregate productivity rises with an increase in average productivity
in the domestic or export markets. Moreover, an increase in the share of domestic or
export markets in total sales also boosts aggregate productivity in the industry.
A point to note here is that ao in Equation AOHET only captures the changes in
industry productivity due to changes in the market share of ﬁrms. A positive ao does
not mean that the ﬁrms are getting more productive. Rather the expansion in the
market share of high-productivity ﬁrms improves the eﬃciency of the industry on
average. In other words, it means that more productive ﬁrms constitute a larger part
of the market than before.
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2.3.2 Endogenous Entry and Exit
In this section, we examine the zero proﬁt condition of the industry and the
endogenous entry/exit of ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm in the monopolistically competitive industry
produces a diﬀerentiated variety that gives them a market power over their unique
product. Hence ﬁrms have the potential to make positive proﬁts in each market
conditional on their productivity levels and the ﬁxed costs they face. This attracts
new ﬁrms into the industry. As new ﬁrms operate in the market, proﬁts of existing
ﬁrms decline. Firm entry continues until there are proﬁts to make in the market.
Therefore, at the industry level, free entry fully exhausts all the potential proﬁts until
the zero proﬁt condition in the industry is restored in equilibrium. Hence the total
number of ﬁrms in the industry is endogenous and is determined by the zero proﬁts
condition which is sometimes referred as the ”entry condition”. Conversely, if ﬁrms
make losses, the movement is out of the industry as ﬁrms exit. This continues until
all the ﬁrms in the industry make zero proﬁts.

2.3.2.1 Industry Proﬁt: Zero Proﬁt Condition
Total industry proﬁt is composed of each active ﬁrm’s proﬁt from operating in the
domestic market and selling in export markets. The proﬁt of the representative ﬁrm
in each export market is governed by equation (2.8). Aggregating over all available
sales markets, equation (2.8) becomes

Πirs =
s

s


Qirs Pirs
Qirs Cir
−
− Wir Firs .
(1 + tirs )
ϕ
irs

(2.18)

Expression (2.8) relates export proﬁts to the revenue generated by exporting,
Qirs Pirs
,
(1+tirs

variable costs of production,

Qirs Cir
,
ϕ
irs

and ﬁxed export costs incurred in each

export market Wir Firs . At the industry level, only the successful entrants contribute
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to total proﬁts. Therefore, equation (2.18) needs to be adjusted by the number of
active ﬁrms. However, note that each new ﬁrm also incurs sunk entry costs to begin
production. These costs need to be included in the calculation of industry proﬁts,
as well. Let Hir be the component of value-added composite that is used on ﬁxed
domestic costs for each successful entry in industry i and Nir be the total number of
ﬁrms in the industry. Then industry proﬁt is given by

Πir =

Nirs
s


Qirs Pirs
Qirs Cir
−
− Wir Firs − Nir Wir Hir .
(1 + tirs )
ϕ
irs

(2.19)

Note that in order to obtain the total proﬁt made in each market, we simply
multiply the proﬁt of the representative ﬁrm with the number of active ﬁrms. This
ease in aggregation follows from average productivity. As discussed in Melitz (2003),
the aggregate outcome of an industry with N representative ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms that have
identical productivity levels ϕ,
 is the same as the aggregate outcome of an industry
with N ﬁrms of any distribution of productivity levels μ(ϕ) that yields the same
average productivity level ϕ.

There is free entry and exit in the monopolistically competitive industry. Therefore,
all the potential proﬁts are exhausted as ﬁrms enter the market. Conversely, all the
potential losses are recovered as ﬁrms exit. Entry/exit continues until the marginal
ﬁrm in the industry makes zero proﬁts which means that the industry proﬁt is zero in
equilibrium. Implementing this condition in equation (2.19), we obtain the zero proﬁt
condition for the industry as follows:

s

Nirs Qirs Pirs
=
(1 + tirs )

s

Nirs Qirs Cir
+
ϕ
irs

Nirs Wir Firs + Nir Wir Hir .
s

(2.20)
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Equation (2.20) determines the total number of ﬁrms in the industry, Nir , as ﬁrms
enter/exit to satisfy the zero proﬁt condition. We rewrite expression (2.20) using
GTAP notation as follows:

V OA(j, r) =

V F A(i, j, r) + V AV (j, r)
i∈T RAD

V AF X(j, r, s) + V AF D(j, r),

+

(2.21)

s∈REG

where V OA(j, r) is the value of output in industry j of region r, V F A(i, j, r) is the
value of purchases of intermediate input i demanded in industry j of region r, V AV (j, r)
is the value of purchases of variable value-added composite purchased by industry j in
region r, V AF X(j, r, s) is the value of ﬁxed costs associated with exporting product j
from source r to destination s, and V AF D(j, r) is the value of ﬁxed costs associated
with entering the domestic market j in region r. These value ﬂows correspond to
speciﬁc components in equation (2.20). For example, V OA(j, r) is the total cost of
production and exporting which is equal to total revenue generated by selling in

Qirs Pirs
all available markets. Therefore, it corresponds to the components s Nirs
in
(1+tirs )

equation (2.20). Similarly, j, i∈T RAD V F A(i, j, r) + V AV (j, r) is the total variable

irs Cir
cost of production which corresponds to s NirsϕQirs
in equation (2.20). Finally,

s∈REG V AF X(j, r, s) corresponds to ﬁxed export costs aggregated over all markets

given by s Nirs Wir Firs and V AF D(j, r) corresponds to total sunk-entry costs in the
industry given by Nir Wir Hir in equation (2.20).
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Total diﬀerentiation of Equation (2.21) and use of the Envelope Theorem yields:
V F A(i, j, r) [pf (i, j, r) − af (i, j, r)]

V OA(j, r) ps(j, r) =
i∈T RAD

+ V AV (j, r) [pvav(j, r) − avav(j, r)] + V AF (j, r) pvaf (j, r)
− V AF D(j, r) [qof (j, r) + avaf d(j, r)]
−

V AF X(j, r, s) [qox(j, r, s) + avaf x(j, r, s)]
s∈REG

− V C(j, r) ao(j, r),

(2.22)

where V AF (j, r) is the total cost of ﬁxed value-added in industry j of region
r, pvaf (j, r) is the demand price of ﬁxed value-added in industry j of region r,
V AF D(j, r) is the ﬁxed domestic cost of production in industry j of r, qof (j, r)
is output per ﬁrm in industry j of region r, avaf d(j, r) is the ﬁxed value-added
augmenting technical change in the domestic industry j of region r, V AF X(j, r, s)
is the bilateral ﬁxed cost of exporting product j from source r to destination s,
qox(j, r, s) is output per exporting ﬁrm in industry j, avaf x(j, r, s) is the ﬁxed
value-added augmenting technical change in export markets. For details of this
derivation we refer the reader to the appendix A.1. Equation (2.22) relates output
price to output per ﬁrm and factor prices. The important diﬀerence between this zero
proﬁt condition from that in a perfectly competitive market is the eﬀect of per ﬁrm
output. Everything else constant, as output per ﬁrm increases, the diﬀerence between
price and average total cost at constant scale declines.
Equation (2.22) is implemented in the code as:
Equation ZEROPROFITSMC
# zero pure profits condition for firms in the monopolistically comp
industry #
(all,j,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
VOA(j,r) ∗ ps(j,r)
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= sum{i,TRAD COMM, VFA(i,j,r) ∗ [pf(i,j,r) − af(i,j,r)]}
+ VA(j,r) ∗ pva(j,r) − VAV(j,r) ∗ avav(j,r)
− VAFD(j,r) ∗ [qof(j,r) + avafd(j,r)]
− sum(s,REG, VAFX(j,r,s) ∗ [qox(j,r,s) + avafx(j,r,s)])
− VC(j,r) ∗ ao(j,r) + VOA(j,r) ∗ profitslackmc(j,r) ;

where profitslackmc(j,r) is the exogenous slack variable which allows for alternative
closures. For instance, if there is no entry/exit in the industry, the number of ﬁrms
is ﬁxed. In that case, the industry proﬁt may be positive in the short-run. This is
captured in the closure by allowing the slack variable to be non-zero, i.e. endogenizing
profitslackmc(j,r).

2.3.2.2 Number of Firms in the Domestic and Export Markets
This section focuses on two diﬀerent free entry conditions: (i) domestic and (ii)
export market. As mentioned in section 2.3.2.1, entry/exit of ﬁrms in the industry is
determined by the zero-proﬁt condition. In fact, the zero-proﬁt condition together
with the markup equation dictates the change in output per ﬁrm, qof(j,s), which
then determines the change in the total number of ﬁrms in the industry. This closely
follows from Swaminathan and Hertel (1996).
Total output in the industry is a product of output per ﬁrm and the number of
active ﬁrms in the industry given by:

Qir = Nir Q̃ir ,

(2.23)

where Nir is the total number of ﬁrms snd Q̃ir is the output of the representative ﬁrm
in the monopolistically competitive industry. We assume that each ﬁrm produces the
same amount of product. Total diﬀerentiation of equation (2.23) yields:

qir = nir + q̃ir .

(2.24)
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Equation (2.24) is implemented in the code as:
Equation INDOUTPUT
# industry output in the monopolistically competitive industry #
(all,j,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
qo(j,r) = qof(j,r) + n(j,r) ;

According to Equation INDOUTPUT if output per ﬁrm rises less than the industry
output, new ﬁrms enter the industry to ensure that the zero-proﬁt condition in the
industry is restored. On the other hand, if output per ﬁrm rises more than the industry
output, then some ﬁrms must be forced out of the industry.
Entry and exit of ﬁrms in the domestic market is based on the interaction between
the industry and the representative ﬁrm. The export market is a little diﬀerent.
It depends directly on the productivity threshold of the export market. Given the
productivity distribution, the number of ﬁrms that successfully export is given by:
Nirs = Nir [1 − G(ϕ∗irs )],

(2.25)

where Nirs is the number of ﬁrms that export product i from region r to s, and
[1 − G(ϕ∗irs )] is the proportion of ﬁrms that are active in the export market. This
representation recognizes that not all ﬁrms in industry i are able to export on the
particular r − s link. Among all the ﬁrms in the industry only the ﬁrms that pass the
threshold productivity level of exporting are able to enter the export market, given
the productivity distribution.
Assuming that the productivity distribution is Pareto, Equation (2.25) becomes:
Nirs = Nir (ϕ∗irs )−γi .

(2.26)

nirs = nir − γi (ϕ∗irs ),

(2.27)

Total diﬀerentiation yields:
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where γi denotes the shape parameter of Pareto distribution. It is implemented in the
code as:
Equation NXFIRM
# number of active firms in export markets #
(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
nx(i,r,s) = n(i,r) − SHAPE(i) ∗ aoxt(i,r,s) + entryslack(i,r,s);

According to Equation NXFIRM, if the productivity threshold for the marginal ﬁrm
in the export market increases, the ﬁrms that do not make the cut are forced to exit
the market. This is, of course, based on the heterogeneity of the particular industry
which is captured by the shape parameter of Pareto distribution. Recall that γi is
an inverse measure of heterogeneity. Therefore, as γi increases, productivity becomes
more uniform and ﬁrms become more homogeneous. This means that ﬁrms in the
same industry now have more similar cost structures. In a more homogeneous industry,
more ﬁrms must exit the export market given a constant productivity threshold and a
constant mass of ﬁrms since there are more ﬁrms with similar productivity levels.

2.4 Calibration of Fixed Costs
We use GTAP data base V8 (Narayanan et al., 2012) for the illustrative experiments
in this paper. There are several changes we made to the standard GTAP data base to
make it compatible with the requirements of the ﬁrm heterogeneity module. The most
fundamental change is the transformation of the data base to account for sourcing
of imports by agents which follow from the monopolistically competitive industry
structure. In this context, consumers make a decision between many varieties of the
same good which are slightly diﬀerent from each other. Hence the choice is between
diﬀerent brands such as Honda versus Hyundai as opposed to a car sourced in Japan
versus one sourced in South Korea. Therefore, in contrast to the import-domestic
distinction in the standard data base where composite imports are imperfect substitutes
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for the domestic commodity, imported varieties compete directly with domestic ones
in the ﬁrm heterogeneity module. In addition, imports are sourced by the agent in
the transformed data base which means that we distinguish between the purchases of
imported varieties of private households from that of ﬁrms and government. These
changes follow from Swaminathan and Hertel (1996) and we outline the details in
Appendix A.2.
There is additional information required for the ﬁrm heterogeneity model which is
not available in the standard GTAP data base. These include elasticity of substitution
between varieties, shape parameter of Pareto distribution, and data for ﬁxed costs.
Table 2.1 presents the parameters used in this model.
Table 2.1. Parameters of the Firm Heterogeneity Model.
Industry
Manufacturing
Non-Manufacturing

Model

Elasticity of Substitution
across Varieties, σ

Shape Parameter of
Pareto Distribution, γ

FH
PC

6.96
6.60

7.75
6.20

Notes: FH: Firm heterogeneity, PC: Perfect Competition
Source: GTAP Data Base V8 Narayanan et al. (2012) and Zhai (2008).

For the elasticity of substitution, we adopt the values of the Armington elasticity
for our particular aggregation in the GTAP data base V8 (Narayanan et al., 2012), i.e.
ESUBM in GTAP. Note that these have been estimated using cross-section variation
in trade costs. For the shape parameter of Pareto distribution, we use the values
provided in Zhai (2008) where the shape parameter is calibrated to match the proﬁt
ratio in total markup. While the parameter values are taken from the literature, ﬁxed
costs are calibrated to the GTAP data base. In this model, we need information for
two types of ﬁxed costs: domestic and export. For ﬁxed export costs we follow the
calibration in Zhai (2008). In particular, we use a gravity equation which determines
the bilateral trade ﬂows. For ﬁxed domestic costs we adopt an indirect approach.
First we calibrate total value of ﬁxed costs in the industry following the treatment
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of Swaminathan and Hertel (1996). Fixed domestic costs are, then, the diﬀerence
between total ﬁxed costs and ﬁxed export costs aggregated over all markets.
As explained before, value added costs are composed of a ﬁxed, VAF(i,r), and a
variable, VAV(i,r), portion. Initial value for the ﬁxed component of value-added is
calibrated by using the mark-up pricing rule. It follows that ﬁxed cost is proportional
to total cost with a proportionality constant of

1
:
σi

formula (all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
VAF(i,r) = VOA(i,r) ∗ [1 / SIGMA(i,r)]};

Fixed costs decrease with the elasticity of substitution. As preferences become
more homogeneous, i.e. higher σi , demand for variety is lower which reduces the
need for diﬀerentiating the product. Therefore, ﬁrms cut down the budget on R & D
leading to lower ﬁxed costs. In the extreme case where products are perfect substitutes,
i.e. perfect competition with σi approaching ∞, ﬁxed costs reduce to zero since all
value-added is allocated to production of the identical variety.
The rest of the value-added costs, VA(i,r), are attributed to variable value-added,
VAV(i,r), which are used in the production process as follows:
formula (all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
VAV(i,r) = VA(i,r) − VAF(i,r);

Recall that in the ﬁrm heterogeneity model, ﬁxed value-added cost, VAF(i,r), is
split into two parts: (i) ﬁxed domestic cost, VAFD(i,r), and (ii) ﬁxed export cost,
VAFX(i,r,s). The initial value of the ﬁxed export costs is calibrated to the base year
bilateral trade ﬂows following Zhai (2008). Fixed costs are proportional to trade ﬂows
which is reﬂected in the calibration as follows:

Nirs Wir Firs =

Pirs Qirs γi − σi + 1
.
Tirs
σi γ i

(2.28)
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The left-hand side in equation (2.28), Nirs Wir Firs , gives the ﬁxed cost of exporting
good i from source r to destination s aggregated over all ﬁrms that are active in that
market. The right hand side has two components. The ﬁrst one,

Pirs Qirs
,
Tirs

gives the

total revenue of exporting good i from r to s which equals total cost of exporting
that particular good to market s. The second component,

γi −σi +1
,
σi γi

is a proportionality

constant that depends on preferences and the heterogeneity of the industry. As
preferences become more homogeneous, i.e. higher σi , ﬁrms have little incentive to
invest in diﬀerentiating their varieties because the markup gets smaller. As a result,
ﬁxed export costs decrease with the elasticity of substitution. Similarly, a higher shape
parameter, i.e. less heterogeneity across ﬁrms, reduces ﬁxed costs of exporting.
This calibration is implemented in the code as:
Formula (initial)(all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)(all,s,REG)
VAFX(i,r,s) = [1 − DELTA(r,s)]
∗ VSMD(i,r,s)
∗ [SHAPE(i) − SIGMA(i) + 1] / [SHAPE(i) ∗ SIGMA(i)]} ;

where DELTA(r,s) is the Kronecker delta which is equal to one when r = s. Once
ﬁxed export costs are calibrated, ﬁxed domestic cost is obtained as the diﬀerence
between total ﬁxed costs and ﬁxed export costs aggregated over all markets. It is
implemented in the code as follows:
Formula (all,i,MCOMP COMM)(all,r,REG)
VAFD(i,r) = VAF(i,r) − sum(s,REG, VAFX(i,r,s));

2.5 Closure: Diﬀerences across Armington, Krugman, and Melitz Speciﬁcations
So far we have focused on how to introduce ﬁrm heterogeneity theory into the
standard GTAP model. In order to discuss the additional insight oﬀered by this
framework, we also explore monopolistically competitive GTAP model motivated by
Krugman (1980) and perfectly competitive GTAP model motivated by the standard
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GTAP model with Armington (1969) assumption. A comparison between Armington
(1969), Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003) in CGE models is warranted since the
industry structures they adopt are extremely diﬀerent. In an applied CGE work, it is
important to choose the speciﬁcation which best matches the industry in question.
The research on this front is still active and there is increasing evidence supporting
the relative strengths of each mechanism depending on the industry, initial conditions
and the trade policy being explored. Especially, the ongoing work by Dixon et al.
(2014) highlights the connections between these three structures and allows for nesting
between them. Motivated by this approach, we allow for comparisons across ﬁrm
heterogeneity, monopolistic competition and perfect competition by using closure
swaps. We start with the ﬁrm heterogeneity module of GTAP and impose certain
restrictions to derive the monopolistically competitive module of GTAP. We should
note that, unlike Krugman (1980), we retain the diﬀerence between ﬁxed export costs
and ﬁxed domestic costs in the monopolistic competition structure. Finally, further
restrictions on the model delivers the perfectly competitive module of GTAP.
In order to determine which assumptions need to be imposed on the ﬁrm heterogeneity module to retrieve monopolistic competition or perfect competition, we
ﬁrst need to outline the key diﬀerences across them. The formulation based on the
Krugman (1980) theory assumes the industry to be monopolistically competitive with
ﬁxed setup costs where identical ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated varieties. Krugman
(1980) theory diﬀers from Melitz (2003) on two fronts: (i) there are no ﬁxed costs
associated with exporting, (ii) ﬁrms are identical with respect to their productivity
levels which means that all producing ﬁrms are active in all destination markets.
In contrast, we observe endogenous productivity changes in the ﬁrm heterogeneity
module and the number of ﬁrms in export markets are a subset of the total ﬁrms in
the industry. In order to reduce the ﬁrm heterogeneity module to the monopolistically
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competitive one we need to remove the endogenous productivity changes. This is
achieved by setting the productivity thresholds as well as the aggregate productivity
as exogenous. This also ensures the equality between the number of exporting ﬁrms
and total ﬁrms through equation (2.25).
The slack variables we have in the governing equations in the TABLO code come
in handy at this point. Our ﬁrst objective is to shut down the endogenous productivity
thresholds which are determined in Equations PRODTRESHOLDD and PRODTRESHOLDX.
This is achieved by the swap command as follows:
swap aoxt(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG) = xthreshslack(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG);
swap aodt(MCOMP COMM,REG) = dthreshslack(MCOMP COMM,REG);
swap ao(MCOMP COMM,REG) = prodslack(MCOMP COMM,REG);

This command ensures that the productivity threshold in the domestic market
and export markets, aodt(MCOMP COMM,REG) and aoxt(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG)
are exogenous, while the slack variables in those markets are endogenous,
xthreshslack(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG),

dthreshslack(MCOMP COMM,REG).

With

exogenous productivity thresholds the marginal ﬁrm no longer makes zero proﬁts from
selling in the market. The zero proﬁt condition of the marginal ﬁrm is restored by the
endogenous slack variables which absorb the accumulating proﬁt of the marginal ﬁrm.
In addition, this closure rule has further implications for the number of exporting
ﬁrms. Since there is no change in the productivity threshold of exporting and ﬁrms
are assumed to have identical productivity, the changes in the number of exporting
ﬁrms is equal to the changes in the number of total ﬁrms in the industry governed by
equation (2.25).
As a result of constant productivity thresholds, we do not observe any changes in the
average productivity in the domestic market or in export markets according to equation
(2.12). Needless to say their contribution to changes in aggregate productivity is also
zero based on equation (2.17). Aggregate productivity is automatically exogenous
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since the components that determine it are exogeneous by the closure. Although it
seems redundant to add this as a condition in the closure we retain it in order to allow
for alternative closure possibilities.
We impose further restrictions to the monopolistically competitive module to
obtain the Armington-based perfect competition module. The formulation based on
the Armington assumption entails the standard GTAP model assumptions of perfect
competition, and constant returns to scale, where a representative ﬁrm produces
identical products with identical productivity. Since there is no product diﬀerentiation,
there are no ﬁxed costs associated with production in this framework. Neither the
ﬁrm, nor the industry makes positive proﬁts. The key diﬀerence between the Krugman
and Armington-based trade model is twofold: (i) the products are identical therefore
we do not observe the love-of variety in demand, and (ii) there are no ﬁxed costs
associated with production in the perfectly competitive industry ; therefore, there are
no economies of scale. Hence the two things we need to do in order to reduce the model
to the Armington-based perfect competition module is to shut down the love-of-variety
eﬀect and the scale economies. This is achieved by imposing the following closure rule:
swap
swap
swap
swap

vp(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG) = vpslack(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG);
vg(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG) = vgslack(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG);
vf(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG) = vfslack(MCOMP COMM,REG,REG);
qof(MCOMP COMM,REG) = mkupslack(MCOMP COMM,REG);

The ﬁrst three swap operators remove the impact of changes in the available
varieties in consumer demand by setting the variety indexes as exogenous and the
associated slack variables as endogenous. We should highlight that this does not mean
that there is no change in the number of ﬁrms in the industry. Output variations
in the industry is accommodated by the variation in ﬁrm numbers. However, these
changes no longer create a love-of-variety eﬀect due to the closure rule we imposed.
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The last swap operator addresses the issue of increasing returns to scale by
removing scale economies. In a perfectly competitive market with no ﬁxed costs, there
is no wedge between average total cost and average variable cost which means that
AV C = AT C = P . As a result, the markup equation becomes redundant and the
associated slack variable, mkupslack, is set to be endogenous in the closure. Moreover,
in a competitive market all output expansion occurs by adding more identical ﬁrms at
constant costs. Therefore, output per ﬁrm remains ﬁxed in the closure.

2.6 Policy Application
In this section, we investigate the behavioral characteristics of the ﬁrm heterogeneity
module of GTAP and compare it with that of perfect and monopolistic competition
modules in the context of a tariﬀ removal scenario. The numerical implementation of
these highly theoretical models are carried out by a stylized model which provides a
more transparent interpretation of results.
Our model is calibrated to GTAP data base V8 (Narayanan et al., 2012) for 2007.
We aggregate the data base to 3 regions: USA, Japan and ROW; and 2 commodities: manufacturing and non-manufacturing. The manufacturing sector is treated as
monopolistically competitive with heterogeneous ﬁrms, while the non-manufacturing
sector retains the perfect competitive structure with Armington assumption. The
policy experiment is to eliminate the tariﬀs levied by Japan on the import of US
manufacturing goods, which is a 3.66% decrease in the power of tariﬀs imposed on US
manufactures.
Simulation results for the three models are presented in Table 2.2. In the ﬁrst
three sub-sections, we focus on analyzing the additional insight obtained from the
tariﬀ removal scenario in the ﬁrm heterogeneity module (FH). Then, we move on to
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comparing them to that of monopolistic (MC) and perfect (PC) competition modules.
We conclude the policy analysis by oﬀering a brief discussion of welfare implications.

2.6.1 Impacts on the US
The direct eﬀect of tariﬀ removal is a reduction in the price of US manufactures in
the Japanese market by 3.69% which is accompanied by an increase in sales of US
manufactures in Japan by 67.35%. This signiﬁcant rise in Japanese demand for US
manufactures diverts sales from the home and ROW markets (-0.21% and -2.01%,
respectively). These results constitute a familiar narrative of the immediate eﬀect of
tariﬀ removal in an exporting region.
Additional insights can be gained from examining endogenous ﬁrm entry/exit
and productivity changes. Regarding the former, Table 2.2 shows that the total
number of ﬁrms in the US manufacturing industry declines by 0.26%. This loss of
variety is due to an increase in output per ﬁrm relative to total output. As per ﬁrm
production increases faster than industry output, there is no need for all ﬁrms to
continue producing. Therefore, some ﬁrms exit the market and the total number
of ﬁrms in the US manufactures industry decreases. In order to learn more about
which ﬁrms cease to exist, we need to take a closer look at the marginal ﬁrm and the
productivity changes in the industry.
Figure 2.2A shows the percentage change in productivity thresholds for each US
export destination and percentage change in the number of exporting ﬁrms. We observe
that the productivity threshold to produce in the US manufacturing industry increases
by 0.15%. A higher threshold means that the productivity level of the marginal ﬁrm
that was able to produce for the home market in the pre-tariﬀ cut US economy, is now
too low to make zero proﬁts given the associated variable and ﬁxed costs of production.
In fact, US manufacturing ﬁrms face a more intense foreign competition in the home
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market after the tariﬀ cut in Japan. As factors of production become more expensive
in the US due to higher foreign demand, domestic ﬁrms become less competitive
against cheaper imports coming from Japan and the ROW. As a result, US ﬁrms lose
sales in the home market by 0.21%. This makes production even more costly for the
US ﬁrms since the ﬁxed domestic costs they face are spread over fewer output. In
other words, the sunk entry cost per domestic sale increases by 0.18%. Consequently,
low-productivity ﬁrms incur negative proﬁts and the productivity threshold for the
domestic market increases in the US, forcing them out of the market. Only the ﬁrms
that are more productive than the new threshold level survive and expand their market
share.
This is an example of inter-ﬁrm reallocation of resources within the industry as
more-productive ﬁrms absorb the factors released form the exiting ﬁrms while gaining
a larger share of the home market. Firm exit continues until the zero proﬁt condition
of the industry is satisﬁed again, which happens when the total number of varieties
decline by 0.26%.

Figure 2.2. Productivity Threshold, Firm Entry/Exit and the Decomposition of Industry Productivity in the US.
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Within industry ﬁrm reallocation extends to export markets through the shifts
in bilateral productivity thresholds. In particular, the tariﬀ cut in Japan lowers the
productivity threshold for US manufacturing ﬁrms exporting into the Japanese market
by 3.64% as depicted in Figure 2.2A. Unlike in the home market case, the marginal
ﬁrm on the export threshold beneﬁts from this tariﬀ cut since its productivity level
is now considered low enough to make positive proﬁts by exporting to Japan. Same
applies to the mass of ﬁrms that are below the pre-tariﬀ cut threshold, but above the
post-tariﬀ cut one.
There are two factors at play for US manufacturing ﬁrms exporting into Japan: (i)
competitiveness, and (ii) bigger market access. As mentioned above, US manufacturing
ﬁrms are less competitive in domestic and ROW markets due to higher factor costs. On
the other hand, the tariﬀ cut allows US ﬁrms to be more competitive in the Japanese
market and take advantage of bigger market access. As a result, sales to Japan rise
by 67.35% which lowers ﬁxed export cost per sale by 34.13%. This signiﬁcant drop in
ﬁxed cost per exports raises the potential for positive proﬁts and induces a rise in the
number of US ﬁrms exporting into the Japanese market by 32.92%.
It is appealing to think that higher competitiveness and bigger market access
should beneﬁt all US ﬁrms by creating positive proﬁts. However, in practice, the
impact of the tariﬀ cut on each ﬁrm is diﬀerent depending on the ﬁrm’s pre-existing
cost structure. In the case of low-productivity ﬁrms, the impact of higher competition
on ﬁrm proﬁts dominates since their costs are too high to take advantage of bigger
market size. Facing negative proﬁts in the Japanese market, high-cost ﬁrms do not
export to Japan, but continue to produce for the domestic market. On the other hand,
ﬁrms with productivity levels above the new threshold are competitive enough to
make use of the larger market. Therefore, they start exporting to Japan. Entry into
the Japanese market continues until all potential proﬁts from exporting are exhausted.

45
As a result, even though there are less manufacturing ﬁrms in total, more of them
export to Japan.
Importantly, even though the new exporters have higher productivity levels compared to non-exporters, they are relatively less productive than the existing exporters.
As a result, the lower productivity threshold reduces average productivity in export
markets. In order to determine the average exporter productivity, the productivity
of exporters to the ROW are also taken into account. As depicted in Figure 2.2A,
there is an increase in the productivity threshold for exporting into the ROW market
by 0.20%, which in return generates a drop in the number of exporters by 1.78%.
Compared to the Japanese market, this is a rather low response rate which is less
eﬀective in shaping the average productivity in export markets.
The overall eﬀect on aggregate productivity of the manufacturing industry is
shown in Figure 2.2B where the percentage change in the industry productivity is
decomposed into average productivity in home and export markets depending on
the respective shares of home and export markets in total sales. We observe that
the rise in share-weighted domestic productivity by 0.13% dominates the decrease in
share-weighted export productivity of 0.01%. This is due to the fact that home market
has a much bigger share in sales compared to export markets. Therefore, aggregate
productivity in the US manufacturing industry increases by 0.13%. This is purely a
gain of inter-ﬁrm reallocation within the manufacturing industry.

2.6.2 Impacts on Japan
Impacts of tariﬀ removal on the Japanese economy are presented in Table 2.2 and
Figure 2.3. We observe that increasing competition by US ﬁrms crowds out Japanese
ﬁrms from the market and causes a drop in domestic sales by 0.55%.
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Although some ﬁrms are replaced by US competitors in the home market, surviving
Japanese ﬁrms beneﬁt from the cheap US manufactures. There is, in fact, a large
increase in the demand for intermediate inputs sourced from the US, a 66.62% rise
in the manufacturing industry demand and a 67.94% rise in the non-manufacturing
industry demand for US manufactures. Lower prices for intermediate inputs reduce
the average cost of production in Japan by 0.48%. This is good news for the highproductivity Japanese exporters. In particular, Japanese exports to the US and ROW
markets rise by 2.69% and 1.92%, respectively. As Japanese exporters face larger
markets, their ﬁxed export cost per sale declines. This together with the declining
average variable costs, leads to reductions in productivity threshold of exporting to
US as depicted in Figure 2.3A.

Figure 2.3. Productivity Threshold, Firm Entry/Exit and the Decomposition of Industry Productivity in Japan.

Even though the threshold is now lower, the number of exporters to the US market
drops by 0.44% since there are fewer ﬁrms in the Japanese manufacturing industry.
In fact the total number of manufacturing ﬁrms in Japan decreases by 0.77%. On the
other hand, the productivity threshold of exporting into the ROW market increases
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since prices are too low for exporters to proﬁt from higher sales. The higher threshold
reduces the number of exporters to the ROW market by 0.87%. Note that despite
many Japanese ﬁrms exit the export markets, total sales to the US and ROW actually
increase. This is merely due to the expansion of high-productivity ﬁrms. As less
productive exporters exit, high-productivity ﬁrms expand and export more to the US
and ROW markets.
Similar to the loss of Japanese varieties in export markets, the home market also
suﬀers from the loss of domestic varieties. As is shown in Figure 2.3A, the productivity
threshold of producing in the domestic market increases by 0.44%. This change is
largely caused by rising ﬁxed costs. Even though ﬁrms enjoy lower factor costs, the loss
of sales in the domestic market raises ﬁxed cost per domestic sale leading to a decrease
in their proﬁts in the face of intensiﬁed competition in the home market. In the
meantime, the scale of the ﬁrms increase by 0.82% which makes the low-productivity
ﬁrms redundant in the industry given the small increase in manufacturing production.
As a result, less productive ﬁrms are forced to exit the domestic market, while more
productive ﬁrms survive and expand.
Like in the US, tariﬀ removal reallocates market share by shifting resources
towards more productive ﬁrms improving the aggregate productivity in Japan. This is
highlighted in the decomposition depicted in Figure 2.3B. Average productivity in the
domestic market rises by 0.34% overcompensating for the 0% change in the average
productivity of export markets. Consequently, industry productivity rises by 0.34%.
Overall, tariﬀ liberalization improves the industry eﬃciency not only in the US,
but also in Japan. This is a good example of the importance of within industry
reallocation of ﬁrms in facilitating trade through international supply chains.
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2.6.3 Impacts on the ROW
The impact of this tariﬀ cut on the ROW is less pronounced when compared
to other regions. Figure 2.4A summarizes the percentage change in productivity
thresholds and ﬁrm entry/exit in ROW.

Figure 2.4. Productivity Threshold, Firm Entry/Exit and the Decomposition of Industry Productivity in the ROW.

The most striking change is observed in the trade between ROW and Japan. The
productivity threshold for exporting into Japan increases by 0.41% which is largely a
result of the US competition. Demand for ROW manufactures in the Japanese market
is displaced by US varieties leading to a drop in the number of ROW exporters by
3.09%. While there is some trade diversion in the Japanese market, exports into the
US market rises by 0.95%. There is a slight decrease in the productivity threshold by
0.08% which raises the number of ROW exporters into US by 0.71%. Finally, contrary
to US and Japan, the ROW market experiences a decline in the domestic productivity
threshold by 0.03%. Lower productivity threshold together with declining scale of
ﬁrms attract less productive ﬁrms into the manufacturing industry. The total number
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of ﬁrms increase by 0.07% until all the potential proﬁt is eliminated in the market
restoring the zero proﬁt condition.
Figure 2.4B shows the decomposition of aggregate productivity into average
productivity in domestic and export markets. Contrary to the previous cases, the
decomposition shows that average productivity in the domestic market has a negative
contribution to aggregate productivity while that of the export markets has a positive
contribution. Since the domestic market has a larger share in overall demand, the
contribution of domestic average dominates. Consequently, aggregate productivity
in the ROW manufactures sector declines by 0.03%. In practical terms, this is a
negligible change and likely indistinguishable from zero. However, its negative sign
shows that ﬁrm reallocation in the ROW is opposite of the experiences in Japan and
US. In particular, the tariﬀ cut leads to a loss of eﬃciency in the industry where low
productivity ﬁrms expand their share in the domestic market.

2.6.4 Comparison across diﬀerent Model Speciﬁcations
We start with ﬁrm heterogeneity and successively restrict the model to yield simpler
forms, such as monopolistic and perfect competition. Then, we explore the same tariﬀ
removal scenario between the US and Japan in the context of each model. Table 2.2
reports the ﬁndings. A quick look at the results from each model illustrates that
the ﬁrm heterogeneity model captures the changes that occur in a conventional CGE
model with the Armington assumption. Moreover, it includes the eﬀect of changes in
varieties as well as economies of scale delivered by the monopolistically competitive
structure and still incorporates a unique productivity channel that is linked with factor
reallocation across ﬁrms within the same industry.
The implications on production, prices, costs and sales are mostly similar across
these models. In monopolistic and perfect competition, bilateral trade between US and
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Japan rises; the manufacturing sector expands in the US, while it contracts in Japan;
the cost of production increases in the US, while it decreases in Japan. Contrary
to US and Japan, changes in the ROW are negligible in each model. A striking
diﬀerence in the ﬁrm heterogeneity model is the declining cost of production in the
US. This is mainly due to the increase in aggregate industry productivity. As the
share of high-productivity ﬁrms in the industry increases with the tariﬀ-cut, industry
productivity rises which reduces the average variable cost as well as the supply price
in the US.
Even though the direction of change in most of the variables is similar across
models, the amount of change is magniﬁed in the ﬁrm heterogeneity module given
the substitution parameter3 . This is especially true for trade between US and Japan.
While US exports to Japan rises by 26.90% in the monopolistically competitive model,
it rises by 67.35% in the ﬁrm heterogeneity model. This is almost a threefold increase
in the trade response. In contrast, when we compare the export changes in the
monopolistically competitive model to the perfectly competitive one, we see that they
are quite similar in magnitude. This suggests that the contribution of expanding
varieties in ﬁrm heterogeneity is bigger than that of the monopolistically competitive
model. In fact, we observe that while the number of US ﬁrms exporting into Japan
increases by 0.001% in monopolistic competition, it increases by 32.92% in ﬁrm
heterogeneity. This striking diﬀerence is a consequence of the self-selection of ﬁrms
into export markets.
The monopolistic competition model dictates that if a ﬁrm produces, it also exports
into all destination markets. This is reﬂected in the results reported in Table 2.2. The
3

We should note that Melitz (2003) tends to magnify the eﬀects of Armington (1969) for a given
value of the trade substitution parameter. This result should not be generalized to the case where
the substitution parameters in Armington (1969) and Melitz (2003) are chosen to be diﬀerent. For
example, Dixon et al. (2014) argue that welfare implications are close if the Armington (1969) and
Melitz (2003) elasticities are chosen so that the models give the same trade responses.
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percentage change in the number of exporters in each market, nx(j,r,s), equals to
the percentage change in the number of total varieties n(j,r). However, it does not
take the speciﬁc circumstances of each ﬁrm and each destination into account. Once
we factor in the heterogeneity of productivity across ﬁrms, we observe that not all
ﬁrms are able to export into all destinations. In fact, the number of US exporters
increase in Japan, while it declines in the ROW in contrast to the monopolistically
competitive model which predicts an equal increase in exporters to all destinations.
Another diﬀerent result in ﬁrm heterogeneity is the eﬀect of tariﬀ cut on the number
of total varieties in the US. Even though total number of ﬁrms in the US increases
by 0.001% in monopolistic competition, it decreases by 0.26% in ﬁrm heterogeneity.
This is due to the relative changes in ﬁrm scale compared to industry output. In ﬁrm
heterogeneity, per ﬁrm output increases by 0.36% which exceeds the increase in total
industry output and leads to the exit of low-productivity ﬁrms. On the other hand, in
monopolistic competition, the relative increase of ﬁrm scale, 0.034%, is lower than
total industry output, 0.035%, which means that new US ﬁrms enter the domestic
market.

2.6.5 Welfare Eﬀects
There is, currently, no consensus in the literature on the welfare implications of
the Melitz model compared to those from traditional models with the Armington
assumption. In order to do accurate policy analysis in a CGE setting, we need to
understand how these models diﬀer. Are there additional gains from trade that we
are not accounting for when we choose one model over the other? If there are, do
they matter in the overall welfare response? Do they contribute to aggregate welfare?
These questions are getting more attention in the CGE world as traditional models
do not provide satisfying explanations for the changes in welfare in the face of trade
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policies. There is a growing literature that explores these questions in the context of
CGE models.
In related work, welfare changes in the Melitz (2003) model are found to be larger
than the Armington (1969) benchmark (Balistreri et al., 2011; Kancs, 2010; Zhai,
2008). In fact, incorporating ﬁrm heterogeneity into standard CGE models raises the
gains from trade liberalization by a multiple of two in Zhai (2008) and by a multiple
of four in Balistreri et al. (2011). However, Arkolakis et al. (2008) argue that the
impact of trade cost reductions is similar across models once their trade responses
are equalized via the calibration of parameters. This argument suggests that the
Melitz (2003) model does not oﬀer additional gains from trade conditional on equal
trade patterns. A similar ﬁnding is discussed by Dixon et al. (2014). Having started
from an undistorted initial equilibrium, they observe that gains from productivity
and preferences in ﬁrm heterogeneity oﬀset each other which results in equal welfare
change once the observed trade pattern is ﬁtted with higher substitution elasticities
in the Armington formulation.
In this paper, we explore three additional channels through which trade liberalization induces welfare changes in the ﬁrm heterogeneity module of GTAP. They can
be summarized as: (i) productivity eﬀect, (ii) love-of-variety eﬀect, and (iii) scale
eﬀect. The productivity eﬀect is described by Melitz and Treﬂer (2012) as a new
source of gains from trade created by the reallocation of factors of production from less
productive ﬁrms into more productive ones, thereby generating an improvement in the
overall eﬃciency of the industry. The love-of-variety eﬀect is the ability of the model
to capture the trade growth due to expanding varieties and to link it with consumer
utility. As new ﬁrms enter the market, more varieties are available to consumers
contributing to the overall welfare. Kancs (2010) states that even though there are
lost domestic varieties, the empirical ﬁndings in the literature show that consumers
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usually beneﬁt from the trade policy. However, if we account for the preference bias,
we see that the loss of domestic varieties are more highly valued since consumers like
domestic varieties more than imported varieties. The scale eﬀect is associated with
increasing returns to scale technology. As the gap between average total costs and
average variable costs widens, the scale of the ﬁrm expands generating additional
gains from trade.
Table 2.3 provides a summary of regional welfare changes and decomposition in
each model. From a quick look at the results, we observe that the tariﬀ removal in
Japan improves the welfare in the US, while it causes a welfare loss in Japan and the
ROW in the monopolistic and perfect competition models. On the other hand, ﬁrm
heterogeneity results show that not only the US, but also Japan gains from trade.
Moreover, the welfare gain in US is much higher in ﬁrm heterogeneity. Digging deeper
into the decomposition, we observe a quite diﬀerent picture across model structures.
While the perfectly competitive GTAP model only provides information about the
classical terms of trade4 and allocative eﬃciency eﬀects, the ﬁrm heterogeneity model
captures the additional information on variety, scale and productivity which have
signiﬁcant eﬀects on the magnitude of the welfare change.
Exploring the welfare implications in the US, we observe that improvements in the
eﬃciency of the manufacturing industry contributes positively to the welfare in US,
$6172 million. This is accompanied by the positive scale eﬀect of $2345 million. Scale
eﬀect in the ﬁrm heterogeneity model is determined by a combined eﬀect of output
per ﬁrm and output per exporting ﬁrm. We observe that lower export thresholds
in the US leads to an increased number of exporters. However, they operate on a
smaller scale which is welfare reducing. On the other hand, the domestic market is
supplied by fewer US ﬁrms which operate on a larger scale increasing welfare. Since
4

The contribution of terms of trade is the combined eﬀect of changes related to the terms of trade
and the investment-saving balance.
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the drop in export scale is far below the rise in domestic scale. the overall impact is
a welfare enhancing scale eﬀect in the US. In contrast, the variety eﬀect is negative,
$742 million, as consumers suﬀer from a loss in domestic varieties. Even though US
enjoys a wider selection of ROW varieties, the decreasing number of US varieties more
than oﬀsets this positive contribution. This conﬁrms the home bias as loss in domestic
varieties is more dominant in the ﬁnal variety eﬀect.
Contrary to monopolistic and perfect competition, Japan gains from this tariﬀ
removal scenario in the ﬁrm heterogeneity model. Similar to the US results, we see
that the productivity eﬀect derives the welfare change. Despite the negative terms of
trade (-$2636 million) and variety eﬀects (-$1396 million), the positive productivity
($8202 million) and scale eﬀects ($3339 million) increase the welfare in Japan. Even
though Japan beneﬁts from expanding US varieties, the loss of domestic varieties as
well as the ROW varieties dominate the variety eﬀect.
The welfare loss in the ROW is much bigger compared to the Krugman and
Armington cases. This is mostly due to the bigger negative impact of productivity.
There is a small decline in the aggregate productivity of the manufacturing industry
in the ROW which reduces the overall welfare ($6837 million). Contrary to the US
and Japan, the scale eﬀect is negative in the ROW ($2714 million) due to the smaller
scale of ﬁrms in the domestic market as opposed to the bigger scale of exporters. The
variety eﬀect in the ROW is also negative ($804 million). It is largely driven by the
declining varieties sourced from the US. Even though the number of domestic varieties
increases, the drop in US varieties accompanied by the loss in Japanese varieties
dominates the variety eﬀect. This is mostly dictated by the loss of intermediate inputs
used by ROW ﬁrms. Even though 95% of the intermediate input demand of ROW
ﬁrms is met by domestic suppliers, the increase in the number of domestic varieties is
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no match for the decline in US and Japanese varieties supplied to the ROW. Hence
the negative variety eﬀect.

2.7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we discuss how to implement monopolistic competition with ﬁrm
heterogeneity into the GTAP model. Diﬀerent from the standard GTAP model
with Armington speciﬁcation, the ﬁrm heterogeneity module includes the eﬀect of
new varieties in markets (extensive margin), the eﬀect of scale economies, and the
eﬀect of endogenous productivity. We build on Zhai (2008) for ﬁrm heterogeneity;
however, compared to his approach we incorporate endogenous ﬁrm entry/exit, and
we distinguish between sunk-entry costs, and ﬁxed export costs.
The model is calibrated to GTAP data base V8 (Narayanan et al., 2012). There are
three pieces of information not contained in the GTAP data base V8 (Narayanan et al.,
2012) that are needed in ﬁrm heterogeneity approach: (i) the elasticity of substitution
between varieties, (ii) the shape parameter of the Pareto productivity distributions,
and (iii) the magnitude of ﬁxed costs. We use the Armington elasticity values in the
GTAP data base for the elasticity of substitution across varieties, while we use the
values provided in Zhai (2008) for the shape parameter. In order to calibrate ﬁxed
export costs, we adopt Zhai’s (2008) approach of using a gravity model of trade based
on bilateral trade ﬂows. In order to calibrate total ﬁxed costs we use the markup
equation following Swaminathan and Hertel (1996). Model results in ﬁrm heterogeneity
module depends on the choice of substitution elasticity and shape parameter. For
future work, we aim to combine econometric work on model parameters with policy
analysis to obtain more robust results.
To illustrate the behavioral characteristics of the model, we analyze the eﬀects of
eliminating Japanese tariﬀs on the import of US manufacturing goods under a three

57
region - two sector aggregation. This is a highly stylized FTA scenario in TPP with
the aim of laying out the mechanics of this Melitz-type GTAP model. We observe
that productivity threshold for the US-Japan export market reduces mostly due to
the reduction in ﬁxed export costs per sale. This scale eﬀect is the dominant factor in
threshold reduction and a subsequent increase in the number of US manufacturing
ﬁrms exporting in Japanese markets. This ﬁrm reallocation in US-Japan link is in
favor of lower-productivity ﬁrms. On the other hand, the within ﬁrm reallocation
in the domestic market is such that low-productivity ﬁrms are forced to exit due to
higher average variable costs. As a result of exit of ﬁrms in the domestic market, the
productivity of US manufacturing sector rises.
By incorporating monopolistic competition and ﬁrm heterogeneity, we are able
to capture and analyze the previously unobserved eﬀects of trade agreements. The
question to ask at this point is whether these eﬀects matter for trade policy implications.
An initial comparison of model responses to tariﬀ elimination across GTAP models
with Armington, Krugman, and Melitz speciﬁcations show that the ﬁrm heterogeneity
module capture additional gains from trade that result in more pronounced welfare
responses.
The main premise of new trade negotiations, such as the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership
Agreement (TPP), is to develop comprehensive, high-quality rules in trade that
harmonize standards and thereby reduce barriers to trade. The variation in trade
standards across regions force ﬁrms to incur signiﬁcant ﬁxed export costs. Reduction
in these costs are expected to generate huge gains for the member countries. As a
future work we aim to analyze a more comprehensive trade liberalization scenario with
ﬁxed export costs as the policy instrument. The GTAP model with ﬁrm heterogeneity
responds to ﬁxed export cost reductions by changing industry productivity as a result
of shifts in productivity thresholds.
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICALLY-CONSISTENT PARAMETERIZATION OF A
MULTI-SECTOR GLOBAL MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS

3.1 Introduction
Theoretical and empirical developments in the trade literature show that accounting for ﬁrm heterogeneity within an industry improves our understanding of how
trade barriers aﬀect trade ﬂows and economic welfare by providing a new margin
of adjustment through self-selection of ﬁrms into and out of markets. Due to this
added explanatory power, ﬁrm heterogeneity theory has begun to be incorporated into
computable general equilibrium models (CGE) (Akgul et al., 2014; Balistreri et al.,
2011; Balistreri and Rutherford, 2012; Dixon et al., 2015; Zhai, 2008).
In Chapter 2 we laid out the ﬁrm heterogeneity theory and implemented it into the
GTAP model with the objective of making this theory accessible for practical policy
analysis. However, the remaining obstacle to achieving this goal is the lack of an
appropriate set of estimates for the key parameters of the model at the disaggregated
industry level. Particularly, the information that is key to the ﬁrm heterogeneity model
such as the shape of the productivity distribution, which determines productivity
heterogeneity across ﬁrms, and the degree of markups, which is a function of the
elasticity of substitution across varieties, are not available in the GTAP data base.
What is available instead are Armington elasticities which may not be appropriate in a
ﬁrm heterogeneity setting as the estimates incorporate both the demand-side and the
supply-side heterogeneity. Due to this lack of information, we search for parameters
which are consistent with the ﬁrm heterogeneity model and which we can put into
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use for practical policy analysis within this framework. Therefore, our objective in
this paper is to discuss the challenges in the parameterization of a multi-region global
CGE model with heterogeneous ﬁrms with an empirical illustration.
Parameterization of a ﬁrm heterogeneity model is a complicated problem which
has been addressed in numerous studies. However, it has not yet been satisfactorily
solved in the literature because of the diﬃculty in identiﬁcation of the key parameters
of the model. The main issue with estimating the key parameters of ﬁrm heterogeneity
is that there is not enough information in country-level data to disentangle parameters.
For example, as trade costs are not observed in the data it is not possible to separate
distance elasticities from substitution elasticities because small trade ﬂows can be the
result of either large trade barriers and small elasticities or small trade barriers and
large elasticities (Simonovska and Waugh, 2014). Therefore, we need reliable measures
of trade barriers independent of trade ﬂows to disentangle parameters. Eaton and
Kortum (2002) and Simonovska and Waugh (2014) among many others address this
issue by using price gaps in product-level data and estimate productivity parameters.
Even with ﬁrm-level data, identiﬁcation is not a straightforward task. For example,
Arkolakis et al. (2013) uses ﬁrm-level data and tariﬀ variation across locations of
ﬁrms to estimate the parameters of the ﬁrm heterogeneity model. However, they, too,
rely on existing information to separate parameter values. In particular, they use
markup ratios provided in previous studies (Martins et al., 1996; Domowitz et al.,
1988) to obtain elasticities. Since there is not suﬃcient information in ﬁrm-level data
to separate parameters one needs to run additional regressions Crozet and Koenig
(2010). Due to these challenges parameterization of ﬁrm heterogeneity models has
remained to be an outstanding issue.
Chaney (2008) extends the seminal work of Melitz (2003) and demonstrates that
in models with heterogeneous ﬁrms changes in trade barriers aﬀect both the volume of
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sales by existing exporters (i.e., the intensive margin of trade) as well as the number
of ﬁrms in the export market (i.e., the extensive margin of trade) due to productivity
diﬀerences across ﬁrms. An important ﬁnding in the literature is that the extensive
margin is quantitatively very important in governing growth in international trade
ﬂows (Hummels and Klenow, 2005; Yi, 2003). As a result, estimates of the elasticity of
substitution by models that ignore changes in the extensive margin are biased (Chaney,
2008; Helpman et al., 2008). This ﬁnding contrasts with the traditional Armington
(1969) view of the world, whereby changes in trade barriers only aﬀect the intensive
margin of trade, which is governed by the elasticity of substitution across varieties, σ
(Hillberry and Hummels, 2013). However, in ﬁrm heterogeneity models there is an
additional parameter of interest, namely the shape parameter of Pareto distribution,
γ. The shape parameter is an inverse measure of heterogeneity in productivity across
ﬁrms within an industry and it governs the supply-side eﬀects of trade policies. In
fact, the distribution of ﬁrm productivity signiﬁcantly aﬀects aggregate trade response
to reduced trade costs as demonstrated in Chaney (2008), Bernard et al. (2003) and
di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013). Therefore, to work with a ﬁrm heterogeneity
model, we need to have estimates of the shape parameter as well as the elasticity of
substitution amongst varieties.
Empirical studies of international trade ﬂows rely on gravity equations in order to
estimate the structural parameters of trade models. Gravity models relate the volume
of bilateral trade to distance and other determinants of trade. In a gravity model, the
marginal eﬀect of distance on trade volumes is given by −δ (σ − 1), where δ is the
distance elasticity of trade. Identiﬁcation of −δ (σ − 1) requires knowledge on either
δ or σ. However, bringing in an additional parameter to reﬂect ﬁrm heterogeneity, i.e.
γ, introduces further complexities in identifying the elasticity of substitution. Crozet
and Koenig (2010) show that, in the ﬁrm-heterogeneity setting of Chaney (2008), the
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marginal eﬀect of distance on the probability of a bilateral trade ﬂow taking place is
given by −δγ. Therefore, there are three parameters to estimate, i.e. δ, σ and γ,
which implies that an exogenous source of information is needed to identify all of
them.
di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) and Eaton et al. (2011) circumvent this diﬃculty
by imposing the prior values of σ on the model in order to calibrate the values of
γ. This method has two drawbacks: (i) Often, estimates for σ are obtained from
Armington-type models which are fundamentally inconsistent with ﬁrm heterogeneity
theory. (ii) The resulting values for γ typically are not sector and region-speciﬁc
and therefore do not capture the signiﬁcant variation of heterogeneity along these
dimensions. For example, the shape parameter estimates in Spearot (2015) show that
electrical machinery is a more heterogeneous industry where productivity diﬀerences
across ﬁrms is more pronounced, while petroleum reﬁning is a much more homogeneous
industry. Moreover, according to his estimates, even though electrical machinery is
heterogeneous in the US, it is much more homogeneous in Chile. Not accounting for
these drawbacks is likely to lead to biased estimates of parameters in the calibrated
model.
A theory-consistent approach to estimating the shape parameter is oﬀered by
Crozet and Koenig (2010) and Spearot (2015). Both studies present estimates of
γ at the product level in a ﬁrm heterogeneity model. The model in Crozet and
Koenig (2010) is based on Chaney (2008), while the model in Spearot (2015) is based
on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Even though Spearot (2015) provides values for
γ by industry and by region, he does not estimate elasticities that are consistent
with γ. Only Crozet and Koenig (2010) have a rich enough dataset to identify both
parameters. Interestingly, their estimates of the elasticity of substitution are lower
when compared to the traditional Armington elasticity estimates in the GTAP model
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(Hertel et al., 2003). Unfortunately, their estimates are of limited use for a global
general equilibrium model because they are based only on French ﬁrms and cover a
limited number of industries. Against this backdrop, our objective in this paper is
to solve for a set of elasticities of substitution that are theoretically consistent with
trade models considering ﬁrm heterogeneity.
To accomplish this, we extend the seminal work of Melitz (2003) to a multi-sector,
multi-country model and build on Chaney (2008) to distinguish the intensive and
extensive margins of trade. For our gravity estimations, we use bilateral trade data
at the country level from GTAP Version 8.1 (Narayanan et al., 2012) which covers
the years 1995-2009. This makes sense, since our ultimate goal is to incorporate these
parameters in a model based on the GTAP data set. In addition, we use the GeoDist
and Gravity databases of CEPII (Mayer and Zignago, 2011) which include bilateral
data on several relevant variables such as distance, language, colonial link among
others determinant of bilateral trade. The resulting dataset covers 113 countries
over 1995-2006. This makes sense, since our ultimate goal is to incorporate these
parameters in a model based on the GTAP data set. In this paper, we focus on
the motor vehicles and parts industry (MVH) of GTAP which, according to Spearot
(2015)s parameters, has one of the highest productivity dispersions across ﬁrms among
manufacturing industries. Future research will extend this work to all of the GTAP
sectors and regions.
Our estimation strategy merges the approach adopted by Helpman et al. (2008) with
the extensive margin speciﬁcation used in Crozet and Koenig (2010). We distinguish
between the intensive and extensive margins of trade which results in two estimating
equations. The ﬁrst equation estimates the probability of a bilateral trade taking
place, while the second equation estimates the value of bilateral trade conditional
on the choice to export. We refer to the ﬁrst equation as the export participation
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equation and refer to the second equation as the gravity equation1 . Following Crozet
and Koenig (2010) in both equations we focus on the coeﬃcient of distance. In the
export participation equation the distance coeﬃcient is a combination of the distance
and substitution elasticities. On the other hand, in the gravity equation, the distance
coeﬃcient is a combination of the shape parameter and substitution elasticity. This
gives us two equations in three unknowns, whereupon we use the shape parameter
estimates provided in Spearot (2015) to solve for the theoretically consistent estimates
of substitution elasticities.
Our estimation results show that the elasticity estimate consistent with ﬁrm
heterogeneity for the motor vehicles and parts industry is considerably lower than
the GTAP Armington elasticity (Hertel et al., 2003). This implies that elasticities
estimated in that traditional way were in fact picking up additional eﬀects accruing from
the supply-side heterogeneity in this framework. In summary, Armington elasticities
are high when employed in the context of a ﬁrm heterogeneity model because they
confound demand-side eﬀects with the supply-side eﬀects. This ﬁnding underlines
the argument in Dixon et al. (2015) about the observational equivalence between
Armington and Melitz models. In particular, they argue that welfare implications
of trade policies are similar in magnitude between these models if the Armington
and Melitz elasticities are chosen such that trade responses are equal across model
speciﬁcations. In such a scenario, Armington-based elasticities are higher than Melitz
elasticities. This implies that using Armington elasticities in a ﬁrm heterogeneity
model might lead to overestimated trade volumes and welfare eﬀects.
1

In principle, both equations are gravity equations. However, we adopt this convention to distinguish
the new margin of adjustment due to ﬁrm entry/exit from the traditional gravity equation that
determines trade ﬂows.
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3.2 Background on Structural Parameters of the Firm Heterogeneity Model
Although Melitz (2003) does not impose any restrictions on productivity, the
common approach in the ﬁrm heterogeneity literature is to assume that ﬁrms draw
their productivity levels from a Pareto distribution. There are two main reasons
for choosing the Pareto distribution. First, the Pareto distribution is analytically
tractable. As Chaney (2008) argues, an important property of Pareto distribution is
its stability to truncation from below. As a result of this property, exporters, which
are more productive and therefore at the upper tail of the distribution, are also Pareto
distributed. Moreover, the same shape parameter that governs the distribution of
domestic ﬁrms also governs that of exporters2 .
The second reason for favoring the Pareto distribution over alternatives is empirical.
The Pareto distribution is a power law and provides a good ﬁt for the observed size
distribution of ﬁrms3 . Empirical support for this distribution is found for US ﬁrms
(Axtell, 2001) and French ﬁrms (Eaton et al., 2011) among many others4 . The Pareto
assumption for ﬁrm sales is equivalent to assume that ﬁrm productivity is Pareto,
though with a diﬀerent shape parameter. Furthermore, the Pareto distribution predicts
a linear relationship between the log of rank and the log of ﬁrm size (Crozet and
Koenig, 2010). An ever-expanding body of empirical studies uses this property to
consistently estimate shape parameters based on ﬁrm sales data. In particular, they
2

There are new empirical ﬁndings that might challenge this proposition. di Giovanni et al. (2011)
argue that the shape parameter of ﬁrm size distribution is systematically diﬀerent between exporters
and non-exporters. Firm size distribution of exporters is more fat-tailed and has a lower shape
parameter than non-exporters because they are more productive. This in turn implies that the Pareto
shape parameter of productivity distribution is diﬀerent between exporters and non-exporters given
a constant elasticity of substitution for ﬁrm varieties.
3
In developed countries, Pareto seems to provide a better ﬁt for the distribution of manufacturing
ﬁrms that are medium-sized (Axtell, 2001; Crozet and Koenig, 2010). Moreover, there is a minimum
size threshold for power laws to provide a good ﬁt for the data (Axtell, 2001; Luttmer, 2007).
As a result, di Giovanni et al. (2011) argue that the size distribution of small ﬁrms may not be
well-described by a power law.
4
Size distribution of ﬁrms also follows a power law in the case of Japan (Fujiwara, 2004; Okuyama
et al., 1999). See Gabaix (2008) for a full survey on power laws.

65
estimate the Power Law exponent of ﬁrm sales given by γ/(σ − 1) to pin down γ and
σ. However, since this expression is a combination of γ and σ, it is not possible to
separately identify the structural parameters in these studies.
A key restriction on these parameter values in this context is the condition γ > σ−1.
This is described in Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008) as the condition that ensures
the ﬁrm size distribution has a ﬁnite mean. This is equivalent to saying
γ
>1
σ−1
. Therefore, the relative values of γ and σ become critical for quantitative outcomes
such as export sales. The value of the shape parameter determines price diﬀerences
across ﬁrms in the industry. A small shape parameter implies a large dispersion
of productivity among ﬁrms with low-productivity ﬁrms capturing a small share of
the market. In this case new entrants charge higher prices compared to the existing
exporters. On the other hand, in an industry with a large shape parameter, there is a
big mass of low-productivity ﬁrms that represent a larger share of industry output. In
this case, prices charged by new entrants are similar to the existing exporters. This
supply-side heterogeneity is translated into export sales based on the demand-side
heterogeneity.
A small elasticity of substitution means that consumers are willing to pay a
premium for diﬀerentiated varieties which makes low productivity less of a disadvantage.
Therefore, new entrants can capture a larger share of the market. However, a large
elasticity of substitution increases the competition in the market and makes low
productivity a bigger disadvantage. As a result, marginal ﬁrms capture a small share
in the market. This discussion suggests that export sales by new entrants are largest
when there is supply-side homogeneity (high γ) and demand-side heterogeneity (low
σ) (Hillberry and Hummels, 2013).
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An opposite case is where

γ
σ−1

= 1 which is known as the Zipfs Law. This yields

a fat-tailed distribution of ﬁrm size where the infra-marginal ﬁrms in the industry
are large and have a disproportionate share of overall sales compared to the small
marginal ﬁrms. In that case, the welfare impact of trade is driven by infra-marginal
ﬁrms rather than the marginal ones. Therefore, the contribution of the extensive
margin to trade is found to be negligible (di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2013)5 . An
implication of this ﬁnding is that quantitative results of trade cost reductions on trade
ﬂows and welfare are very sensitive to the ﬁrm size distribution and, by extension,
very sensitive to the structural parameters of ﬁrm heterogeneity. This raises the stakes
when it comes to obtaining reliable estimates of the Pareto parameters.
Even though there is a growing body of empirical work aimed at estimating
structural parameters, there is still substantial uncertainty about the appropriate
parameter values to use in the ﬁrm heterogeneity model. This is particularly true
because of the challenges associated with the identiﬁcation of two parameters using
only one estimating equation, as mentioned above. A brief overview of parameter
values used in the ﬁrm heterogeneity literature is provided in Table 3.26 . There are
three key points that we can draw from this table.

5

This can be linked back to the discussion in Dixon et al. (2015) about the oﬀsetting eﬀects of
extensive margin and productivity on welfare in a tariﬀ increase scenario.
6
This table is by no means a full review of the literature. The aim of this table is to present only
a sample of the most relevant work to explore the mainstream approach in obtaining parameter
estimates and to compare the values of key parameters used in these studies.

Manufacturing

-

French ﬁrm-level
data for 113
importers (1986)

Fench ﬁrm-level data
(2006)

Cross-section data of
50 largest economies
US

Eaton et al. (2011)

di Giovanni et al.
(2011)

di Giovanni and
Levchenko (2013)
Melitz and Redding
(2013)
39 sectors

Pareto
Pareto

Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008)

Pareto

Pareto

Pareto

Pareto

Pareto

Pareto

Pareto

Frchet

Frchet

Zipf

Dist.

Melitz (2003)

Melitz (2003) Eaton
et al. (2011)

Melitz (2003)

Melitz (2003)

Melitz (2003)

Chaney (2008)

Melitz (2003)

-

Eaton and Kortum
(2002)

Ricardian model

-

Model

-

[0.362 - 1.011]
(exporters) [0.470
-1.663]
(non-exporters) 1.06
(domestic sales)
1.06 (di Giovanni
et al. (2011))
1.42 (empirical
evidence)

2.46 (estimated)

-

-

-

-

-

-

1.06 (estimated)

Power Law
Exponent,
γ/(σ − 1)

[1.76-6.29]
(estimated)

4.25 (implied)

5.3 (implied)

-

4.87 (implied)

-

6 (Anderson and van
Wincoop (2004)
4 (Bernard et al.
(2003))

-

6.0
4.3, 5.0, 6.0
(calibrated)
[1.15-6.01]
(estimated) mean:
2.25
3.8 Bernard et al.
(2003)
2.98 (method in
Bernard et al.
(2003))

5.3 (calibrated)

3.79 (calibrated)

-

Substitution
elasticity, σ

5.17 , 6.20, 7.75
(calibrated)
[1.65-7.31]
(estimated) mean:
3.09
3.924, 4.582, 5.171
(estimated)

3.6 (calibrated)

8.28 , 12.86 (based
on prices) 3.6 (based
on wages)

Shape parameter,
γ

Notes: This table is ordered based on each paper’s publish date. Empirical methods followed in these studies include: Axtell (2001) uses a Power Law speciﬁcation for ﬁrm sizes to estimate
the Power Law exponent; Eaton and Kortum (2002) uses the Method of Moments Estimator to estimate the shape parameter of Fréchet distribution based on trade and prices as well as based
on trade and wages; Bernard et al. (2003) calculates the parameter values by matching the productivity and size advantage of exporters in the simulated data with that of the empirical data;
Arkolakis et al. (2008) uses the Feenstra (1994) Ratio to adjust the standard import price index for changing varieties and calibrates the shape parameter; in Zhai (2008) the shape parameter
is calibrated to proﬁt ratio in total markup, while the elasticity is calibrated to the markup ratio; Crozet and Koenig (2010) use a structural estimation method to estimate both parameters;
Balistreri et al. (2011) uses a structural estimation method where they ﬁt trade ﬂows subject to equilibrium conditions in the model; Eaton et al. (2011) uses a Simulated Method of Moments
estimator to estimate the Power Law exponent; di Giovanni et al. (2011) estimate the Power Law exponent by using log rank-log size regression; di Giovanni and Levchenko (2013) use the Power
Law exponent in di Giovanni et al. (2011) with the elasticity in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) to infer the shape parameter; Melitz and Redding (2013) calibrate the shape parameter to
match the Power Law exponent for ﬁrm revenue; Spearot (2015) estimates a structural trade growth equation using Maximum Likelihood to ﬁnd the shape parameter.

Cross-section

7 aggregate sectors

Cross-section (2001)

Balistreri et al.
(2011)

Spearot (2015)

34 manufacturing
sectors

Crozet and Koenig
(2010)

25 tradeable sectors

11 aggregate sectors

Cross-section data

-

Manufacturing

Manufacturing

-

Sectors

France, panel data at
the ﬁrm-level
(1986-1992)

US ﬁrm-level data
(1997)
Cross-section data of
19 OECD Countries
(1990)
US plant-level data
(1992) for 47
importers
Costa Rican imports
from 111 exporters
(1986-1992)

Country (Period)

Zhai (2008)

Arkolakis et al.
(2008)

Bernard et al.
(2003), BEJK

Eaton and Kortum
(2002)

Axtell (2001)

Author (Year)

Table 3.1. Overview of Structural Parameter Values in the Firm Heterogeneity Literature.
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First, empirical studies conﬁrm that the value of the Power Law exponent of
ﬁrm size distribution is around 1 (Axtell, 2001; di Giovanni et al., 2011) and it
is used in various studies to infer shape parameter values by relying on external
sources for elasticities (di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2013; Melitz and Redding, 2013).
Second, the shape parameter values that are calibrated using the Power Law exponent
(di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2013; Eaton et al., 2011; Melitz and Redding, 2013) or by
other methods (Arkolakis et al., 2008; Zhai, 2008) are higher compared to the directly
estimated values (Crozet and Koenig, 2010; Spearot, 2015). Using calibrated values of
shape parameters would attribute lower productivity dispersion to the industry, while
there could, in fact, be much higher productivity heterogeneity across ﬁrms. Therefore,
we prefer to use the information contained in the shape parameter estimates instead
of those from the calibration exercises.
Third, aggregation has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on parameter values. Estimates based
on higher levels of aggregation are found to be higher than the ones based on lower
levels of aggregation. This is because when we work with aggregated products, we
fail to capture the variation across sectors and we settle on one parameter value to
describe the entire industry. For example, in the two cases where the parameter
values are estimated at a disaggregate level, for more than 30 sectors, the shape
parameter estimates are found to show substantial variation in the range of 1.65-7.31
in Crozet and Koenig (2010) and 1.76-6.29 in Spearot (2015). On the other hand,
estimates/calibrations that are at an aggregate industry level provide few values that
are in the range of 3-7, on average (Arkolakis et al., 2008; Balistreri et al., 2011; Bernard
et al., 2003; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Eaton et al., 2011; Zhai, 2008). Similarly, the
diﬀerence in aggregation is important for the elasticity values, as well. Elasticity
estimates in Crozet and Koenig (2010) are in the range of 1.15-6.01, reﬂecting a wide
range of demand-side heterogeneity compared to the more aggregated studies. In
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order to account for the variation across sectors, we prefer to work at a disaggregated
level of the manufacturing industry, focusing initially on the motor vehicles and parts.
Aggregation is extremely important in analyzing the extensive and intensive margin
eﬀects of trade ﬂows, as well. Hillberry and Hummels (2013) argue that the extensive
margin plays a larger role when one works with aggregated product lines. On the
other hand, the impact of the intensive margin is more pronounced when we work
with disaggregated product lines. Making this distinction is paramount in interpreting
the results of any policy experiment.

3.3 Theoretical Model
We present a model of international trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms building on the
theoretical model in Helpman et al. (2008) and Crozet and Koenig (2010). We consider
the world to be composed of R countries, where we index exporters by r = 1, 2, , R
and importers by s = 1, 2, , R. Every country produces and consumes diﬀerentiated
as well as homogeneous products. For the homogeneous goods industry, we retain
the traditional assumption of national product diﬀerentiation (Armington, 1969) and
the industry is characterized by perfect competition with constant returns to scale
technology. On the other hand, we follow Melitz (2003) and assume that there are
H diﬀerentiated industries indexed by h = 1, 2, , H. Each industry is composed of a
continuum of ﬁrms where each ﬁrm produces a unique variety indexed by ω. Moreover,
ﬁrms diﬀer in their productivity levels and operate under monopolistic competition.

3.3.1 Consumers
We adopt a Dixit-Stiglitz treatment in the demand-side. In this setting, consumers
are characterized by love-of-variety where they perceive each variety as a unique product
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and derive utility from that uniqueness. The utility function for the diﬀerentiated
good h in country s, Uhs , is given by

Uhs =
r

ωhrs ∈Ωhr

qhrs (ωhrs )

σh −1
σh

 σ σh−1
h

dωhrs

,

(3.1)

where ωhrs indexes the variety of good h imported by country s from the source
country r, Ωhr is the set of all varieties of good h available in country r, qhrs (ωhrs ) is
the quantity demanded by a representative consumer in country s of variety ωhrs of
good h imported from country r and σh > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
the varieties of good h.
Let Phs be the price index of good h in country s, i.e. the dual price index of the
Dixit-Stiglitz composite of demand in equation (3.1), which is given by


1
 1−σ

Phs =
r

ωhrs ∈Ωhr

phrs (ωhrs )1−σh dωhrs

h

,

(3.2)

where phrs (ωhrs ) is the price in country s of variety ωhrs of good h imported from
country r (gross of trade costs). Based on these demand and price aggregates, we
can ﬁnd the demand for each variety of good h shipped from country r to s to be as
follows:
qhrs (ωhrs ) =

phrs (ωhrs )−σh
Yhs ,
1−σh
Phs

(3.3)

where Yhs is the total expenditure in country s on industry h (equal to income in the
relevant industry in country s)7 .
7

Please note that
Yhs = Phs Uhs =

ωhrs ∈Ωhs

phrs (ωhrs ) qhrs (ωhrs ) dωhrs
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3.3.2 Producers
Producer behavior is based on Melitz (2003). In this setting, there are Nhr varieties
of the diﬀerentiated good h produced in the exporting country r. A corollary to this
is that there are Nhr active ﬁrms in the monopolistically competitive industry h in
country r. Each ﬁrm produces a unique variety, ω, with diﬀerent productivity, ϕ. In
addition, varieties produced by ﬁrms in the exporting country r are distinct from the
varieties produced by ﬁrms in the importing country s. Each country exports only a
subset of its unique varieties because only some ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to export into
a given market. As a result, exports from country r to s includes only Nhrs < Nhr
varieties being shipped on the r -s trade route. This means that the total number of
varieties of good h available to consumers in country s is Nhs domestic varieties plus

Nhrs imported varieties.
r

Firms in industry h incur variable and ﬁxed costs of production and of exporting.
There are two types of ﬁxed costs: sunk-entry costs to produce in the domestic
market and ﬁxed export costs to enter export markets. Fixed export costs are sourcedestination speciﬁc and are assumed to be identical across ﬁrms on the same bilateral
trade route. There are two types of variable costs: marginal cost of production and
transportation costs for export shipments. We adopt the standard assumption of
iceberg transportation costs, in which τhrs > 1 units of good h must be shipped from
country r in order for one unit of good h to arrive in country s.
The only type of cost that is ﬁrm-speciﬁc in this setting is the marginal cost of
production which equals chr /ϕhr for an active ﬁrm in industry h of country r. Here,
chr is the cost of the input bundle that is used for producing one unit of output in
industry h of country r and ϕhr is the productivity of an active ﬁrm in industry h
of country r which measures the amount of output produced by one bundle of input.
Given the input bundle cost, let fhrs measure the number of bundles that is used by
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ﬁrms in industry h to cover the ﬁxed costs of exporting from country r to country s.
Then, the ﬁxed export costs on this particular bilateral trade route equals chr fhrs .
The proﬁt-maximizing price in a monopolistically competitive industry is a constant
markup over marginal cost. Hence the delivered price in country s of the variety
produced by a ﬁrm in country r with productivity ϕ is given by

phrs (ϕ) =

where

σh
σh −1

σh τhrs chr
σh − 1 ϕhrs

(3.4)

is the markup that decreases with a larger elasticity of demand. If

preferences are more homogeneous (large σh ), the industry becomes more competitive
and ﬁrms have to charge a lower markup for their respective varieties. Using the proﬁt
maximizing prices in equation (3.4) and utility maximizing level of sales in equation
(3.3), the proﬁt from exporting qhrs (ϕ) units of good h into country s is found to be
1−σh

phrs (ϕ) qhrs (ϕ)
σh τhrs chr
πhrs (ϕ) =
− chr fhrs =
Yhs − chr fhrs .
σh
σh − 1 ϕhrs Phs

(3.5)

Firm export participation is determined by the potential proﬁt to be made in each
bilateral market based on equation (3.5). Firm proﬁt increases with market size in
the destination country (Yhs ), lower marginal costs (chr /ϕhr ), and lower barriers to
trade (τhrs and fhrs ). Productivity level of the ﬁrm plays a key role in determining the
potential proﬁt to be made on a particular trade route based on ﬁxed costs associated
with exporting. Particularly, destination-speciﬁc ﬁxed export costs limit the number
of exporters from source country r since only the ﬁrms with high productivity levels
can cover ﬁxed export costs and make positive proﬁts in the export market. The
cutoﬀ productivity level of exporting is destination-speciﬁc and is determined by the
zero proﬁt condition on each bilateral trade route. The revenue made by the marginal
exporting ﬁrm is just enough to cover total costs of exporting and determines the

73
productivity threshold. Let the productivity threshold for ﬁrms in industry h to export
from country r to s be ϕ∗hrs , which is governed by the following equation
ϕ∗hrs


 1
σh τhrs chr chr fhrs σh −1
=
.
σh − 1 Phs
Yhs

(3.6)

Firms that have a higher productivity level than ϕ∗hrs will successfully export on the
r -s route, while the rest of the ﬁrms, which have lower productivity levels than ϕ∗hrs ,
will only supply the domestic market. This self-selection mechanism determines the
number of ﬁrms in export markets which can diﬀer across destinations. As mentioned
above only a subset Nhrs ﬁrms out of the total Nhr ﬁrms are able to export into
country s and the mass of ﬁrms in this subset depends on the productivity distribution
in the industry.
We assume that ﬁrm productivity follows the Pareto distribution with support
[ϕmin , ∞) and shape parameter γh that satisﬁes the condition γh > σh − 1. The
associated density function, g (ϕ), and cumulative distribution function, G (ϕ), are
then as follows:
g (ϕ) = γ

ϕγmin
, G (ϕ) = 1 − (ϕmin /ϕ)γ
ϕγ+1

(3.7)

where ϕmin ∈ [1, ∞) is assumed in this paper.8 Given the productivity distribution,
1 − G (ϕ∗hrs ) measures the proportion of ﬁrms that have productivity levels higher
than the threshold ϕ∗hrs . Therefore, the fraction of active exporters to all ﬁrms in the
industry Nhrs /Nhr equals 1 − G (ϕ∗hrs ).9
8

Helpman et al. (2008) uses a truncated Pareto distribution by imposing upper and lower bounds
to productivity. The reason for these bounds is to construct a model that can explain zero trade
ﬂows in the country level data with ﬁrm behavior. But, using a truncated Pareto distribution brings
about nonlinearities into the model which we do not attempt to solve in this paper. For analytical
tractability purposes we choose to impose only a lower bound for productivity. An implication of
this assumption is that because there is a continuum of ﬁrms in the industry, there is a positive mass
of exporters for all countrypairs as noted in Head and Mayer (2014).
∞
9
This follows from Nhrs = ϕ∗ Nhr g (ϕ)dϕ
hrs
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3.3.3 Aggregate Trade Flows
The value of aggregate trade ﬂows is the product of number of ﬁrms that sell in
the destination market and the average revenue along the bilateral trade route. Let
Mhrs be the total value of demand in destination country s for good h sourced in
country r which is given by
∞

Mhrs =

ϕ∗hrs

Nhrs phrs (ϕ) qhrs (ϕ) μ (ϕ) dϕ

(3.8)

where μ (ϕ) is the productivity distribution of successful ﬁrms in equilibrium, i.e.
conditional distribution of g (ϕ) on support [ϕ∗hrs , ∞) as in Melitz (2003):
⎧
⎪
⎨
μ (ϕ) =

g(ϕ)
ifϕ
1−G(ϕ∗ )

≥ ϕ∗

⎪
⎩ 0otherwise

(3.9)

We simplify (3.8) by using optimal demand and price for good h given by equations
(3.3) and (3.4). The simpliﬁed representation of bilateral trade ﬂows is then given by
⎧ 
⎪
⎨
Mhrs =

σh τhrs chr
σh −1 Phs

1−σh

Yhs Nhr Vhrs ifϕ ≥ ϕ∗

⎪
⎩ 0otherwise,

(3.10)

where Vhrs is deﬁned as in Helpman et al. (2008)10 :
∞

Vhrs =
10

ϕ∗hrs

ϕ

σh −1

g (ϕ)dϕ.

(3.11)

Vhrs corresponds to the average productivity in the industry. In Melitz (2003), average productivity
 σ 1−1

σ −1
∞
h
is deﬁned as ϕ̃hrs (ϕ∗hrs ) = ϕ∗ ϕ h μ (ϕ) dϕ
. Based on this deﬁnition, we have Vhrs =
hrs
∞
σ −1
σh −1
∗
ϕ̃hrs [1 − G (ϕhrs )]. Please note that since we deﬁne Vhrs as Vhrs = ϕ∗ ϕ h g (ϕ)dϕ, we can
hrs
express Mhrs in terms of Nhr instead of the bilateral Nhrs .
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Equation (3.10) can be thought of as a measure of the intensive margin because
it takes export sales of all exporters into account in determining aggregate export
sales on a particular trade route. Equation (3.10) also shows that bilateral trade ﬂows
increase with market size of the importer s (Yhs ), the mass of ﬁrms in the industry
(Nhr ), competition in the importing market (Phs ), reductions in barriers to trade (τhrs )
and reductions in factor costs (chr ). A quick look at equation (3.10) would suggest that
the elasticity of trade with respect to reduced trade costs is 1 − σh . This corresponds
to the trade-cost elasticity in the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman monopolistic competition
model. However, this is only part of the story. In fact, 1 − σh only represents the
demand side eﬀects of reduced trade barriers in a ﬁrm heterogeneity model. There
are additional eﬀects of trade cost reductions embedded in Vhrs which work through
the supply side. In particular, Vhrs represents how self-selection of ﬁrms into export
markets stimulate average productivity and thereby increase trade ﬂows in the case of
lower trade barriers. This mechanism introduces the supply side eﬀects of trade cost
changes into equation (3.10).
The combined eﬀect of demand and supply side eﬀects reveals that the trade-cost
elasticity of trade ﬂows in a ﬁrm heterogeneity model is diﬀerent from that of a model
with homogeneous ﬁrms. In fact, Chaney (2008) shows analytically that trade-cost
elasticity11 is equal to the supply side parameter −γh in a multi-country Melitz (2003)
framework. This ﬁnding paved the way for subsequent empirical work that changed
the interpretation of parameter estimates in gravity equations in the presence of
heterogeneous ﬁrms.
11

Elasticity is deﬁned as

∂Mhrs τhrs
∂τhrs Mhrs .
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3.3.4 Extensive, Intensive and Compositional Trade Margins
Many empirical studies in the gravity literature distinguish between two margins of
adjustment to trade shocks: intensive and extensive margins. As trade costs fall, not
only does the volume of sales from each exporter increase, i.e. intensive margin, but
the set of exporters changes as well, i.e. extensive margin. As opposed to this two-way
decomposition, Head et al. (2014) oﬀer a three-way decomposition by arguing that an
implicit margin is embedded in the conventional interpretation. Since new entrants
are less productive than the existing exporters, sales of new entrants are lower than
the average shipment prior to trade cost reductions. The margin of adjustment as a
result of this diﬀerence in sales is referred to as the compositional margin by Head
et al. (2014). The compositional margin is a part of the extensive margin in Chaney
(2008) and Crozet and Koenig (2010), while it is included in the intensive margin in
Bernard et al. (2007) and Hillberry and Hummels (2008). Needless to say, depending
on how the compositional eﬀects are assigned the relative contribution of the intensive
and extensive margins of trade will vary across otherwise identical studies. Therefore,
it is appealing to break out this compositional eﬀect.
Here we explicitly show the three-way decomposition of trade-cost elasticity. Trade
ﬂows in equation (3.8) can be written as the product of the number of exporters
and average sales per exporter, Mhrs = Nhrs m (ϕ̃hrs ) where average sales is deﬁned
∞
as m (ϕ̃hrs ) = ϕ∗ m (ϕ) μ (ϕ) dϕ. Using the Leibniz rule, as in Chaney (2008), we
hrs

obtain a decomposition of the trade-cost elasticity similar to the one in Head et al.
(2014) as follows:
∞
∂ ln m (ϕ)
1
m (ϕ) μ (ϕ) dϕ
m (ϕ̃hrs ) ϕ∗hrs ∂ ln τhrs



intensive
margin


.
∂ ln [1 − G (ϕ∗hrs )] ∂ ln ϕ∗hrs
∂ ln Nhrs
m (ϕ∗hrs )
−1
+
+
∂ ln τhrs
m (ϕ̃hrs )
∂ ln ϕ∗hrs
∂ ln τhrs
  



∂ ln Mhrs
∂ ln τhrs

=

extensive margin

compositional margin

(3.12)
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The ﬁrst component in equation (3.12) is the intensive margin which gives the
adjustment in trade-cost elasticity due to changes in sales of the existing exporters.
As mentioned before, the intensive margin eﬀect is the same as in the traditional
Armington model. The second component is the extensive margin, due to changes in
the set of exporters. The third component is the compositional margin due to lower


mhrs (ϕ∗hrs )
per ﬁrm sales of new entrants. In particular, the term mhrs (ϕ̃hrs ) − 1 captures the
diﬀerence between lower sales of new exporters and the average sales of the incumbents
in the export market.
We follow Head et al. (2014) in simplifying equation (3.12) by applying the Pareto
distribution and using the optimal demand and pricing equations. The resulting
trade-cost elasticity of trade ﬂows is identical to Chaney (2008).
∂ ln Mhrs
=
∂ ln τhrs

(1 − σh ) +
  
intensive margin

( −γ )
 h 
extensive margin

+

(σh − 1)
  

= −γh

(3.13)

compositional margin

According to equation (3.13) the intensive margin depends only on the demandside parameter σh and is equal to the trade-cost elasticity in a Krugman-type model
with homogenous ﬁrms. Similarly, the compositional margin also depends on the
demand-side parameter as sales of new entrants are also governed by the substitution
elasticity. An important discussion in Head et al. (2014) is that the intensive and
compositional margins exactly oﬀset each other due to the assumed Pareto distribution.
This is in line with the discussion in Chaney (2008) even though his deﬁnition of the
extensive margin includes the compositional part as well. He states that ﬁrm-level
trade behaves in the same way as aggregate trade behaves in traditional models. As a
result, the intensive and compositional margins aﬀect the trade elasticity with the
same magnitude, but in opposite direction. On the other hand, the extensive margin
introduces supply-side eﬀects through the shape parameter γh . In the end, what
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determines the ﬁnal trade-cost elasticity of trade ﬂows is the extensive margin in a
ﬁrm heterogeneity model. An interesting point Chaney (2008) makes is that in ﬁrm
heterogeneity models, the impact of trade barrier changes on trade ﬂows is larger
than that of the representative ﬁrm models. This is due to the required condition
γh > σh − 1 which shows that the quantitative importance of the extensive margin on
trade ﬂows is higher in a ﬁrm heterogeneity setting compared to the intensive margin
eﬀect.
In this paper we adopt the convention in Chaney (2008) and include the compositional margin within the extensive margin. Therefore, our deﬁnition of the extensive
margin captures the combined eﬀect of export sales per new exporter and the change
in the set of exporters. Therefore, when we refer to the extensive margin in this paper,
we refer to −γh + σh − 1.

3.4 Data
We use two data sources in this paper. Bilateral trade data comes from the Global
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Version 8.1 (Narayanan et al., 2012). This version
includes 57 GTAP commodities and 134 GTAP regions of which 113 country titles
are available. We use the time series bilateral trade data of this version that covers
the period 1995 to 2009 with 2007 as the reference year. (Detailed information about
data sources and variable deﬁnitions can be found in Appendix B.)
In this paper, we focus on the motor vehicles and parts sector, coded as MVH
in GTAP. Therefore, we only use the trade data that is related to MVH. This
choice is based on the information about the shape parameter estimates reported in
Spearot (2015). Motor vehicles and parts is one of the most heterogeneous industries
with respect to productivity in Spearot (2015) with a value of 1.79. On the other
hand, the Armington elasticity in GTAP for motor vehicles and parts is 5.6 (Hertel
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et al., 2003). A comparison of these values reveals that the condition for ﬁnite size
distribution γ > σ − 1 is not satisﬁed for MVH if we stick to the Armington elasticity
(1.79 < 5.6 − 1).
Trade barriers which are modeled as iceberg trade costs are not explicitly observed
in the data. Therefore, a common approach in the gravity literature is to assume
that iceberg trade cost is a function of many observable variables such as the physical
distance between trading partners, sharing a common language, having a colonial relationship etc. We adopt the same approach and use the distance (GeoDist) and gravity
(Gravity) databases of Centre d‘Etudes Prospectives et dInﬁormations Internationales
(CEPII) to obtain the information about gravity variables. GeoDist is CEPIIs distance
database developed by (Mayer and Zignago, 2005) and it includes country-speciﬁc
data for 225 countries and bilateral data for 224 country pairs. Further details about
this database can be found in Mayer and Zignago (2011). In our paper, data on
distance, contiguity, common language, colonial links and landlocked countries are
obtained from GeoDist. In addition, we use CEPIIs Gravity database based on Head
et al. (2010). This database covers an exhaustive set of variables for 224 countries
for the period 1948 to 2006. In our paper, data on common legal origins, common
currency, FTA and GATT/WTO membership are obtained from Gravity.
The time period considered in this paper is from 1995 to 2006 to match the time
series of bilateral trade from GTAP and the gravity variables from CEPII. In particular,
we drop the years 2007-2009 from the GTAP time series data and we drop the years
1948-1994 from the CEPII Gravity data. Our ﬁnal dataset is obtained by merging
GTAP data with CEPII data for motor vehicles and parts industry, 113 country titles
and it covers the period from 1995 to 2006. The list of countries included in our
dataset is presented in Table B.1.
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Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for the ﬁnal sample of our dataset. We
also tabulate the frequency of zero trade ﬂows in the dataset by year in Table 3.3.
Table 3.2. Summary Statistics of the Dataset, Motor Vehicles and
Parts, 113 Countries, for Years 1995-2006.
Variable
Exports (millions $US)
Distance (km)
Contiguity
Common Language
Common Colony
Colonial Link
FTA/RTA
Common Legal Origins
Common Curency
GATT /WTO Membership (both)
Landlocked

Obs

Mean

Std.Dev.

Min

Max

151,872
151,872
151,872
151,872
151,872
151,872
151,872
151,872
151,872
151,872
151,872

48.35
7467
0.026
0.112
0.062
0.017
0.091
0.299
0.010
0.714
0.040

809.4
4346
0.158
0.315
0.241
0.128
0.287
0.458
0.098
0.452
0.196

0
131.8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

65206
19781
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Table 3.3. Zeros in the Motor Vehicles and Parts Industry, 113 Countries.
Year

Frequency of Zeros

Fraction of Zeros (%)

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

10,246
10,165
10,094
10,010
10,040
10,028
9,942
9,943
9,458
9,293
9,074
8,996

80.96
80.32
79.76
79.09
79.33
79.24
78.56
78.56
74.73
73.43
71.70
71.08

Pooled

117,289

77.23

Bilateral trade datasets are known to include large numbers of zeros even at the
country level (Helpman et al., 2008). Our dataset is no exception. As reported in
Table 3.3, zero trade ﬂows of motor vehicles and parts account for 77 per cent of the
observations over the period 1995-2006. Large fraction of zeros in the dataset is known
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to cause sample selection bias in coeﬃcient estimates in gravity equations where the
dependent variable is log of trade ﬂows. Since the logarithm of zero is undeﬁned, zero
observations are dropped from the sample in traditional OLS regressions. We follow
the approach adopted in Helpman et al. (2008) to control for sample selection.
Table 3.3 also shows that the fraction of zero trade ﬂows diminished across years.
While zero trade ﬂows account for almost 81 per cent of the observations in 1995, this
fraction reduces to 71 per cent in 2006. This reduction implies that there have been
new bilateral trade routes created over the course of 12 years in motor vehicles and
parts industry. We can interpret this as the reﬂection of extensive margin eﬀect in the
data resulting from ﬁrm entry and exit over the years.

3.5 Empirical Methodology
We follow the common practice of estimating the intensive and extensive margins of
trade using a speciﬁcation based on the gravity equation. Our empirical strategy draws
on the work of Helpman et al. (2008) and Crozet and Koenig (2010). The empirical
strategy in Helpman et al. (2008) is to develop a two-stage Heckman estimation
procedure where they explicitly account for unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity and sample
selection bias to consistently estimate the gravity equation in a ﬁrm heterogeneity
model. Similarly, we consider two equations. The ﬁrst one is an export participation
equation in which we estimate the eﬀect of distance on the probability that a ﬁrm
exports on the r-s route. The second one is a gravity equation in which we estimate
the eﬀect of distance on aggregate trade ﬂows. We diverge from Helpman et al. (2008)
on two fronts. First, we estimate these two equations separately, not simultaneously.
Second, our latent variable deﬁnition for the ﬁrst equation is diﬀerent and follows
Crozet and Koenig (2010).
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Since we focus only on the motor vehicles and parts industry, we suppress the
h subscript for industries in the rest of the paper. Moreover, we introduce a time
subscript t to the variables that have diﬀerent values across years.

3.5.1 Export Participation: Probit
The ﬁrst equation we estimate is the probability of ﬁrm participation in export
markets which captures entry/exit of ﬁrms, i.e. the extensive margin eﬀect. Firm
activity is not explicit in our dataset because we only observe trade ﬂows at the country
level. Helpman et al. (2008) use a latent variable in order to capture ﬁrm behavior
in country level observations. Their latent variable is deﬁned as the ratio of variable
export proﬁts to ﬁxed export costs. According to this speciﬁcation, positive trade ﬂows
are observed at the country level if and only if the latent variable is greater than one.
However, this speciﬁcation does not use the information implicit in the productivity
distribution. As a result, the Pareto shape parameter does not appear in the export
selection equation considered in Helpman et al. (2008). In this paper, we want to
show the interaction between the shape parameter (γ) and the substitution elasticity
(σ) which requires use of the productivity distribution. Therefore, we follow the latent
variable deﬁnition in Crozet and Koenig (2010) and compare ﬁrm productivity with
the productivity threshold in the export market. We now turn to the details of this
approach.
A ﬁrm with productivity ϕ exports from country r to s if its productivity level passes
the threshold level, i.e. ϕ > ϕ∗rs . Let Trst be an indicator variable where Trst = 1 if the
country r exports MVH to country s in year t, and zero otherwise. Then, the probability
that a ﬁrm exports from r to s in year t is given by Pr (Trst = 1) = Pr (ϕ > ϕ∗rst ).
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When we apply the cumulative distribution function of the Pareto distribution we
obtain
Pr (Trst = 1) = Pr (ϕ > ϕ∗rst ) = (ϕ∗rst )−γ

(3.14)

Substituting equation (3.6) and (3.14) and rearranging, we obtain the following
equation for ﬁrm selection into export markets:
−γ 

 1 −γ 
−γ 
 −γ
τrst
frst σ−1 −γσ
σ τrst cr cr frst σ−1
σ
= 1) =
=
crσ−1 .
σ − 1 Ps
Ys
σ−1
Ps
Ys
(3.15)


Pr (Trst

We do not have information about the value of variable trade costs and bilateral
ﬁxed export costs in our dataset. Hence we follow the convention of imposing additional
structure on variable and ﬁxed costs. Variable trade costs are assumed to be a function
of distance between countries and several other trade barriers as follows:
δ
τrst = Drs
exp (−kψrst − urst ) ,

(3.16)

where Drs is the distance between country r and s, δ is the distance elasticity of trade
which is strictly positive, ψrst is a vector of trade impeding and trade facilitating
variables and urst ∼ N (0, σu2 ) captures unobserved trade costs that are i.i.d.
We follow Balistreri et al. (2011) and Helpman et al. (2008) and model ﬁxed export
costs as a combination of barriers imposed by importers only, by exporters only and
by a county-pair speciﬁc bilateral cost. Let frst ≡ exp (θr + θs + κθrs − vrst ), where θr
are ﬁxed export costs common across destinations incurred by exporting country r, θs
are the ﬁxed trade barriers imposed by the importing country on all exporters, θrs are
country-pair speciﬁc ﬁxed trade barriers, and vrst ∼ N (0, σv2 ) captures unmeasured
trade frictions. Helpman et al. (2008) notes that vrst is i.i.d; however, they may be
correlated with the unmeasured variable trade costs, urst .
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Incorporating these deﬁnitions of variable and ﬁxed export costs into equation
(3.15) and taking logarithms of both sides we get the following probit equation:
Pr (Trst = 1) = α0 − δγ ln Drs + Er + Es + α4 θrs + α5 ψrst + ηrst ,
σ
where α0 = −γ ln σ−1
, α4 =

γκ
,
1−σ

α5 = kγ, Er =

γσ
1−σ

ln cr +

γ
θ,
1−σ r

(3.17)

is an exporter

ﬁxed eﬀect which controls for the marginal cost (cr ) and ﬁxed cost (θr ) that are
associated with the exporter, Es = γ ln Ps +

γ
σ−1

ln Ys +

γ
θ
1−σ s

is an importer ﬁxed

eﬀect which controls for market size and ﬁxed costs associated with the importer and
urst + vrst = ηrst ∼ N (0, σu2 + σv2 ) is i.i.d.12 We also add a year dummy that controls
for the omitted variables which vary across years but common to all trade ﬂows. The
estimating equation, then, becomes
Pr (Trst = 1) = α0 − δγ ln Drs + Er + Es + Et + α4 θrs + α5 ψrst + ηrst ,

(3.18)

where Et is a year dummy. In our ﬁrst step regression, we estimate the Probit equation
in (3.18) for motor vehicles and parts industry. Since ﬁxed export costs, captured by
the variable θrs , only aﬀect the probability of a bilateral trade taking place, we can
use them as exclusion restrictions. We will turn to this again in the results section.

3.5.2 Trade Flows: OLS
The second step in our empirical strategy is to estimate the value of export sales
using the gravity equation. We use the aggregate sales of motor vehicles and parts from
country r to country s that is governed by equation (3.8). Log linearizing equation
12

There is an implicit assumption we impose here. For simplicity, we assume that ση2 ≡ σu2 + σv2 = 1.
Helpman et al. (2008) do not impose this restriction which means that all coeﬃcient estimates in
their Probit speciﬁcation is normalized by ση .

85
(3.8) and using variable trade costs deﬁned as (3.16), we obtain the following regression
equation:
ln Mrst = λ0 − δ (σ − 1) ln Drs + Er + Es + λ4 ψrst + lnVrst + urst ,

(3.19)

where λ0 = (1 − σ) ln σ/(σ − 1), [λ4 = k (σ − 1), Er = (1 − σ) ln cr + ln Nr is an
exporter ﬁxed eﬀect which controls for the marginal cost (cr ) and new varieties (Nr )
that are associated with the exporter, Es = (σ − 1) lnPs + lnYs is an importer ﬁxed
eﬀect which controls for importer size and prices, and urst ∼ N (0, σu2 ) is i.i.d.
Consistent estimation of Equation (3.19) requires two corrections as argued in
Helpman et al. (2008).

The ﬁrst correction requires adding a control variable

into (3.19) for the sample selection bias. Omitting country pairs that have zero
trade ﬂows from the dataset might cause a correlation between the unobserved
urst and the explanatory variables. Therefore, we need a consistent estimate for
E [urst |., Trst = 1]. Following Helpman et al. (2008) we deﬁne the consistent estimate
as E [urst |., Trst = 1] = corr (urst , ηrst ) σu η̄rst where η̄rst = E [ηrst |., Trst = 1]. In order
to be able use this in the gravity equation, we also need a consistent estimate of η̄rst .
As is customary in the Heckman procedure, we obtain this consistent estimate from
the inverse Mills ratio ˆ¯ηrst =

φ(ρ̂rst )
,
Φ(ρ̂rst )

where ρ̂rst be the predicted probability of trade

between country r and s based on the estimated Probit equation in (3.18).
The second correction requires adding a control variable into (3.19) for the entry/exit of ﬁrms into export markets which is captured by the variable lnVrst . Since
ﬁrm productivity is not observed, we need a consistent estimate for E [lnVrst |., Trst = 1].
Here, we diverge from Helpman et al. (2008) because our export participation is diﬀerent from theirs. Instead, we use the relationship between lnVrst and ln ϕ∗rst and apply
the cumulative distribution function of ﬁrm productivity. The predicted value of our latent variable is ρ̂rst = (ϕ̂∗rst )−γ . In log-linear form this is equivalent to ln ϕ̂∗ =

1
−γ

ln ρ̂rst .
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Using this condition and the deﬁnition in (3.11), a consistent estimate for lnVrst is
given by the following:

ln V̂rst = ln

γ−σ+1
γ
+
ln ρ̂rst .
γ−σ+1
γ

(3.20)

We use (3.20) to transform our gravity equation in (3.19) which gives
ln Mrst = βo −δ (σ − 1) ln Drs +Er +Es +Et +β4 ψrst +β5 ln ρ̂rst +β6 η̂rst +εrst , (3.21)
γ
where βo = λ0 + ln γ−σ+1
, β4 = λ4 , β5 =

γ−σ+1
γ

and β6 = corr (urst , ηrst ) σu . We note

that the new error term εrst satisﬁes the condition E [εrst |., Trst = 1] = 0. In our
second step regression, we estimate the gravity equation in (3.21) for motor vehicles
and parts.
Equation (3.17) delivers a combination of the distance elasticity and the shape
parameter, −δγ, while equation (3.19) delivers a combination of the distance and
demand elasticities, −δ (σ − 1). However, estimates of −δγ and −δ (σ − 1) are not
enough to identify three parameters separately.
To circumvent this diﬃculty Crozet and Koenig (2010) estimate a third equation
that governs the relationship between each ﬁrms total factor productivity and its
production by using ﬁrm level data. From this equation they obtain an estimate of
−γ + (σ − 1), which facilitates the identiﬁcation of three parameters in three equations.
With country-level data we cannot determine the relationship between ﬁrm sales and
their total factor productivity. Instead, we take the ratio of the two coeﬃcients from
the Probit and OLS equations which gives estimates of γ/(σ − 1). Incidentally, this
fraction is the Power Law exponent of ﬁrm size distribution.
In order to solve for the elasticity of substitution in this fraction, we use the shape
parameter estimates provided in Spearot (2015). This method delivers estimates of
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σ, which are conditional on γ, and therefore, consistent with the underlying ﬁrm
heterogeneity theory. This estimate of σ is assumed to capture changes in trade ﬂows
coming from substitutability in consumption while γ captures the changes in trade
ﬂows taking into account the variation in productivity across industries and regions.

3.6 Results and Discussion
In this section we present and discuss the estimation results. We also note the
implications of these results as well as the limitations in the discussed empirical
analysis.

3.6.1 Estimation Results
Table 3.4 presents our estimation results. The ﬁrst two columns give the regression
results for a Probit model that determines the probability of ﬁrm export participation.
Column (1) reports marginal eﬀects evaluated at sample means, while estimates
reported in (2) are parameter estimates. Column (3) gives our benchmark model
which is a standard gravity equation estimated using ordinary least squares. Column
(4) reports estimation results for equation (3.21) where we include the variables ln ρ̂
and η̂ which correct for sample selection as well as ﬁrm heterogeneity. All models
in Table 3.4 include country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects as well as year dummies. Standard
errors reported in all models are adjusted for clustering on country-pairs.
Our estimation results are in line with the gravity literature in general. In both (1)
and (3) distance is found to be statistically signiﬁcant with an estimated coeﬃcient
around -1, which is consistent with the usual coeﬃcient estimates in the gravity
literature. Our results show that the rest of the explanatory variables are positive in
both regressions. In particular, we ﬁnd that the probability of exporting as well as
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the volume of exports increases between country-pairs when countries: (i) are closer
to each other, (ii) are adjacent, (iii) are colonized by the same country, (iv) are both

Table 3.4. Gravity Estimation Results for Motor Vehicles and Parts
(MVH in GTAP), 113 Countries, for Years 1995-2006.
Export Participation (Probit)
Variables

log(Distance)
Contiguity
Common Colony
Colonial Link
Landlocked
Common Legal Origins
Common Currency
GATT /WTO Membership (both)
FTA/RTA
Common Language

Export Value (OLS)

Marginal Eﬀects
(1)

Coeﬃcients
(2)

Benchmark
(3)

FH-SS
(4)

-0.093***
(0.003)
0.043***
(0.011)
0.067***
(0.009)
0.058***
(0.012)
0.015
(0.01)
0.023***
(0.004)
0.018
(0.023)
0.025***
(0.004)
0.041***
(0.005)
0.021***
(0.006)

-0.941***
(0.031)
0.435***
(0.116)
0.675***
(0.087)
0.582***
(0.121)
0.154
(0.104)
0.235***
(0.037)
0.179
(0.227)
0.256***
(0.045)
0.410***
(0.050)
0.212***
(0.059)

-0.914***
(0.038)
0.548***
(0.105)
0.767***
(0.140)
0.405***
(0.108)
0.023
(0.138)
0.224***
(0.047)
0.374***
(0.113)
0.383***
(0.056)
0.681***
(0.062)
0.0565
(0.077)

-1.121***
(0.056)
0.635***
(0.118)
0.960***
(0.237)
0.581***
(0.120)
-0.074
(0.188)
0.323***
(0.051)
0.166
(0.120)
0.532***
(0.066)
0.728***
(0.073)

Sample Selection (η̂)

-0.435*
(0.227)
-0.183***
(0.033)

Firm Heterogeneity (lnρ̂)

Observations
R2

151,872
0.672

34,583
0.699

28,355
0.721

Notes: Probit reports both the marginal eﬀects at sample means and coeﬃcient estimates,
Benchmark is an OLS speciﬁcation of a traditional gravity equation without any corrections,
FH-SS is an OLS speciﬁcation of a gravity equation with both ﬁrm heterogeneity (FH) and sample
selection (SS) corrections, SS only corrects for the sample selection bias, and FH only corrects for
the ﬁrm heterogeneity bias. Each model includes importer, exporter and year ﬁxed eﬀects.R2
in Probit corresponds to pseudo-R2 . Robust standard errors with country-pair clustering are
reported in parantheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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members of GATT/WTO, (v) are both in the same FTA, (vi) share a colonial link, or
(vii) share a common legal system.
Our results show that the landlocked indicator is not signiﬁcant either for export
participation or for volume of exports. Moreover, the fact that two countries share
the same currency is not signiﬁcant for export participation, while it increases the
volume of exports. To the contrary, the probability that two countries share a common
language increases the probability of exporting while it is not signiﬁcant for how much
they trade. We attribute this to the fact that language is akin to a ﬁxed export cost.
Once the ﬁrm engages in trade, having a common language ceases to be a signiﬁcant
factor for trade volumes as the ﬁrm has already invested in the new language for
marketing, legal work etc.
As discussed in Helpman et al. (2008) estimating a two-stage model requires using
an exclusion restriction that is correlated with the probability of export participation,
but not correlated with the residuals in the second-stage gravity equation, as once a
decision to export has been made, the exclusion restriction is no longer important for
trade volumes. In our model, common language satisﬁes these requirements for a valid
exclusion restriction. This is evident from the regression results in (1) and (3). As
mentioned before, common language reduces ﬁxed costs of exporting and thereby it is
a signiﬁcant factor in export participation, while it does not matter for trade volumes.
The validity of common language as an excluded variable is also argued by Helpman
et al. (2008) who use common language as an alternative exclusion restriction and
obtain similar results to the case where religion is used as an excluded variable.
Comparison of (3) with (4) suggests that the coeﬃcients for almost all explanatory
variables are underestimated in the benchmark model. These ﬁndings substantially
diﬀer from Helpman et al. (2008). Their results suggest that the parameters in
benchmark model are overestimated because the extensive margin eﬀect and the
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country pairs that have zero trade ﬂows are excluded in the gravity equation. In
particular, they argue that ignoring sample selection introduces a downward bias,
while ignoring ﬁrm heterogeneity introduces an upward bias. However, according
to our results, not only sample selection control, but also ﬁrm heterogeneity control
corrects for the downward bias. We attribute the diﬀerence in our results to the
latent variable speciﬁcation used for the Probit model. Basically, the control for ﬁrm
heterogeneity captures the movements in productivity thresholds for export markets
as trade barriers change. For example, a higher productivity threshold for exporting
to a particular country forces low-productivity ﬁrms to exit the market which reduces
the number of exporters on that bilateral route. Because of having fewer exporters in
the market, aggregate trade ﬂows for MVH declines. This is reﬂected as a signiﬁcant
and negative coeﬃcient on the ﬁrm heterogeneity control variable reported in column
(4).
While the variable correcting for ﬁrm heterogeneity is highly signiﬁcant, the variable
correcting for sample selection is barely signiﬁcant in column (4). To further explore
the eﬀect of each correction in explaining aggregate trade ﬂows in MVH, we estimate
two more speciﬁcations each focusing on one of the corrections. Results of these
regressions are reported in Table 3.5.
In order to facilitate comparison across models we report the estimation results
of the benchmark model in column (1) and the estimation results including both
corrections in column (2). The results of sample selection correction are given in
column (3), while the results of ﬁrm heterogeneity correction are given in column (4).
We note that the coeﬃcient estimate for sample selection is signiﬁcant and enters
positively contrary to (2). When we look at the ﬁrm heterogeneity correction in (4),
we see that the coeﬃcient estimates are slightly lower than (3) and similar to (2).
Hence we see that ﬁrm heterogeneity correction dominates in (2) to the extent that
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sample selection changes sign and almost becomes insigniﬁcant for trade ﬂows in the
motor vehicles and parts industry. Overall, the coeﬃcient of distance is robust to

Table 3.5. Corrections in the Gravity Equation for Motor Vehicles and
Parts (MVH in GTAP), 113 Countries, for Years 1995-2006.
Export Value (OLS)
Variables

log(Distance)
Contiguity
Common Colony
Colonial Link
Landlocked
Common Legal Origins
Common Currency
GATT /WTO Membership (both)
FTA/RTA
Common Language

Benchmark
(1)

FH-SS
(2)

SS
(3)

FH
(4)

-0.914***
(0.038)
0.548***
(0.105)
0.767***
(0.140)
0.405***
(0.108)
0.023
(0.138)
0.224***
(0.047)
0.374***
(0.113)
0.383***
(0.056)
0.681***
(0.062)
0.0565
(0.077)

-1.121***
(0.056)
0.635***
(0.118)
0.960***
(0.237)
0.581***
(0.120)
-0.074
(0.188)
0.323***
(0.051)
0.166
(0.120)
0.532***
(0.066)
0.728***
(0.073)

-1.267***
(0.051)
0.629***
(0.109)
1.046***
(0.157)
0.696***
(0.117)
0.030
(0.146)
0.358***
(0.045)
0.110
(0.123)
0.504***
(0.053)
0.819***
(0.061)

-1.126***
(0.056)
0.628***
(0.118)
0.960***
(0.238)
0.590***
(0.120)
-0.070
(0.188)
0.325***
(0.051)
0.150
(0.120)
0.536***
(0.066)
0.737***
(0.073)

-0.435*
(0.227)
-0.183***
(0.033)

1.375***
(0.071)

28,355
0.721

34,583
0.729

Sample Selection (η̂)
Firm Heterogeneity (lnρ̂)

Observations
R2

34,583
0.699

-0.098***
(0.028)
28,355
0.721

Notes: Benchmark is an OLS speciﬁcation of a traditional gravity equation without any corrections, FH-SS is an OLS speciﬁcation of a gravity equation with both ﬁrm heterogeneity (FH)
and sample selection (SS) corrections, SS only corrects for the sample selection bias, and FH
only corrects for the ﬁrm heterogeneity bias. Each model includes importer, exporter and year
ﬁxed eﬀects.R2 in Probit corresponds to pseudo-R2 . Robust standard errors with country-pair
clustering are reported in parantheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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diﬀerent speciﬁcations which is reassuring, as this is what will give us the desired
elasticities, to which we now turn13 .

3.6.2 Elasticity of Substitution across Varieties
Up to this point, we have largely followed on the heels of existing work. However, the
main interest in this paper lies in obtaining substitution elasticities that are consistent
with the underlying ﬁrm heterogeneity theory. Given the coeﬃcient estimates reported
in Table 3.4, we can now solve for the theoretically-consistent elasticities for use in
global trade analysis.
Table 3.6. Elasticities of Substitution between Varieties of Diﬀerent Sources.

Benchmark
FH-SS

Models

Probit

Power Law
Exponent

Shape
Parameter*

Melitz
Elasticity

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

GTAP
Armington
Elasticity
(6)

−δ(σ − 1)

−δγ

γ/(σ − 1)

γ

σ

ESUBM

-0.91
-1.12

-0.94
-0.94

1.03
0.84

1.79
1.79

2.74
3.13

5.60
5.60

*

From Spearot (2015).
Notes: Probit reports coeﬃcient estimates, Benchmark is an OLS speciﬁcation of a traditional
gravity equation without any corrections, FH-SS is an OLS speciﬁcation of a gravity equation
with both ﬁrm heterogeneity (FH) and sample selection (SS) corrections.

Table 3.6 reports these elasticities for the motor vehicles and parts industry under
the benchmark and FH-SS speciﬁcations. A comparison with the associated GTAP
Armington elasticity dubbed ESUBM (Hertel et al., 2003) - is also presented in
Table 3.6.
13

Silva and Tenreyro (2015) argue that the assumption of homoscedastic error terms adopted in
Helpman et al. (2008) causes misspeciﬁcations in their gravity model and might lead to biased and
inconsistent estimators. In order to control for the heteroskedasticity in the data Silva and Tenreyro
(2015) suggest using Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood Estimator (PPML). As a robustness check,
we estimate the gravity equation in (3.19) using PPML. Regression results show that the coeﬃcient
estimate of distance is -0.71 and is signiﬁcant at 1 per cent level.

93
Column (1) reports the coeﬃcient estimate of distance under the benchmark and
FH-SS speciﬁcations, while column (2) reports the distance coeﬃcient in Probit. The
ratio of column (2) to column (1) gives a similar coeﬃcient as the Power Law exponent
of ﬁrm sizes. Values of this ratio under two speciﬁcations are reported in column (3)
and found to be around 1. In particular, the ratio is 1.03 for the benchmark model
and 0.84 for the FH-SS corrected model. These values are quite close to the Power
Law exponent estimates found in the literature summarized in Table 3.2 (Axtell,
2001; di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2013; di Giovanni et al., 2011; Melitz and Redding,
2013). This suggests that empirical evidence about Power Law exponents for ﬁrm
size is quite robust to the type of data used for estimation, as the value we obtain
with country-level data is consistent with that obtained from the ﬁrm-level empirical
studies.
Armed with empirically supported Power Law exponents, we move on to solve for
the theoretically-consistent elasticities of substitution. The shape parameter estimate
for motor vehicles and parts industry found in Spearot (2015) is reported in column
(4) of Table 3.2. We use this information in the Power Law exponent to solve for
our “Melitz substitution elasticities which are reported in column (5). Elasticity
values are found to be quite close across our speciﬁcations, 2.74 for the benchmark
model and 3.13 for the corrected model. Both are substantially lower than the GTAP
Armington elasticity of 5.60 and both satisfy the key parameter restriction of the
model (γ > σ − 1).
It is important to note that even when the ﬁrm heterogeneity and sample selection
corrections are not applied, the elasticity implied by the theory is lower than the
Armington elasticity used in the GTAP model. This ﬁnding is consistent with our
arguments and deserves further discussion. Even though the benchmark model does
not take sample selection and ﬁrm heterogeneity into account, it still gives us a “Melitz
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elasticity in this framework. This is because we are complementing the estimates
found in the benchmark model with the estimates found in the Probit model to infer
those elasticities. Although we do not use the Probit predictions in the trade-ﬂow
equation, we still use the information about export participation through the Power
Law exponent. On the other hand, GTAP Armington elasticities are estimated based
only on the trade-ﬂow equation with an Armington structure; thereby, they do not
contain any information about ﬁrm entry/exit behavior. As a result, we can say that
when used with the Probit model, even the benchmark elasticity removes the supplyside eﬀect captured in the GTAP Armington elasticity. In fact, when we compare
it with the corrected model, we see that the benchmark case gives a lower elasticity
estimate which implies that it removes more than the supply-side eﬀects. That is to
say the appropriate elasticity for the ﬁrm heterogeneity model lies somewhere between
the benchmark elasticity and the GTAP Armington elasticity.

3.6.3 Implications and Limitations
So, what is the economic signiﬁcance of ﬁnding a lower elasticity of substation
between varieties for use in global economic analyses? To answer this question we
should recall the eﬀect of parameter choice on the extensive margin. Based on the
deﬁnition in Chaney (2008) the extensive margin captures the contributions to trade
ﬂows of both the change in the number of exporters and their respective export
volumes. As you may recall this corresponds to the familiar form γ − (σ − 1). This is
where the choice of structural parameters becomes the key to policy implications. The
extensive margin is less responsive to trade barriers when the elasticity is high, while
the intensive margin is more responsive. Therefore, the choice of structural parameters
will determine the trade response as well as the welfare response to policy changes
through micro and macro mechanisms in the model. The most relevant mechanisms
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in this context are changes in average productivity through the self-selection of ﬁrms
into export markets and changes in consumer utility through the availability of new
varieties. Both of these mechanisms primarily depend on the parameter choice.
Finding a lower elasticity means that the demand-side is more heterogeneous in
the ﬁrm heterogeneity model for motor vehicles and parts than we thought it was
based on the Armington elasticity. Since consumer preferences are more heterogeneous
there is more room for new exporters in the MVH market to invest in diﬀerentiating their varieties. Therefore, marginal ﬁrms can markup their prices against large
infra-marginal ﬁrms in the market. It should be noted that there is also signiﬁcant
supply-side heterogeneity in the MVH market. Spearots shape estimate is 1.79 for
MVH is one of the lowest shape parameter values within the aggregate manufacturing
industry (Spearot, 2015). This implies that infra-marginal ﬁrms have a disproportionate share of the overall activity in this market and marginal ﬁrms are much less
productive compared to the incumbents. As noted in previous discussions, having a
low productivity is less of a disadvantage when preferences are more heterogeneous
(low elasticity). Even though marginal ﬁrms charge slightly higher prices than the
incumbents, consumers are willing to pay a premium for new varieties. However, with
a higher elasticity, marginal ﬁrms would have lost their market power and would be
subsumed by the large and productive infra-marginal ﬁrms. So moving from the higher
substitution elasticities used previously in GTAP-based studies of ﬁrm heterogeneity
to the lower values suggested by this study represents an important change.
The take-away from this discussion is that the relative value of the shape parameter
and the elasticity of substitution have important consequences for trade and welfare
responses in a ﬁrm heterogeneity model. In a sense, quantitative outcomes are driven
by the Power Law exponent of ﬁrm size. For example, as mentioned before, di Giovanni
and Levchenko (2013) show that welfare impact of the extensive margin of trade is
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negligible when the Power Law exponent is 1, i.e. when the ﬁrm size distribution
converges to Zipfs Law. In fact, they compare welfare gains from reductions in ﬁxed
and variable costs when the Power Law exponent is 1 to the case when it equals 2.
They show that when the Power Law exponent equals 1, welfare gains from reductions
in ﬁxed costs are an order of magnitude lower and welfare gains from reductions in
variable costs are an order of magnitude higher compared to the case when the Power
Law exponent is 2. Quantitative outcomes are not the only policy implications we are
interested in. Parameter choice also matters for analyzing the dominant mechanisms
in bringing about the changes in trade ﬂows and welfare.
The objective in this paper is to highlight the need for parameterization of the
ﬁrm heterogeneity module of GTAP for practical policy analysis. We illustrate the
need for using theoretically-consistent parameters with empirical examples in order to
have a more informed discussion about the issue. However the work presented here
has some limitations. First of all, the use of untruncated Pareto distribution in our
theoretical model imposes some restrictions on the theory to explain zero trade ﬂows
between countries. The explanatory power of the model can be improved by putting
bounds on the productivity distribution similar to Helpman et al. (2008). Secondly,
elasticity values presented in this study are conditional on the choice of the shape
parameter value as well as the underlying model speciﬁcation. In particular, some
of the variation in our ﬁrm heterogeneity elasticities is the result of using Spearot
(2015) shape estimates, which are lower than the inferred shape parameters in the
mainstream literature. In our view, this issue is an econometric one that requires
ﬁrm-level data to estimate both parameters simultaneously. Future work should focus
on separate identiﬁcation of key ﬁrm heterogeneity parameters and provide conﬁdence
intervals to those estimates for systematic sensitivity analysis. While our objective in
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this paper is to deﬁne the problem, the outstanding issue of parameter identiﬁcation
remains to be open for future work.

3.7 Concluding Remarks
In this study we discuss a theoretically-consistent way to parameterize the ﬁrm
heterogeneity model with a focus on the elasticity of substitution across varieties. The
current CGE literature relies on Armington elasticities and infers shape parameters
based on these elasticities. However, Armington elasticities are not appropriate
in a ﬁrm heterogeneity model. In fact, their interpretation and the underlying
econometric speciﬁcation for their estimation are diﬀerent in a Melitz (2003) framework.
Particularly, the traditional gravity equation that delivers Armington elasticities do
not control for the impact of ﬁrm self-selection into export markets which is the
main micro mechanism for productivity and variety induced gains from trade. In the
absence of ﬁrm behavior the resulting coeﬃcient estimates confound the demand-side
eﬀects with the supply-side eﬀects. This indicates overestimated elasticities which
pick up part of the supply-side heterogeneity governed by the shape parameter. The
resulting parameter set used in the current CGE literature is, then, an overestimated
Armington elasticity with an inferred shape parameter that does not capture the
substantial variation across industries.
In this study we distinguish between the intensive and extensive margins of trade
ﬂows to obtain theoretically-consistent elasticities. In particular, we estimate two
equations: an export participation equation and a gravity equation that governs
bilateral trade ﬂows. Since we use country level data, we impose further information
in order to identify the elasticities. Speciﬁcally, we use the shape parameter estimates
provided in Spearot (2015) which shows the variation of heterogeneity across industries
and regions. Our results show that GTAP Armington elasticities are signiﬁcantly
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higher than the elasticity estimates that are theoretically consistent with the Melitz
(2003) model.
This study provides an informed discussion about the theoretically-consistent
parameterization of ﬁrm heterogeneity models in a CGE setting. Since we work with
country-level data, separate identiﬁcation of parameters is not feasible. Therefore, we
rely on external shape parameter estimates. Our future research agenda is to identify
elasticities and shape parameters separately by utilizing ﬁrm-level data. We, then, will
be able to test the observational equivalence between an Armington-based model with
a Melitz (2003) model in a CGE setting. We believe that combining theory-consistent
econometric evidence with the ﬁrm heterogeneity model in a CGE framework will
lead the way for mainstream application of ﬁrm heterogeneity models in the GTAP
community.
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CHAPTER 4. FIRM HETEROGENEITY, FIXED COSTS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS: THE CASE OF US-EU BEEF TRADE

4.1 Introduction
Regulatory measures and non-tariﬀ barriers are among the key issues discussed in
recent trade agreement negotiations between the United States (US) and the European
Union (EU). Lowering of protection on several agricultural products has been on the
agenda of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement
where beef trade stands out among many others as it is heavily protected in the EU
market. Non-tariﬀ barriers in the EU beef market include sanitary and phystosanitary
(SPS) measures such as the hormone ban on beef (Arita et al., 2014). In particular,
the use of growth-promoting hormones in beef production was banned in the EU in
1989 which has put a signiﬁcant restriction on US beef exports into the EU market
(FAS, 2014). These measures have been subject to scrutiny by US beef exporters as
well as industry stakeholders and are being discussed in recent TTIP negotiations.
In order to ensure that beef exports meet the EU standards, the Agricultural
Marketing Service (AMS) of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
has been oﬀering the Non-Hormone Treated Cattle (NHTC) Program (FSIS, 2014).
Signing up for this program brings additional costs to the ﬁrms as it requires them to
pay for on-site visits by AMS, prepare the associated documents, adapt the production
and packing processes to comply with the hormone-free beef production etc (Arita
et al., 2014). These are signiﬁcant ﬁxed costs which may prevent US beef producers to
export into the EU market. Removal of these barriers could yield signiﬁcant economic
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gains by reducing ﬁxed costs in export markets and by US improving market access
to the EU.
There are a few CGE-based studies of the TTIP that quantify the economic
implications of removing NTMs in general (ECOYRS, 2009; CEPR, 2013; EP, 2014)
and the beef hormone ban in particular (Arita et al., 2015; Beckman and Arita, 2015).
The established approach in this literature is to model trade based on the Armington
assumption of national product diﬀerentiation. Even though computational policy
analysis with Armington-based models shed some light on the implications of NTM
removal, it fails to capture (i) important demand-side mechanisms based on product
diﬀerentiation and (ii) important supply-side mechanisms based on productivity
dispersion across ﬁrms.
Beef industry is assumed to have a perfectly competitive market structure in these
studies (Arita et al., 2015; Beckman and Arita, 2015). However, a more appropriate
treatment is to allow for monopolistic competition in the beef industry. Consumers
in the EU market diﬀerentiate between hormone-free and hormone-treated beef such
that they have a higher preference for the hormone-free varieties (Lusk et al., 2003).
In fact, studies show that European consumers, on average, indicate a willingness
to pay a premium for steaks with a USDA Choice No Hormones or GMOs stamp
(Tonsor and Shroeder, 2003). A monopolistically competitive industry structure ﬁts
better in this case as it captures the eﬀect of availability of diﬀerent varieties from
diﬀerent source regions.
On the supply-side, the interaction of ﬁxed costs and productivity dispersion across
ﬁrms provides signiﬁcant insights into which exporters will sign up for the NHTC
program and which will be given the license to export. One of the stylized facts in
the empirical literature is that ﬁrms substantially vary in their eﬃciency levels and
only the relatively productive ones are able to export (Bernard and Jensen, 1999;
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Bernard et al., 2003). This applies to the beef industry as well which implies that
the same ﬁxed costs imposed by the NHTC program do not aﬀect each ﬁrm in the
same way. Productivity dispersion in the beef market dictates which ﬁrms will export
and which ﬁrms will supply the domestic market. Therefore, the costly compliance
procedures may prevent ineﬃcient US ﬁrms to export beef into the EU market. These
mechanisms have signiﬁcant welfare implications.
In this paper we address these gaps by using the ﬁrm heterogeneity module of
GTAP developed in Chapter 2 where we explicitly model monopolistic competition
with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity based on the seminal work of Melitz (2003). A unique
aspect of this model is its ability to capture the trade creation and diversion eﬀects at
the extensive margin and to tease out productivity changes due to within-industry
factor movements. These new mechanisms available in the ﬁrm heterogeneity module
of GTAP will help better understand the welfare implications of NTMs in general and
hormone ban in particular. In addition, we provide values for key parameters of the
ﬁrm heterogeneity model consistent with the underlying theory based on the insights
discussed in Chapter 3.
In this paper we explore the implications of reducing the hormone ban imposed by
the EU on US beef imports by using two speciﬁc policy instruments: (i) reduction in
ﬁxed export costs, (ii) reduction in tariﬀ rates. There are three forms of modeling
NTMs in the mainstream CGE literature. These are summarized by Andriamananjara
et al. (2003) as tariﬀ-equivalent, export tax equivalent and as eﬃciency losses. Our
treatment for (i) falls broadly under the eﬃciency loss category, while that of (ii) falls
under the tariﬀ-equivalent category.
In the GTAP model NTMs are modeled as eﬃciency losses by considering their
implications on the eﬀective price and demand for imports from a particular exporter
(Hertel et al., 2001). This is a demand-side treatment of NTMs which does not trace
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out the direct eﬀect of ﬁxed costs on ﬁrms. However, the ﬁxed costs associated with
beef hormone ban accrue directly to producers and exporters before they are reﬂected
in consumer prices. Therefore, we lose important information about ﬁrm behavior
when NTMs are modeled on the demand-side only. A novelty in our paper is to model
NTMs on the supply-side. In particular, we map NTMs to country pair-speciﬁc ﬁxed
export cost shifters that capture eﬃciency losses on the use of inputs that cover ﬁxed
costs. These shifters are additional policy leverages introduced to the GTAP model in
the context of ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Finally, we explore the welfare implications of reducing the ﬁxed export costs
associated with beef hormone ban. We compare welfare predictions under the ﬁrm
heterogeneity model to the mainstream models, in this case the standard GTAP model
with Armington assumption and perfect competition.

4.2 Data and Empirical Background
Our model is calibrated to GTAP Version 9 Pre-release 1 data base with 2011
as the base year. We aggregate the data base to include eight regions, six tradeable
products and three primary factors of production as listed in Table 4.1.
The choice of our regional aggregation is based on major trade partners of US
and major beef exporters to the EU. South American countries constitute the biggest

Table 4.1. Data Aggregation: GTAP Version 9.1 Pre-release.
Regions
European Union (EU)
United States (USA)
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Australia

Canada
Mexico
China
India
Rest of the World (ROW)

Sectors

Endowments

Primary Food
Extraction
Beef
Processed Food
Manufactures
Services

Land
Labor
Capital
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share in beef import of the EU. In particular, Brazil (40%), Argentina (21%) and
Uruguay (17%) account for 78 percent of beef imports in the EU between 2009 and
2013 (Arita et al., 2014) followed by the US as the fourth largest source.
Our sectoral aggregation consists of primary food, extraction products, beef, processed food, manufactures and services. The details of this aggregation are summarized
in Appendix C. In the GTAP sectoral deﬁnition beef includes bovine meat products.
Therefore, the beef industry in this study is composed of ﬁrms that produce and sell
bovine meat products. The rest of the ﬁrms which produced other processed food are
included in the processed food industry.
We assume a monopolistically competitive market structure in the beef industry
with ﬁrm-level productivity heterogeneity. The motivation for this treatment is based
on consumer preferences. Beef is not just one homogeneous product. There are many
varieties within the industry. The most important distinction is between hormone-free
and hormone-treated beef. Consumers in the EU have a higher preference for the
hormone-free varieties of beef (Lusk et al., 2003) which are sold as premium products.
There is also variation across the varieties of diﬀerent regions. For example, US
beef imports in the EU are grain-fed and are considered as higher value products. In
contrast, South American beef is categorized as prepared products such as corned beef
and manufacturing-grade product used in ground beef production (Arita et al., 2014).
Similar to beef, we treat processed food and manufacturing industries as monopolistically competitive with heterogeneous ﬁrms. The other sectors (Primary Food,
Extraction and Services) are assumed as perfectly competitive.
Key to our analysis is how we calibrate the parameters of our aggregation in
the ﬁrm heterogeneity model. There are two parameters of particular importance in
the ﬁrm heterogeneity model: (i) the elasticity of substitution across varieties which
governs the demand-side heterogeneity and (ii) the shape parameter of productivity
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distribution (Pareto) which governs the supply-side heterogeneity. As discussed in
Chapter 3, parametric assumptions are paramount to computational policy analysis.
Interpretation and estimation/calibration of key parameters of the model have to be
tailored to the model speciﬁcation.
These arguments have been addressed in Chapter 3 and we ﬁnd that the elasticity
of substitution is diﬀerent between the ﬁrm heterogeneity model and the Armingtonbased perfect competition models. As a result, we cannot simply use the Armington
elasticities in the GTAP data base in this study. Instead, we use the method proposed in
Chapter 3 and obtain the theoretically-consistent elasticities for the ﬁrm heterogeneity
model conditional on shape parameter estimates of Spearot (2015). We, then, aggregate
the new elasticities based on each product’s respective share in world trade, while
we aggregate the shape parameters based on each industry’s respective share in total
costs of production. The calculated parameter values are presented in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2. Key Parameters of the Model.
Aggregate
Sectors
Primary Food
Extraction
Beef
Processed Food
Manufactures
Services

Market
Structure

Shape Parameter
γ

Melitz Elasticity
σ

GTAP Armington Elasticity
ESUBM

PC
PC
FH
FH
FH
PC

3.78
2.71
2.59
-

4.21
2.95
3.55
-

4.97
10.65
7.70
4.90
7.16
3.85

Notes: FH: Firm heterogeneity, PC: Perfect Competition (Armington).

Parameters in perfectly competitive industries are calibrated via the usual techniques where GTAP Armington elasticities are used for primary food, extraction and
services products. For the monopolistically competitive industries with heterogeneous
ﬁrms, we ﬁnd that ’Melitz’ elasticities are lower than the GTAP Armington elasticities.
The ’Melitz’ elasticity for the beef industry is found to be 4.21, while the elasticity is
7.70 if the industry was treated as perfectly competitive. This big diﬀerence indicates
that the choice of market structure would have important welfare implications.
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4.3 Policy Application
In this section we present our policy applications in the ﬁrm heterogeneity module
of GTAP developed in Chapter 2. Speciﬁcally, we examine the implications of reducing
EU’s hormone ban imposed on US beef imports by using two speciﬁc policy instruments:
(i) reduction in ﬁxed export costs, (ii) reduction in tariﬀ rates. We, then, compare
the eﬀects of each policy under the ﬁrm heterogeneity model with that of the perfect
competition model.

4.3.1 Treatment of Non-Tariﬀ Measures
Treatment of NTMs in the ﬁrm heterogeneity model is quite diﬀerent than the
mainstream approach adopted in the standard GTAP model. To highligt the diﬀerences
we brieﬂy summarize each approach before detailing the speciﬁcs of the shocks.
NTMs are modeled as eﬃciency losses in the standard GTAP model. They enter as
technical coeﬃcients, AMS(i,r,s), and work through the demand-side (Hertel et al.,
2001). AMS(i,r,s) is deﬁned as the import augmenting technical change of product
i from source region r to destination s. Changes in the value of AMS(i,r,s) are
reﬂected in the price of imports from a particular exporter as well as the demand
for imports from that exporter. Thus, non-tariﬀ measures work its way through the
prices. Moreover, since there are no NTM costs in the initial data base, the model
needs to be calibrated to add those costs into the data.
Unlike the standard GTAP model, the impact of NTMs work through the supplyside in the ﬁrm heterogeneity model. In particular, we map NTMs to country
pair-speciﬁc ﬁxed export cost shifters that capture eﬃciency losses on the use of inputs
that cover ﬁxed costs. For this purpose, a new policy instrument AVAFX(i,r,s) is
deﬁned as the technical change in the ﬁxed cost of exporting product i from source
region r to destination s. An increase in AVAFX(i,r,s) ensures a fall in the eﬀective
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quantity of value-added used in covering the ﬁxed export costs in that particular
market. In other words, each ﬁrm faces lower ﬁxed export costs conditional on
exporting. This has repercussions for the eﬀective price of value-added as well. In
this model, we assume that ﬁrms’ price of value-added is the same for ﬁxed and
variable portions of value-added in order to ensure market clearing for endowments.
Therefore, an improvement in the eﬃciency of ﬁxed costs reduces the eﬀective price of
all value-added independent of whether it is employed in the variable cost coverage or
ﬁxed cost coverage.
Initial ﬁxed costs in the model are calibrated based on a gravity equation of trade
ﬂows. Chapter 2 explains this in more detail. Here, we modify the calibration slightly
to match the share of revenues spent on ﬁxed costs in the export market to that
of ﬁxed costs in the domestic market. Our simplifying assumption is that domestic
suppliers face similar plant modiﬁcation costs to segregate the production line for
hormone-free and hormone-treated beef. Based on our parameter settings, we ﬁnd
that the average ﬁrm in the beef industry devotes 3.6 % of its net revenues from sales
in a particular market on the ﬁxed costs to operate in that market.

4.3.2 Shocks on Policy Instruments
The shocks we impose on our policy instruments are based on the gravity estimations obtained in Arita et al. (2015). They use estimates of NTM costs as data
in the standard GTAP model as well as in a supply-chain module of GTAP where
detailed land-use competition among livestock markets are modeled. The removal of
NTM costs is, then, broken out into changes in import taxes (tms(i,r,s)), changes
in export taxes (txs(i,r,s)) and changes in eﬃciency (ams(i,r,s)). They ﬁnd that
if the removal of NTM costs is allocated entirely to the eﬃciency variable, US beef
exports to the EU increases by 274%. If it is allocated entirely to import taxes, US
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beef exports to the EU increases by 274%, as well. If on the other hand, the removal of
NTM costs are broken into three policy variables under a supply-chain model explored
by Arita et al. (2015), US beef exports to the EU increases by 306%. These simulation
results are in line with the gravity model predictions presented in Arita et al. (2015).
According to their gravity model, if the hormone ban were removed, the estimated
amount of US beef exports ranges between 210% - 314% across diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
We calibrate the shocks used in our policy scenarios based on the trade volume
changes obtained in Arita et al. (2015). We use the percentage change in exports
found by using the tariﬀ and eﬃciency variables only (274%) as opposed to the one
found in the supply-chain case (306%). There are two reasons for this preference.
First, in the ﬁrm heterogeneity model we do not allow for land-use competition among
livestock markets as in the supply-chain module in Arita et al. (2015). Second, we
explore the eﬀects of policy instruments separately; therefore, isolating the shocks is
more appropriate for our purposes.
We ﬁx the percentage change in export sales of beef from the US to EU as 274% in
our model and calibrate how much eﬃciency increase in ﬁxed export costs is required
to obtain this trade volume increase. This gives us the shock on our ﬁxed export
cost shifter, avafx(i,r,s). We repeat the same procedure for the tariﬀ rate with
the same trade volume increase. This gives us the shock on our power of the tariﬀ,
tms(i,r,s). These shocks are presented in Table 4.3
We follow the same procedure in calibrating the shocks for the perfect competition
model. Note that we use the standard GTAP model as the perfectly competitive model.
There are several diﬀerences in our policy application under the perfect competition
model. First, to calibrate the shock for ﬁxed cost reduction we use the eﬃciency
variable ams(i,r,s) as opposed to avafx(i,r,s). Second, in order to be able to
compare welfare results in ﬁrm heterogeneity with perfect competition we distinguish
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between Melitz and Armington elasticities in respective model speciﬁcations. This is
in line with the discussion in Arkolakis et al. (2008) and Dixon et al. (2015). They
argue that a meaningful comparison across Melitz and Armington models can be
done if the observed trade patterns are equivalent and model-consistent elasticities are
used across model speciﬁcations. Both of these conditions are satisﬁed in our policy
scenarios. The resulting shocks are summarized in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3. Shocks Imposed on US Beef Imports in the EU under Firm Heterogeneity and Perfect Competition Models where j
∈ MCOMP COMM for Monopolistically Competitive Industry, and r,s ∈
REG for Regions.
Shock
Type

Model

Policy
Instrument

Shock
Value

Tariﬀ Equivalent

FH
PC

tms(i,r,s)
tms(i,r,s)

−13.42%
−16.05%

65.28%
65.28%

43.10%
38.75%

Fixed Costs

FH
PC

avafx(i,r,s)
ams(i,r,s)

207.54%
22.01%

−
−

−
−

Original
Ad-Volarem

New
Ad-Volarem

Notes: FH: Firm heterogeneity, PC: Perfect Competition (Armington). tms(i,r,s) is
the source-speciﬁc change in the power of the tax on imports of product i from source
r into destination s, avafx(i,r,s) is the technical change in the ﬁxed cost of exporting product i from source r into destination s, ams(i,r,s) is the import augmenting
technical change of product i from source r into destination s.

A comparison of tariﬀ shocks across model speciﬁcations show that a higher tariﬀ
reduction is required in the perfect competition model (-16.05%) compared to the
ﬁrm heterogeneity model (-13.42%) to generate the same increase in US beef exports
to the EU. Initial ad-volarem tariﬀ rate imposed on beef exports from the US to EU
is 65.28 per cent. A -13.42 per cent reduction in the power of tariﬀ brings about an
ad-volarem tariﬀ rate of 43.10 per cent. Therefore, it is not a complete removal of
tariﬀ, rather a reduction to facilitate imports from the US.
A positive value for the ﬁxed export cost shifter means that, ﬁxed export costs per
active ﬁrms will be reduced. As per ﬁrm ﬁxed export costs are now lower, proﬁtability
in the export market increases which attracts new ﬁrms into the market. Therefore,
the mass of exporters in the US-EU beef market expands. As a result of this ﬁrm
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entry, total ﬁxed costs incurred in the post-shock economy is actually higher than
initial ﬁxed costs. This is purely an extensive margin eﬀect. We should note that the
ﬁxed export cost shock of 207.54% does not eliminate all ﬁxed costs. It is merely a
reduction in ﬁxed costs per ﬁrm conditional on observed trade patterns.
We analyze four scenarios that reduce NTMs on US beef imports in the EU:
* Fixed cost reduction of 207.54% under the ﬁrm heterogeneity model;
* Tariﬀ reduction of 13.42% under the ﬁrm heterogeneity model;
* Fixed cost reduction of 22.01% under the perfect competition (Armington)
model;
* Tariﬀ reduction of 16.05% under the perfect competition (Armington) model;

4.3.3 Results under the Firm Heterogeneity Model
One of the major mechanisms captured by the Melitz (2003) model is the selfselection of ﬁrms into domestic and export markets. In this theory, ﬁrm participation
in industries or in export markets is governed by the productivity threshold to enter
that market. The productivity threshold is deﬁned as the lowest productivity level
for a ﬁrm to produce or export in that market. We ﬁrst focus on the eﬀect of ﬁxed
export cost reduction on these key ﬁrm heterogeneity mechanisms. Then we compare
the results with that of the tariﬀ cut scenario.
Table 4.4 presents the changes in the productivity threshold to enter the EU beef
market as well as the changes in the number of exporters that supply this market
under the ﬁxed cost reduction scenario. Results show that while export productivity
threshold decreases for the US ﬁrms, it increases for all other regions. The direct eﬀect
of lower ﬁxed export costs per ﬁrm is a fall in the demand for value-added inputs
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used by existing US beef exporters to fulﬁll the AMS export requirements. As ﬁxed
export cost per sale decreases, it becomes more proﬁtable for existing US exporters
to supply the EU market. This is especially good news for the marginal exporters of
US beef who previously made zero proﬁts in the pre-shock economy. As they start to
make positive proﬁts, the cutoﬀ productivity level to export into the EU beef market
decreases by 79%.
Table 4.4. Fixed Cost Reduction: Changes in the Export Threshold
and Number of Exporters to the EU Beef Market (%).
Regions
European Union
United States
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Australia
Canada
Mexico
China
India
Rest of the World

Productivity
Threshold

Number of
Exporters

0.000
−78.582
0.013
0.013
0.014
0.013
0.015
0.014
0.018
0.013
0.013

−1.506
275.863
−0.048
−0.050
−0.045
−0.035
−0.049
−0.050
−0.056
−0.038
−0.021

The proﬁtability in the European beef market attracts new exporters which
previously could not aﬀord to sign up for the AMS program due to their lower
productivity levels relative to the existing exporters. Consequently, the number of US
exporters that supply the EU market increases by 276%. This rather large increase is
partly because of the rate of productivity dispersion in the beef industry. There is a
large pool of low-productivity producers in the beef industry around the margin that
can proﬁtably export in the post-shock economy.
While this cost reduction beneﬁts US ﬁrms, it diverts trade from other beef
exporters. US ﬁrms meet almost all the demand in the EU beef market such that
they replace sales from all other regions. As potential sales to the EU market
drop signiﬁcantly for the rest of the regions, exporters no longer beneﬁt from scale
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economies. Therefore, their export productivity thresholds increase as shown in
Table 4.4. Marginal exporters lose their market sales and start making negative proﬁts
which force them out of the EU market. As a result, the number of exporters to the
EU beef market diminish in all regions except for the US.
Table 4.5 presents the results in the tariﬀ cut scenario on productivity threshold
and number of exporters into the EU beef market. The tariﬀ cut scenario predicts
smaller changes for the threshold and mass of exporters. Reduction in ﬁxed export
cost per sale increases the proﬁtability of exporting more than cutting tariﬀs.
Table 4.5. Tariﬀ Reduction: Changes in the Export Threshold and
Number of Exporters to the EU Beef Market (%).
Regions
European Union
United States
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Australia
Canada
Mexico
China
India
Rest of the World

Productivity
Threshold

Number of
Exporters

0.000
−53.034
0.011
0.011
0.012
0.011
0.012
0.016
0.016
0.011
0.011

−1.228
103.756
−0.040
−0.042
−0.036
−0.024
−0.027
−0.049
−0.049
−0.031
−0.015

It is important to note the diﬀerence in the nature of tariﬀs and ﬁxed costs as
policy instruments. By using tariﬀs as a policy instrument we are allowing for money
transfers between exporters and importers. On the other hand by using ﬁxed costs,
we are actually improving the eﬃciency of value-added devoted to cover ﬁxed costs
and reduce the factor demand of ﬁrms for entering a new market. As a result, the
underlying general equilibrium mechanisms are markedly diﬀerent in each scenario.
Table 4.6 presents the changes in the number of exporters, producers and potential
ﬁrms in the beef industry of each region under both scenarios. We see that beef
exporters increase in all regions except for the EU and Argentina. Beef production in
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the EU falls as the domestic demand is met by the US imports. As a result, factors of
production released from the beef industry are devoted to production in the processed
food and manufactures industries in the EU.
Table 4.6. Changes in Varieties in the Beef Market under Fixed Cost
Reduction and Tariﬀ Cut Scenarios (%).
Regions

European Union
United States
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Australia
Canada
Mexico
China
India
Rest of the World

Exporters

All Producers

Potential Firms

Fixed Cost
Reduction

Tariﬀ
Reduction

Fixed Cost
Reduction

Tariﬀ
Reduction

Fixed Cost
Reduction

Tariﬀ
Reduction

−0.071
0.528
0.001
−0.002
0.007
0.021
0.007
0.007
0.000
0.017
0.001

−0.057
0.182
0.001
−0.001
0.011
0.027
0.012
0.010
0.000
0.016
0.001

−1.506
0.289
0.001
−0.001
0.006
0.016
0.007
0.004
0.010
0.011
0.027

−1.228
−0.170
0.001
0.000
0.009
0.019
0.020
0.011
0.011
0.011
0.025

−1.506
0.537
0.001
−0.001
0.006
0.016
0.007
0.004
0.010
0.011
0.027

−1.228
0.401
0.001
0.000
0.009
0.020
0.020
0.011
0.011
0.011
0.025

We see that the number of all producers increases in most of the regions including
the US under the ﬁxed cost reduction scenario (0.289%). The US experience is
noteworthy because the domestic productivity threshold increases much more in the
US compared to other regions. Interestingly, there is ﬁrm entry into the beef industry
even though the domestic threshold increases. This can be explained by the eﬀect of
trade policies on potential ﬁrms.
The pool of potential ﬁrms is determined endogenously by the zero proﬁts condition
in the model. A potential ﬁrm decides to enter the industry if the potential proﬁts
from all sales are high enough to cover both domestic and export ﬁxed costs. The
US beef industry becomes highly proﬁtable following the ﬁxed export cut as a result
of increased sales to the EU market. This attracts many potential ﬁrms to make
the productivity draw and survive in the beef industry. The increase in the mass of
potential ﬁrms (0.537%) more than oﬀset the rise in domestic productivity threshold
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(0.065%) which eventually leads to an increase in the mass of active ﬁrms in the US
beef industry (0.289%). The number of potential and total ﬁrms are the same in other
regions as there is not much of a change in their respective domestic thresholds (only
after three decimal places).
The compositional change in domestic and export markets have signiﬁcant implications for the industry productivity. Table 4.7 presents the changes of average
productivity of domestic suppliers, exporters and the whole industry under the two
trade policy simulations.
Table 4.7. Productivity Growth in the Beef Industry: Domestic,
Export and Industry-Wide Averages under Fixed Cost Reduction and
Tariﬀ Cut Scenarios (%).
Regions

European Union
United States
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Australia
Canada
Mexico
China
India
Rest of the World

Domestic Suppliers
Fixed Cost
Reduction
0.000
0.065
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Tariﬀ
Reduction
0.000
0.151
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Exporters

All Producers

Fixed Cost
Reduction

Tariﬀ
Reduction

Fixed Cost
Reduction

Tariﬀ
Reduction

−0.001
−0.066
0.000
0.000
−0.001
−0.004
−0.002
−0.002
0.000
−0.003
0.000

−0.001
−0.057
0.000
0.000
−0.001
−0.005
−0.003
−0.002
0.000
−0.003
0.000

−0.001
−0.084
0.000
0.000
−0.001
−0.004
−0.002
−0.002
0.000
−0.003
0.000

−0.001
0.044
0.000
0.000
−0.001
−0.005
−0.003
−0.002
0.000
−0.003
0.000

Notes: Domestic suppliers report the average productivity growth of ﬁrms that only sell in the domestic
market. Exporters report the productivity growth of exporters in all export markets weighted by the
respective share of each export market in total sales of beef. All producers report the average productivity
growth in the industry weighted by the respective share of each market in total sales of beef.

For most regions, average productivity in the domestic market is aﬀected only
modestly by these policies. Comparatively, the US experiences a more sizeable change.
Average productivity of domestic suppliers increases by 0.065% under the ﬁxed cost
reduction scenario while it increases by 0.151% under the tariﬀ cut scenario.
Average productivity of exporters decreases in most of the regions as a result of
the expansion of low-productivity ﬁrms into export markets. Even though most of
the regions suﬀer from a productivity threshold increase for the EU market, there is
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a decline in the productivity threshold for other export markets. As a result, they
divert their beef sales to regions other than the EU. This allows for low-productivity
exporters in the beef market to expand their market shares. Since new exporters
are less eﬃcient than the incumbents, their entry into the export markets lowers the
overall eﬃciency in export markets on average.
Industry-wide average productivity is aﬀected by the compositional changes in
domestic and export markets. As less eﬃcient ﬁrms expand into the beef export
market, the industry-wide productivity decreases on average in all regions under both
scenarios. The only exception is the US under the tariﬀ cut scenario. In that particular
case, domestic market productivity increases more than in the ﬁxed cost scenario
because less eﬃcient ﬁrms drop out of the industry. The domestic average (0.151%)
more than compensates for the reduced export market average (-0.057%). Therefore,
tariﬀ cut reallocates market share by shifting resources towards more productive ﬁrms
improving the aggregate productivity in the US (0.044%).
So far, we have focused on the beef industry. To complete the picture, we brieﬂy
turn to other industries. Table 4.8 presents changes in the output of each industry
in the EU and US under the two policy scenarios. As expected, production in the
primary food industry expands as well as beef in the US. This is not surprising as
primary food is the major input used in beef production.
Unlike primary food, production in other industries drops. As beef becomes more
proﬁtable, ﬁrms in other industries switch to beef production especially the ones in
the processed food industry. On the other hand, the EU experiences the opposite
such that there is a substantial contraction in the beef industry and a more modest
expansion in the manufacturing industry.
Finally, we consider the eﬀects of ﬁxed cost reduction and tariﬀ cut on prices.
Table 4.9 presents the supplier prices in each industry for the US and EU across the
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two scenarios. An interesting ﬁnding is that price of beef in the US increases under
the ﬁxed cost scenario while it decreases under the tariﬀ scenario. In both cases the
expansion in the beef industry bids up factor prices. Although input prices are higher
at the industry level, the average eﬃciency of ﬁrms within the industry diﬀers across
scenarios.
Table 4.8. Change in the Production of Each Sector under Fixed Cost
Reduction and Tariﬀ Reduction Scenarios (%).

Sectors
Primary Food
Extraction
Beef
Processed Food
Manufactures
Services

Fixed Cost
Reduction

Tariﬀ
Reduction

EU

US

EU

US

−0.063
0.039
−1.497
−0.001
0.007
0.002

0.052
−0.026
0.476
−0.002
−0.010
0.000

−0.051
0.033
−1.221
−0.001
0.007
0.001

0.051
−0.025
0.598
−0.002
−0.009
0.000

Table 4.9. Change in the Supplier Prices of Each Sector under Fixed
Cost Reduction and Tariﬀ Reduction Scenarios (%).

Sectors
Primary Food
Extraction
Beef
Processed Food
Manufactures
Services

Fixed Cost
Reduction

Tariﬀ
Reduction

EU

US

EU

US

−0.014
−0.011
−0.007
−0.003
−0.001
−0.001

0.013
0.007
0.090
0.003
0.002
0.002

−0.012
−0.009
−0.006
−0.003
−0.001
−0.001

0.013
0.007
−0.037
0.004
0.001
0.002

As mentioned before in the tariﬀ cut scenario, the domestic threshold in the beef
industry increases and pushes the less eﬃcient ﬁrms out of the industry which improves
the overall eﬃciency in the industry. As high-productivity ﬁrms constitute a larger
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share of the industry, the average productivity in the industry falls despite the increase
in factor prices. Hence the decline in supplier prices under the tariﬀ-cut scenario.
The opposite occurs in the ﬁxed cost scenario due to the rise in domestic average
productivity.

4.3.4 Welfare Implications across Model Speciﬁcations
Implications of these TTIP scenarios can be better understood by exploring the
resulting welfare eﬀects in each region. In this section we provide a detailed analysis on
the components of welfare change in ﬁrm heterogeneity. There are three new sources
of economic gains from trade that can be captured in ﬁrm heterogeneity models. We
can summarize them as: (i) productivity eﬀect, (ii) love-of-variety eﬀect, and (iii)
scale eﬀect (Melitz and Treﬂer, 2012; Zhai, 2008). These components are additional to
the allocative eﬃciency and terms of trade eﬀects which are the traditional channels
of gains from trade in perfect competition models with Armington assumption.
Productivity eﬀect is the result of within-industry compositional change of ﬁrms
in favor of the high-productivity ﬁrms. As factors of production are reallocated
towards more productive ﬁrms, overall eﬃciency in the industry rises which has a
positive contribution to overall welfare. The productivity channel is unique to the ﬁrm
heterogeneity model. The second channel is the Dixit-Stiglitz love-of-variety eﬀect
which results from the ability of the ﬁrm heterogeneity model to capture trade growth
along the extensive margin. Trade contributes to overall welfare by allowing new
varieties to become available to consumers who gain utility from the uniqueness of
products. The third channel is the scale eﬀect which is the result of increasing returns
to scale technology available in the monopolistically competitive industries. As trade
expands, there are fewer ﬁrms left in the market which face lower average costs and
operate at a higher scale generating additional gains from trade.
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Aggregate welfare eﬀects of the unilateral ﬁxed export cost reduction and tariﬀ
cut in the ﬁrm heterogeneity model are presented in Table 4.10. The provide additional insights about the contribution of ﬁrm heterogeneity mechanisms, we compare
the outcomes of this model to that of the standard GTAP model with Armington
assumption of national product diﬀerentiation and perfectly competitive industries.

Aggregate
Welfare Eﬀect

460
-9
-1
0
0
-1
-1
-3
-6
1
-38
403

261
-23
-1
0
0
-1
-1
-3
-6
1
-33
195

Regions

EU
USA
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Australia
Canada
Mexico
China
India
ROW

World Total

EU
USA
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Australia
Canada
Mexico
China
India
ROW

World Total

337

371
-10
0
0
0
-1
0
-2
0
1
-21

417

456
-13
0
0
0
-1
0
-2
0
1
-24

Productivity
Eﬀects

Terms of
Trade Eﬀects

0

-43
50
0
0
0
-1
0
0
-2
0
-4

Tariﬀ Reduction

-121

-42
-71
0
0
0
-1
0
0
-2
0
-5

0

-45
38
0
0
0
1
1
2
1
1
0

0

-45
49
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
-6

Fixed Export Cost Reduction

Allocative
Eﬃciency Eﬀects

0

-2
14
-1
0
0
0
0
-1
-5
-1
-5

0

-2
15
-1
0
0
0
0
-1
-5
-1
-5

IS
Eﬀects

32

5
28
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1

11

6
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Scale
Eﬀects

-174

-25
-143
0
0
0
0
-2
-2
0
-1
-2

96

87
7
0
0
0
0
-1
0
0
-1
2

Variety
Eﬀects

Table 4.10. Welfare Eﬀects of Two Scenarios under Firm Heterogeneity: Equivalent Variation in millions of US$.
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The ﬁrm heterogeneity model predicts a global welfare gain of $403 million from
the ﬁxed export cost reduction. This is much higher than what the tariﬀ reduction
scenario predicts which is about a $195 million global welfare gain. Here we should
note that the higher welfare gains predicted by the ﬁxed cost scenario is not simply
the result of the bigger shock we imposed on ﬁxed costs. In fact, since trade responses
are equalized between the two scenarios, welfare diﬀerences are attributed to the
diﬀerential eﬀects of each policy instrument on the responses of productivity and
extensive margin.
Welfare decomposition can provide more insights into these ﬁndings. Looking at
the experience of each country in the ﬁrm heterogeneity model reveals that welfare
of the EU increases under both scenarios, $460 million with ﬁxed cost reduction and
$261 million with tariﬀ cut. The main driving force of these economic gains is due to
the traditional allocative eﬃciency eﬀect. As the EU welcomes increasing levels of
beef imports from the US, a considerable amount of tariﬀ rents are collected which
contributes positively to the welfare of EU ($456 million). Even in the case of tariﬀ
reduction, the EU beneﬁts from rents ($371 million) because tariﬀs are not completely
eliminated and beef imports from the US increases by the same rate as in the ﬁxed
cost scenario. As expected, terms of trade contribution is negative (-$45 million under
both scenarios) due to terms of trade deterioration in the EU (-0,002%).
The new channels in ﬁrm heterogeneity paint a more detailed picture of the welfare
change. We see that the loss in average productivity in the beef industry as well as in
other heterogeneous industries reduces welfare by $42 million in the case of ﬁxed cost
reduction and $43 million in the case of tariﬀ cut. The loss caused by productivity
and terms of trade eﬀects are oﬀset by the variety eﬀects ($87 million) under ﬁxed
cost reduction. Increased domestic varieties of manufacturing products more than
compensates for the loss in domestic beef varieties ultimately contributing to the
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welfare gain. The opposite happens in the tariﬀ cut scenario where the private sector
suﬀers from the loss in domestic beef varieties which eventually reduces welfare by
$25 million.
The ﬁrm heterogeneity model predicts a welfare loss in the US (-$9 million and
-$23 million under the respective scenarios). This is contrary to the predictions of the
Armington-based model reported in Table 4.11 which estimates a $40 million welfare
gain under the tariﬀ cut scenario and a more modest $8 million gain under the ﬁxed
cost reduction scenario. The divergent ﬁndings across model speciﬁcations result from
the additional channels of economic gains in the ﬁrm heterogeneity model. In the ﬁxed
cost reduction scenario, we see that the negative welfare in the US is driven by the loss
in average productivity (-$71 million). This is due to within-industry compositional
change in favor of the low-productivity ﬁrms. In this context, trade growth causes
welfare loss by allowing ineﬃcient marginal ﬁrms to survive in domestic and export
markets. This can be thought of as trade diversion in the sense that lower ﬁxed costs
makes production and exporting proﬁtable for ineﬃcient ﬁrms. Therefore, part of the
trade is diverted away from high-productivity ﬁrms.

Aggregate
Welfare Eﬀect

41
8
0
0
0
0
-1
0
0
0
-3
43

120
40
-2
-2
-1
-1
-3
-2
-2
0
-13
134

Regions

EU
USA
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Australia
Canada
Mexico
China
India
ROW

World Total

EU
USA
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Australia
Canada
Mexico
China
India
ROW

World Total

134

140
-3
0
0
0
0
0
-1
0
0
-2

33

34
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Allocative
Eﬃciency Eﬀects

0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Tariﬀ Reduction

10

10
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0

-19
31
-1
-1
-1
-1
-2
-1
1
0
-6

0

-3
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-2

Terms of
Trade Eﬀects

Fixed Cost Reduction

Productivity
Eﬀects

0

-2
12
0
0
0
0
0
0
-4
0
-4

0

0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1
0
-1

IS
Eﬀects

0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Scale
Eﬀects

0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Variety
Eﬀects

Table 4.11. Welfare Eﬀects of Two Scenarios under Perfect Competition: Equivalent Variation in millions of US$.
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On the other hand, welfare loss under the tariﬀ cut scenario is driven by the
negative variety eﬀect (-$143 million). US consumers suﬀer from the loss of domestic
varieties in the beef industry as well as the manufacturing industry. In particular, the
impact of domestic variety loss of beef is most severe on private households, while
the impact of domestic variety loss of manufactures is most severe on ﬁrms that use
manufacturing products as inputs. Even though the imported varieties of beef and
manufactures increases in the US, it is no match for the loss of domestic varieties when
we account for the preference bias of home goods. Overall, we see that the choice of
policy instruments matters for the responses of each welfare mechanism.
Comparison of results between ﬁrm heterogeneity and perfect competition indicates
that the US beneﬁts from lower ﬁxed costs if the productivity and variety channels are
not taken into account. In particular, without the trade diverting eﬀect of lower average
productivity in the case of ﬁxed costs and the utility reducing eﬀect of variety loss in
the case of tariﬀs, welfare in the US increases due to positive terms of trade eﬀects.
However, this leaves out important economic information which can be paramount for
policy recommendation.
Overall, the ﬁrm heterogeneity model predicts larger welfare gains for the world
compared to the perfect competition model. Including ﬁrm-level heterogeneity in the
model allows for tracing out the welfare implications of NTM reduction due to new
channels which are unexplored in Armington-based perfect competition models. By
ignoring the signiﬁcant variation across ﬁrms, NTM removal scenarios miss the eﬀect
of productivity change and the extensive margin on global welfare.

4.4 Sensitivity Analysis and Limitations
The policy analysis in this chapter relies on the assumptions we make in model
calibration and parameterization to determine the values of substitution elasticities
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between varieties, shape parameters and the associated ﬁxed costs in the domestic
and export markets. In this section, we check the sensitivity of the model results to
alternative assumptions about the model parameters. The key issue in this sensitivity
analysis is to use parameter values that will satisfy the parametric restriction in the
model, γ > σ − 1. This parametric restriction is important in the calibration of ﬁxed
costs and variable costs in value-added which we turn to now.

4.4.1 Calibration of Fixed Costs and Parametric Restrictions
In this study we assume that ﬁxed costs for the domestic and export markets
are composed of value-added only. For the initial value of ﬁxed costs we follow Zhai
(2008) in calibrating ﬁxed costs to the base year bilateral sales data because the GTAP
data base does not have information about ﬁxed costs. This method imposes certain
restrictions on the parametric space that allows the model to run. In this section we
discuss these restrictions and present the set of parameters for the beef industry that
satisfy these restrictions. We start with brieﬂy summarizing the main aspects of the
calibration.
Using the optimal demand and price for the diﬀerentiated variety, we ﬁnd ﬁxed
costs to be proportional to sales where the proportionality constant depends on our
parametric choice. The calibration for ﬁxed costs in both domestic and export markets
is given as follows:

Nirs Wir Firs =

Pirs Qirs γi − σi + 1
,
Tirs
σi γ i

(4.1)

where Pirs is the price of product i produced in region r and sold in region s, Qirs is
the quantity of product i produced in r sold in s, Nirs is the number of exporters of
i that sell on the r − s trade route, Wir is the cost of one value-added bundle that
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is used by ﬁrms in region r that sell product i to cover ﬁxed costs and Firs is the
number of value-added bundles required to cover ﬁxed costs of sales of i from region r
to region s.
The left-hand side in equation (4.1), Nirs Wir Firs , gives the ﬁxed cost of selling
product i from source r to destination s aggregated over all ﬁrms that are active
in that market. The right hand side has two components. The ﬁrst one,

Pirs Qirs
,
Tirs

gives the total revenue of selling product i from r to s which equals total cost of
exporting that particular good to market s. The second component,

γi −σi +1
,
σi γi

is a

proportionality constant that depends on preferences and the heterogeneity of the
industry. As preferences become more homogeneous, i.e. higher σi , ﬁrms have little
incentive to invest in diﬀerentiating their varieties because the markup gets smaller.
As a result, in this model ﬁxed export costs decrease with the elasticity of substitution.
Similarly, a higher shape parameter, i.e. less heterogeneity across ﬁrms, reduces ﬁxed
costs of exporting.
The rest of the value-added costs are attributed to the variable portion of production.
Then, variable value-added costs are calculated as residuals from ﬁxed costs. Based
on the parametric choice, initial ﬁxed and variable cost calibration could give negative
values. In order to avoid negative values, we need to restrict the parametric space to
a particular region where the parameter combinations give positive values for ﬁxed
costs as well as for variable costs in the initial data base. The parametric restriction
for the beef industry is shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 plots the combinations of the substitution elasticity and Pareto shape
parameter for the beef industry. The range of parameters considered is [1, 13]. The
lower bound is selected based on the model assumptions, i.e. σ > 1 and γ > 1. We
limit the upper bound for both parameters at 13 for representative purposes. For the
shape parameter, the value of the upper bound is in line with empirical studies where
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(2015) within the bounds of the model. The parameter combination for the beef
industry that we used in our policy analysis is reported as the ‘reference value’ in
Figure 4.1, where γ = 3.78 and σ = 4.21. The shape parameter estimate is from
Spearot (2015) which is the mean value for 59 countries. The elasticity value that
corresponds to this shape parameter is found by following the empirical study in
Chapter 3.
Spearot (2015) provides shape parameter estimates for the beef industry by country.
This gives us a range of shape parameter estimates that vary across 59 countries.
However, he does not provide corresponding elasticity values. Therefore, we rely on
empirical studies in order to ﬁnd a way to disentangle elasticity values that correspond
to the Pareto shape estimates in Spearot (2015). The ﬁrst candidate is the ﬁrm-level
study conducted by Arita et al. (2015) for the beef industry in Europe. Arita et al.
(2015) estimates the dispersion of ﬁrm-level export sales by following the approach
in Helpman et al. (2004) which gives an estimate of a combination of the Pareto
shape parameter and the elasticity of substitution. The resulting coeﬃcient estimate
is γ − σ + 1 = 0.62. We ﬁt the elasticities to this empirical relationship using the
shape parameter values in Spearot (2015). The resulting parameter combinations are
plotted in Figure 4.1 and referred to as Arita et al. (2015). As is shown on the ﬁgure,
several parameter combinations do not satisfy the parametric restriction and are in
the invalid region.
In order to compare the parameter combinations with an alternative ﬁt for elasticities, we also consider the empirical work of di Giovanni et al. (2011) where the
Power Law exponent of ﬁrm sales are estimated by regressing log of rank on log of
sales by based on French ﬁrm-level data. The resulting coeﬃcient estimate is the
Power Law exponent which gives a value of

γ
σ−1

= 1.06. This is for an average of 25

tradeable industries. The resulting parameter combinations are plotted in Figure 4.1
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and referred to as di Giovanni et al. (2011). The parameter values on this ﬁt are
very close to the ﬁt with Arita’s (2015) estimate. However, in this case all parameter
combinations are within the valid region.
Table 4.12 reports the parameter values used in our sensitivity analysis. The
reference values presented in the table are the parameter values we use in the original
policy analysis in Section 4.3.3. The low and high values for Arita et al. (2015) and
di Giovanni et al. (2011) are selected such that the parameter values are within the
valid region. The lower and higher values for the shape parameter are selected to be
the same in Arita et al. (2015) and di Giovanni et al. (2011) in order to be able to
compare the eﬀect of a diﬀerent elasticity ﬁt on simulation results.
Table 4.12. Parameter Values for the Beef Industry used in the Sensitivity Analysis.
Arita (2015)
Parameters
Shape parameter, γ
Elasticity of substitution, σ

Reference Value
3.78
4.21

Low Value
2.17
2.55

High Value
11.60
11.98

di Giovanni et al. (2011)
Low Value
2.17
3.05

High Value
11.60
11.94

Notes: Reference Value reports the parameter values used in this dissertation for policy analysis, Arita
(2015) reports the parameter combinations that ﬁts elasticities to the estimates found in Arita (2015)
and shape parameters in Spearot (2015), di Giovanni et al. (2011) reports the parameter combinations
that ﬁts elasticities to the estimates found in Arita (2015) and shape parameters in Spearot (2015).

Since the Pareto shape parameter and the elasticity of substitution move in tandem
based on the parametric restriction of the model and ﬁt, low values correspond to
lower values for both parameters. In other words, if the Pareto shape parameter is
low, then the associated elasticity is also low. Similarly, high values correspond to
higher values for both parameters.
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4.4.2 Simulation Results with Alternative Parameter Values
Table 4.13 presents the welfare eﬀects of the two policy scenarios analyzed in
Section 4.3.3 under alternative parameter values. Low and high values correspond to
the parameter combinations in Table 4.12 under Arita (2015).
Results in Table 4.13 show that welfare changes under the ﬁxed cost scenario are
not very sensitive to parameter values. For the EU, welfare gains are slightly higher
under higher parameter values. The US experiences welfare loss under all parameter
values considered; however, there is no clear relationship as to how the parameter
values aﬀect the magnitude of the change. Compared to the reference value, the
US experiences a larger welfare loss both under lower parameter values and higher
parameter values.
Table 4.13. Welfare Eﬀects under Alternative Parameter Values (Elasticities are ﬁtted to Arita et al. (2015)): Equivalent Variation in
millions of US$.
Region

Fixed Cost Scenario

Tariﬀ Scenario

Low Value

Reference Value

High Value

Low Value

Reference Value

High Value

EU
USA
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Australia
Canada
Mexico
China
India
ROW

450
-17
-1
0
0
-1
-1
-3
-6
1
-35

460
-9
-1
0
0
-1
-1
-3
-6
1
-38

464
-11
-1
0
0
-1
-1
-3
-6
1
-40

165
-29
0
0
0
-1
0
-2
-7
1
-27

261
-23
-1
0
0
-1
-1
-3
-6
1
-33

386
-18
-1
0
0
-1
-1
-3
-6
1
-40

Total

388

403

403

99

195

317

Sensitivity analysis for the tariﬀ cut scenario presents a clearer comparison. For
the EU, welfare gains are much higher as parameter values are increased. On the other
hand, the US experiences a smaller welfare loss as parameter values are increased. We
see that the impact of parameter values on the eﬀects of tariﬀ cut is more pronounced.
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Welfare eﬀects are much more sensitive to parameter values under the tariﬀ cut
scenario compared to the ﬁxed cost scenario.
Table 4.14 presents the eﬀects of using alternative parameter values on changes in
export values for beef under the two policy scenarios. The results show that export
values are not very sensitive to parameter values under either scenario. The EU
experiences a loss in beef exports which is lower under higher parameter values. On
the other hand, there is a considerable increase in US beef exports, the magnitude of
which gets lower as parameter values are increased.
Table 4.14. Changes in the Value of Beef Exports under Alternative
Parameter Values (Elasticities are ﬁtted to Arita et al. (2015)), $US
millions.
Region

EU
USA
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Australia
Canada
Mexico
China
India
ROW
Total

Fixed Cost Scenario

Tariﬀ Scenario

Low Value

Reference Value

High Value

Low Value

Reference Value

High Value

-46
585
1
0
0
7
3
1
0
2
4
557

-46
583
1
0
0
5
2
1
0
1
3
550

-43
579
0
-1
0
5
2
1
0
1
2
545

-34
579
1
0
0
7
4
1
0
1
4
565

-37
574
1
0
0
7
4
1
0
1
4
555

-39
561
1
-1
0
7
5
1
0
1
5
541

Table 4.15 presents the eﬀects of using alternative parameter values on the percentage change of average productivity in the beef industry under the two policy scenarios.
The sensitivity analysis on welfare results may depend on how we ﬁt the elasticity
values. An alternative ﬁt for elasticities may paint a diﬀerent picture for the welfare
results. Table 4.16 presents the welfare eﬀects of the two policy scenarios under an
alternative elasticity ﬁt using the estimates in di Giovanni et al. (2011).
The welfare gains under alternative parameter values are similar for the EU in
the ﬁxed cost scenario. On the other hand, there is a huge diﬀerence in the welfare
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Table 4.15. Changes in Average Productivity in the Beef Industry
under Alternative Parameter Values (Elasticities are ﬁtted to Arita
et al. (2015)), % Change.
Region

EU
USA
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Australia
Canada
Mexico
China
India
ROW
Total

Fixed Cost Scenario

Tariﬀ Scenario

Low Value

Reference Value

High Value

Low Value

Reference Value

High Value

-0.001
-0.178
-0.001
0.000
-0.004
-0.010
-0.004
-0.005
0.000
-0.008
0.000
-0.210

-0.001
-0.084
0.000
0.000
-0.001
-0.004
-0.002
-0.002
0.000
-0.003
0.000
-0.096

0.000
-0.025
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.001
-0.001
0.000
0.000
-0.001
0.000
-0.027

-0.001
-0.059
-0.001
0.000
-0.004
-0.010
-0.005
-0.005
0.000
-0.006
0.000
-0.091

-0.001
0.044
0.000
0.000
-0.001
-0.005
-0.003
-0.002
0.000
-0.003
0.000
0.029

0.000
0.097
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.002
-0.001
0.000
0.000
-0.001
0.000
0.093

Table 4.16. Welfare Eﬀects under Alternative Parameter Values (Elasticities are ﬁtted to di Giovanni et al. (2011)): Equivalent Variation in
millions of US$.
Region

EU
USA
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Australia
Canada
Mexico
China
India
ROW
Total

Fixed Cost Scenario

Tariﬀ Scenario

Low Value

Reference Value

High Value

Low Value

Reference Value

High Value

455
4
-1
0
0
-1
-1
-3
-6
1
-37
412

460
-9
-1
0
0
-1
-1
-3
-6
1
-38
403

464
-11
-1
0
0
-1
-1
-3
-6
1
-40
403

174
-25
0
0
0
-1
0
-3
-7
1
-30
109

261
-23
-1
0
0
-1
-1
-3
-6
1
-33
195

386
-18
-1
0
0
-1
-1
-3
-6
1
-40
317

response of the US to changes in parameter values. The US experiences a welfare gain
under low parameter values, while it experiences a welfare loss under high parameter
values. The sensitivity of welfare changes to parameter values can be traced back to
the sensitivity of the variety eﬀects to parameter values. As parameter values get
higher, the variety eﬀect turns from positive to negative.
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The diﬀerent results under alternative ﬁts to elasticities highlight the importance
of proper parameterization of the ﬁrm heterogeneity model. A better parameterization
of the model is paramount for improving the performance of the model.

4.4.3 Limitations
An outstanding issue in this study is the parametric restrictions imposed by the
theory and the calibration of ﬁxed costs. As initial values for ﬁxed costs and variable
value-added depend on the parametric choice, we are restricted to the parameter
combinations which provide positive values for ﬁxed and variable value-added costs.
In order to improve the model, alternative methods of parameterization should be
considered. Expansion of the parametric space can relax the dependency of the model
on parameters which requires an alternative method to calibrate or estimate initial
ﬁxed costs. Estimation of ﬁxed costs is diﬃcult as their identiﬁcation depends on
their nonlinear eﬀects on market participation patterns. Das et al. (2007) develops a
structurally dynamic framework which allows for the estimation of ﬁxed export costs
based on plant-level data. In particular, Das et al. (2007) identify ﬁxed costs by using
the diﬀerences in the exporting frequency of plants with similar proﬁt streams but
diﬀerent export participation history. We do not attempt to solve this issue in this
study. However, using empirical information for initial ﬁxed costs may improve the
ﬂexibility of the model for alternative parameters.

4.5 Concluding Remarks
Reducing NTMs as a means to increase market access and harmonizing the
standards in trade between the US and the EU has been the main target of recent
TTIP negotiations. EU’s hormone ban on US beef is one of the frequently discussed
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issues in these negotiations. Removal of the ﬁxed costs associated with US beef
imports into the EU is expected to generate signiﬁcant economic gains.
This study focuses on the implications of reducing beef hormone ban imposed on
US imports. We contribute to this line of literature by taking ﬁrm-level heterogeneity
and extensive margin eﬀects prevalent in the monopolistically competitive beef market
into account. For this purpose we use the newly developed ﬁrm heterogeneity module
of GTAP which (i) accounts for ﬁxed costs in domestic and export markets; (ii) traces
out self-selection of ﬁrms into export markets based on productivity diﬀerences and
(iii) captures trade growth along the extensive margin. We compare the eﬀects of
using diﬀerent policy instruments to capture NTM reductions. Moreover, we provide
insights into welfare implications of ﬁrm heterogeneity model and compare them with
that of the perfect competition model.
Our ﬁndings show that the mass of US exporters into the EU beef market increases
signiﬁcantly under both scenarios. The compositional change in US beef export market
is such that low-productivity ﬁrms expand their market shares as a result of lower
productivity thresholds. We ﬁnd that reducing ﬁxed export costs cause aggregate
productivity in the US beef industry to fall since it allows less eﬃcient marginal
ﬁrms to survive in the industry and expand into export markets. This has signiﬁcant
welfare implications. Reduced average productivity in the beef industry causes an
overall welfare loss in the US. We ﬁnd that the choice of policy instrument alters the
underlying mechanisms at play that cause the welfare loss. When NTMs are captured
as tariﬀ equivalents in the ﬁrm heterogeneity model, we see that the US experiences a
higher welfare loss despite the rising average productivity in the beef market. The
tariﬀ cut causes a signiﬁcant loss of domestic varieties in the beef and manufacturing
industries which more than oﬀset the welfare gain of improved productivity.
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Overall, we ﬁnd important productivity and variety impacts of NTM reductions
consistent with much of the ﬁrm heterogeneity literature on trade integration. The
comparison with Armington-based GTAP model highlights the importance of productivity and variety impacts captured by the theory of ﬁrm heterogeneity. While
the Armington-based GTAP model predicts positive welfare gains in the US under
both policy scenarios, the ﬁrm heterogeneity speciﬁcation predicts negative welfare
gains. The diﬀerent welfare predictions across model speciﬁcations is due to the
productivity and variety eﬀects captured by the theory of ﬁrm heterogeneity. Since
Armington-based CGE models fail to account for these eﬀects, their welfare predictions
are not suﬃciently informative.
In this study we focus only on the impact of reducing beef hormone ban. However,
there are other trade barriers prevalent in the beef industry such as non-technical
NTMs known as tariﬀ rate quotas (TRQ). In fact, the EU has a restrictive TRQ policy
on US beef imports which further impedes US exports. There can be interactive eﬀects
between the TRQ policy and the hormone ban which deserves further analysis. In fact,
the potential interplay between the hormone ban and TRQs on US beef imports is
explored in Beckman and Arita (2015). They ﬁnd that the binding TRQ is the limiting
constraint which has signiﬁcant implications for trade ﬂows. This is a promising venue
for an extension of this study.
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CHAPTER 5. SUMMARY

This thesis contributes to the international trade literature by extending the
tools available to analyze trade policies with a mainstream policy model introducing
the theory of ﬁrm heterogeneity. These extensions encompass the development and
inclusion of the related theory, calibration, estimation and simulation. These tools will
become available to the entire community of GTAP users. The broader availability of
these tools provide the basis for a more thorough policy analysis and strengthen the
link between CGE analysis and broader trade literature.
Chapter 2 presents the implementation of ﬁrm heterogeneity theory in the GTAP
model and illustrates the behavioral characteristics of the new model in a stylized tariﬀ
removal scenario whereby Japanese tariﬀs on US manufactures are eliminated. Results
are compared across diﬀerent model speciﬁcations such as monopolistic competition
based on Krugman (1980) and perfect competition based on the Armington (1969)
assumption of national product diﬀerentiation. Signiﬁcant productivity, variety and
scale eﬀects are observed under the ﬁrm heterogeneity model which lead to more
pronounced welfare responses compared to the monopolistic and perfect competition
models. Exit of less eﬃcient ﬁrms from the industry due to higher competition is
found to be the main source of overall productivity increase in the manufacturing
industry of the US. This contributes positively to the welfare change. The loss in
domestic varieties due to the exit of ﬁrms results in negative variety eﬀects which
reduces welfare.
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Chapter 3 proposes a theoretically-consistent way to parameterize the ﬁrm heterogeneity model with a focus on the elasticity of substitution across varieties. Intensive
and extensive margins of trade are distinguished in a multi-sector, multi-country
ﬁrm heterogeneity model resulting in two estimating equations. Elasticity of substitution consistent with ﬁrm heterogeneity theory is obtained conditional on the
shape parameter estimates of Spearot (2015). Results show that the elasticity values
that are consistent with the ﬁrm heterogeneity theory are considerably lower than
Armington elasticities used in the standard GTAP model. This implies that current
implementations of Melitz-type models which use elasticities of substitution estimated
in the absence of ﬁrm heterogeneity will give overly large trade volume responses to
policy reforms.
Chapter 4 investigates the implications of reducing non-tariﬀ measures on US-EU
beef trade associated with the beef hormone ban imposed on US imports. Two
alternative policy instruments are used: ﬁxed export costs and tariﬀ equivalents of the
hormone ban. Results show that while the EU beneﬁts from these scenarios, the US
experiences a welfare loss. The choice of policy instrument is found to have important
welfare implications. Welfare loss in the US is found to be driven by the decline in
aggregate productivity under ﬁxed cost reduction, while it is found to be driven by
the loss in domestic varieties under the tariﬀ cut. Results are also compared across
model speciﬁcations. Findings indicate that welfare change in the US is reversed
under perfect competition. Since the perfectly competitive model does not account for
productivity and variety eﬀects, terms of trade improvement dominates the welfare
response. As a result, welfare increases in the US. The diﬀerent welfare implications
highlights the importance of taking ﬁrm heterogeneity into account in policy analysis.
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This section provides the derivation of the zero proﬁt condition in the monopolistically competitive industry with heterogeneous ﬁrms. In the monopolistically
competitive industry, total cost (TC) is composed of variable (VC) and ﬁxed (FC)
costs. In order to obtain the average total cost (ATC) and hence the output price
(P), we normalize both the right-hand side and left-hand side variables by the level of
output (Y) as follows:

T C (w, p, Y ) = V C (w, p, Y ) + F C(w, p, )
TC
VC
F C(w, p)
(w, p, Y ) =
(w, p, Y ) +
,
Y
Y
Y
F C (w, p)
.
AT C (w, p, Y ) = P = AV C (w, p, Y ) +
Y

(A.1)
(A.2)
(A.3)

Using GTAP notation, (A.1) corresponds to,
V AF (j, r)
,
QO(j, r)
P V AF (j, r) QV AF (j, r)
= AV C (j, r) +
,
QO(j, r)

P S(j, r) = AV C (j, r) +

(A.4)

where j ∈ M COM P COM M for monopolistically competitive industries and r ∈
REG for regions. Total diﬀerentiation of (A.4) yields:

dP S (j, r) = dAV C (j, r) +

QV AF (j, r)
dP V AF (j, r)
QO (j, r)

P V AF (j, r)
dQV AF (j, r)
QO (j, r)
P V AF (j, r) QV AF (j, r) dQO(j, r)
−
,
QO(j, r)
QO(j, r)
+

(A.5)
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We divide and multiply both sides of the equation by price and quantity variables to
obtain percentage changes in the corresponding variables.

P S (j, r)

dP S (j, r)
dAV C (j, r)
= AV C (j, r)
P S (j, r)
AV C (j, r)
P V AF (j, r) QV AF (j, r) dP V AF (j, r)
+
QO (j, r)
P V AF (j, r)
P V AF (j, r) QV AF (j, r) dQV AF (j, r)
+
QO (j, r)
QV AF (j, r)
P V AF (j, r) QV AF (j, r) dQO(j, r)
−
,
QO(j, r)
QO(j, r)

(A.6)

If we rearrange and use lowercase letters to denote percentage changes in the corresponding uppercase variables, we obtain

V OA (j, r) ps(j, r) = V C (j, r) avc (j, r) + V AF (j, r) pvaf (j, r)

(A.7)

+ V AF (j, r) qvaf (j, r) − V AF (j, r) qo(j, r).

Recall that average variable cost is determined by the following equation:
V F A (i, j, r) [pf (i, j, r) − af (i, j, r)]

V C (j, r) avc (j, r) =

(A.8)

i=T RAD COM M

+ V AV (j, r) [pvav (j, r) − avav (j, r)] − V C (j, r) ao(j, r).

Substituting (A.8) into (A.7) we obtain:
V F A (i, j, r) [pf (i, j, r) − af (i, j, r)]

V OA (j, r) ps(j, r) =

(A.9)

i=T RAD COM M

+ V AV (j, r) [pvav (j, r) − avav (j, r)] − V C (j, r) ao(j, r)
+ V AF (j, r) pvaf (j, r) + V AF (j, r) qvaf (j, r)
− V AF (j, r) qo(j, r).
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Note that total ﬁxed cost, V AF (j, r) is composed of ﬁxed domestic costs and ﬁxed
export costs:

V AF (j, r) = V AF D (j, r) +

V AF X(j, r, s).

(A.10)

s=REG

Substituting (A.10) into (A.9) yields:
V F A (i, j, r) [pf (i, j, r) − af (i, j, r)]

V OA (j, r) ps (j, r) =

(A.11)

i=T RADCOM M

+ [V AV (j, r) pvav (j, r) + V AF (j, r) pvaf (j, r)]
− V AV (j, r) avav (j, r)
− V C (j, r) ao (j, r) + V AF (j, r) qvaf (j, r)
− [V AF D (j, r) +

V AF X(j, r, s)]qo(j, r)].
s=REG

Recall that the demand price of value-added composite is a share-weighted summation
of prices of ﬁxed and variable value-added composites. This is given as follows:

V F A(i, j, r)pva (j, r) = V AV (j, r) pvav (j, r) + V AF (j, r) pvaf (j, r)
i=EN DW COM M

V A(j, r)pva (j, r) = V AV (j, r) pvav (j, r) + V AF (j, r) pvaf (j, r).
(A.12)
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Substituting (A.12) into (A.11) we obtain:
V F A (i, j, r) [pf (i, j, r) − af (i, j, r)]

V OA (j, r) ps (j, r) =

(A.13)

i=T RADCOM M

+ V A (j, r) pva (j, r) − V AV (j, r) avav (j, r)
− V C (j, r) ao (j, r) + V AF (j, r) qvaf (j, r)
− V AF D (j, r) qo (j, r) −

V AF X(j, r, s)qo(j, r).
s=REG

Note that demand for ﬁxed value-added is composed of demand for domestic and
export markets as follows:

V AF (j, r)qvaf (j, r) = V AF D (j, r) qvaf d (j, r)
+

(A.14)

V AF X (j, r, s) qvaf x(j, r, s).
s=REG

Substituting (A.14) into (A.13) yields:
V F A (i, j, r) [pf (i, j, r) − af (i, j, r)]

V OA (j, r) ps (j, r) =

(A.15)

i=T RADCOM M

+ V A (j, r) pva (j, r) − V AV (j, r) avav (j, r)
− V C (j, r) ao (j, r) + V AF D (j, r) qvaf d (j, r)
+

V AF X (j, r, s) qvaf x(j, r, s)
s=REG

− V AF D (j, r) qo (j, r) −

V AF X(j, r, s)qo(j, r).
s=REG

Note that demand for value-added is further determined by the following equations:
qvaf d (j, r) = n (j, r) − avaf d(j, r),
qvaf x (j, r, s) = nx (j, r, s) − avaf x(j, r, s).

(A.16)
(A.17)
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Substituting (A.16) into (A.15) we obtain:
V F A (i, j, r) [pf (i, j, r) − af (i, j, r)]

V OA (j, r) ps (j, r) =

(A.18)

i=T RADCOM M

+ V A (j, r) pva (j, r) − V AV (j, r) avav (j, r)
− V C (j, r) ao (j, r)
+ V AF D (j, r) [n (j, r) − avaf d (j, r)]
V AF X (j, r, s) [nx (j, r, s) − avaf x (j, r, s)]

+
s=REG

− V AF D (j, r) qo (j, r)
−

V AF X(j, r, s)qo(j, r).
s=REG

Output per ﬁrm and output per exporter are determined by the following equations:

qo (j, r) = qof (j, r) + n (j, r)

(A.19)

qox (j, r, s) = qo (j, r) − nx (j, r, s)

(A.20)
(A.21)
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Substituting (A.19) into (A.18) yields:
V F A (i, j, r) [pf (i, j, r) − af (i, j, r)]

V OA (j, r) ps (j, r) =

(A.22)

i=T RADCOM M

+ V A (j, r) pva (j, r) − V AV (j, r) avav (j, r)
− V C (j, r) ao (j, r)
+ V AF D (j, r) [n (j, r) − avaf d (j, r)]
V AF X (j, r, s) [nx (j, r, s) − avaf x (j, r, s)]

+
s=REG

− V AF D (j, r) [qof (j, r) + n (j, r)]
−

V AF X (j, r, s) [qox (j, r, s) + nx (j, r, s)]
s=REG

After simpliﬁcation (A.22) becomes:

ps (j, r) =
i=T RADCOM M

V F A (i, j, r)
[pf (i, j, r) − af (i, j, r)]
V OA (j, r)

(A.23)

V AV (j, r)
V A (j, r)
pva (j, r) −
avav (j, r)
V OA (j, r)
V OA (j, r)
V C (j, r)
−
ao (j, r)
V OA (j, r)
V AF D (j, r)
−
[qof (j, r) + avaf d (j, r)]
V OA (j, r)
V AF X (j, r, s)
−
[qox (j, r, s) + avaf x (j, r, s)]
V
OA
(j,
r)
s=REG
+

A.2 Data Description and Transformation
In the monopolistic competition model imports are sourced by agent as mentioned in
the previous sections. The structure of the standard GTAP database is not compatible
with sourced imports. Therefore, we transform the standard GTAP database following
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Swaminathan and Hertel (1996). This section outlines the steps in making this
transformation.
There are three steps to generate the monopolistically competitive data base:
• Sourcing agent demand at market prices
• Sourcing agent demand at agents prices
• Trade data
We summarize each step in this section for completeness purposes. For more details,
we refer the reader to Swaminathan and Hertel (1996).

A.2.1 Sourced Imports at Market Prices
In the standard GTAP database, consumption expenditure on domestic and imported goods are given separately. For instance, the private household consumption
expenditure is VDPM(i,s) (for domestic goods) and VIPM(i,s) (for imported goods).
The ﬁrst step is to transform agents domestic and import demands into sourced
demands valued at market prices. Share of imports from a particular source country
in all imports of the destination country is applied to value of agent purchases. Let
M SHRS(i, r, s) be the market share of source r in total imports of i by region s
which is calculated as follows:
V IM S(i, r, s)
M SHRS(i, r, s) = 
,
k V IM S(i, k, s)

(A.24)

where V IM S(i, r, s) is the value of imports of i by source r to destination s. Applying
this share to agent purchases yields the consumption of imports of i from source r to
destination s by agent. For instance, for the private household, we use VIPM(i,s) and
the import share MSHRS(i,r,s) to generate VPMS(i,r,s). If the source region, r, is
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the same as the destination region, s, agents purchases of domestically produced i are
also taken into account. An example for private household is given as follows:
V P M S(i, r, s) = M SHRS(i, r, s) ∗ V IP M (i, s) f or r = s,

(A.25)

V P M S(i, r, s) = M SHRS(i, r, s) ∗ V IP M (i, s) + V DP M (i, r, s) f or r = s. (A.26)

As a result, agents domestic and import demands, i.e. VDPM(i,s) and VIPM(i,s),
are replaced by sourced demands, VPMS(i,r,s). The change in GTAP notation is
outlined in Figure A.1, Panel A.

A.2.2 Sourced Imports at Agent’s Prices
The second step is to generate the sourced import demands valued at agents prices.
Sourced imports at market prices have already been obtained in step one. Value ﬂows
at market prices will be used to generate sourced imports at agents prices by using the
power of average (ad volarem) tax on total demand by an agent (T P (i, s), T G(i, s),
and T F (i, j, s)). The formula to calculate the power of the tax for private household
is as follows:
T P (i, s) =

V IP A(i, s) + V DP A(i, s)
.
V IP M (i, s) + V DP M (i, s)

(A.27)

The same method is used for private households, government and ﬁrm intermediate
input demands. To obtain the sourced purchases at agents prices, T P (i, s) is applied
to V P M S(i, r, s) as follows:
V P AS(i, r, s) = T P (i, s) ∗ V P M S(i, r, s)

(A.28)
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As a result, agents domestic and import demands, i.e. VDPA(i,s) and VIPA(i,s),
are replaced by sourced demands, VPAS(i,r,s). The data transformation in this step
is summarized in Figure A.1, Panel B.

A.2.3 Trade Data
The third step is to generate the trade data. Trade data does not go through sourcing
since it is already sourced. There are just two changes: (a) notation (exports and
imports are renamed as sales and demands respectively), and (b) inclusion of domestic
sales to ensure market equilibrium (for r = s, aggregate domestic sales are also taken
into account). The following formulas are used for exports:
V SM D(i, r, s) = V XM D(i, r, s) f or r = s,

(A.29)

V SM D(i, r, s) = V XM D(i, r, s) + V DM (i, r) f or r = s.

(A.30)

where V DM (i, r) is the value of aggregate domestic sales of i in r at market prices:

V DM (i, r) = V DP M (i, r) + V DGM (i, r) +

V DF M (i, j, r).

(A.31)

j

The following formulas are used for imports:
V DM S(i, s, r) = V IM S(i, r, r) f or r = s,

(A.32)

V DM S(i, s, r) = V IM S(i, s, r) + V DM (i, r) f or r = s.

(A.33)

Swaminathan and Hertel (1996) note that there are hardly any consumption tax on
domestic demand which allows the addition of domestic sales into value ﬂows for
exports and imports when r = s. However, they highlight the fact that if domestic
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Appendix B: Data Appendix to Chapter 3
This section deﬁnes the variables used in the empirical analysis and describes the
data sources. We used two sources to obtain the data. The bilateral trade ﬂows are
from the GTAP Data Base Version 8.1 (Narayanan et al., 2012). This version includes
57 GTAP commodities and 134 GTAP regions of which 113 country titles are available.
We use the time series bilateral trade data of this version that covers the period 1995
to 2009 with 2007 as the reference year.
The gravity data have been obtained from the CEPII distance and gravity databases
(http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd modele/bdd.asp). GeoDist is CEPIIs distance
database developed by Mayer and Zignago (2005). In our paper, data on distance,
contiguity, common language, colonial links and landlocked countries are obtained
from GeoDist. There are two ﬁles available in this database: a country-speciﬁc dataset
geo cepii.xls (geo cepii.dta) which includes geographical variables for 225 countries
and a dyadic dataset dist cepii.xls (dist cepii.dta) which includes diﬀerent measures
of bilateral distances between 224 countries. The content of these ﬁles and details
about the variables included in these ﬁles are explained in Mayer and Zignago (2011).
Gravity is CEPIIs gravity database gravity cepii (gravdata cepii.dta) based on Head
et al. (2010). This database covers an exhaustive set of variables for 224 countries for
the period 1948 to 2006. Details about the sources used in creating this database are
explained in Head et al. (2010). In our paper, data on common legal origins, common
currency, FTA and GATT/WTO membership are obtained from Gravity.
The time period considered in this paper is from 1995 to 2006 to match the time
series of bilateral trade from GTAP and the gravity variables from CEPII. In particular,
we drop the years 2007-2009 from the GTAP time series data and we drop the years
1948-1994 from the CEPII Gravity data. Our ﬁnal dataset is obtained by merging
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GTAP data with CEPII data for motor vehicles and parts industry, 113 country titles
and it covers the period from 1995 to 2006.
Table B.1. List of Countries.
List of Countries
Albania
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belgium - Lux.
Benin
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica

Cte d’Ivoire
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
India
Indonesia

Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Kazakstan
Kenya
Korea
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Malta
Mauritius
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique

Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia

South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Thailand
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United Rep. of Tanzania
United States of America
Uruguay
Venezuela
Viet Nam
Zambia
Zimbabwe

All of the variables used in our empirical work are summarized below with details
about the respective data sources resorted to obtain them. To facilitate comparison
with the gravity literature we adopt the convention in Helpman et al. (2008) for several
of the variable deﬁnitions.
Bilateral Trade: is the bilateral trade between exporter r and importer s in
millions of US dollars. We use GTAP database for information about bilateral trade
ﬂows. In particular, we use value of export sales evaluated at world (FOB) prices
which corresponds to ‘VXWD in GTAP. The dependent variable in our empirical work
is value of export sales in logs.
Distance: the population-weighted bilateral distance between the biggest cities
of exporter r and importer s in kilometers. For distance, we use the dist cepii ﬁle of
the CEPII GeoDist database. This uses city level data to evaluate the geographic
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distribution of population inside each country. There are two population-weighted
distance measures reported in this database. We use the one named as ‘distw which is
calculated by setting the sensitivity of trade ﬂows to bilateral distance as 1. We use
log(distance) in the regression equations.
Contiguity: a dummy variable that equals one if exporter r and importer s are
adjacent countries, i.e. are contiguous, and zero otherwise. For contiguity, we use
the dist cepii ﬁle of the CEPII GeoDist database. The name of the variable in the
database is ‘contig.
Common Colony: a dummy variable that equals one if exporter r and importer
s have had a common colonizer after 1945. For common colony, we use the dist cepii
ﬁle of the CEPII GeoDist database. The name of the variable in the database is
‘comcol.
Colonial Link: a dummy variable that equals one if exporter r and importer
s have ever had a colonial link, and zero otherwise. For colonial link, we use the
dist cepii ﬁle of the CEPII GeoDist database. The name of the variable in the database
is ‘colony.
Common Language: a dummy variable that equals one if exporter r and
importer s share a common oﬃcial language, and zero otherwise. For common
language, we use the dist cepii ﬁle of the CEPII GeoDist database. The name of the
variable in the database is ‘comlang.oﬀ.
Landlocked: a dummy variable that equals one if both exporter r and importer
s are landlocked countries, i.e. no direct access to sea, and zero otherwise. For
landlocked countries, we use the geo cepii ﬁle of the CEPII GeoDist database. The
name of the variable in the database is ‘landlocked. This database is country speciﬁc;
therefore, landlocked is deﬁned as a dummy variable that equals one if the particular

155
country is landlocked. We deﬁne a new dummy variable for our purposes using the
country-speciﬁc information available in geo cepii.
Common Legal Origins: a dummy variable that equals one if exporter r and
importer s share a common legal origin, and zero otherwise. For common legal origins,
we use the gravity cepii ﬁle of the CEPII Gravity database. The name of the variable
in the database is ‘comleg.
Common Currency: a dummy variable that equals one if exporter r and
importer s use the same currency, and zero otherwise. The data on currency unions
come from the gravity cepii ﬁle of the CEPII Gravity database. The name of the
variable in the database is ‘comcur.
GATT/WTO Membership: a dummy variable that equals one if both exporter
r and importer s are GATT/WTO members, and zero otherwise. The data on
GATT/WTO membership comes from the gravity cepii ﬁle of the CEPII Gravity
database. This database has separate information about the GATT/WTO membership
of exporter r (gatt o) and importer s (gatt d). Therefore, we deﬁne a new dummy
variable to incorporate the membership information on both countries which matches
our deﬁnition above.
FTA/RTA: a dummy variable that equals one if both exporter r and importer s
belong to the same regional trade agreement, and zero otherwise. FTA data comes
from the gravity cepii ﬁle of the CEPII Gravity database. The name of the variable
in the database is ‘rta.
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Appendix C: Sector Aggregation in Chapter 4
Table C.1. Sector Aggregation: GTAP Version 9.1 Pre-release.
No

Code

Description

Aggregation

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

pdr
wht
gro
v f
osd
c b
pfb
ocr
ctl
oap
rmk
wol
frs
fsh
coa
oil
gas
omn
cmt
omt
vol
mil
pcr
sgr
ofd
b t
tex
wap
lea
lum
ppp
p c
crp
nmm
i s
nfm
fmp
mvh
otn
ele
ome
omf
ely
gdt
wtr
cns
trd
otp
wtp
atp
cmn
oﬁ
isr
obs
ros
osg
dwe

Paddy rice
Wheat
Cereal grains nec
Vegetables, fruit, nuts
Oil seeds
Sugar cane, sugar beet
Plant-based ﬁbers
Crops nec
Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses
Animal products nec
Raw milk
Wool, silk-worm cocoons
Forestry
Fishing
Coal
Oil
Gas
Minerals nec
Bovine meat products
Meat products nec
Vegetable oils and fats
Dairy products
Processed rice
Sugar
Food products nec
Beverages and tobacco products
Textiles
Wearing apparel
Leather products
Wood products
Paper products, publishing
Petroleum, coal products
Chemical, rubber, plastic products
Mineral products nec
Ferrous metals
Metals nec
Metal products
Motor vehicles and parts
Transport equipment nec
Electronic equipment
Machinery and equipment nec
Manufactures nec
Electricity
Gas manufacture, distribution
Water
Construction
Trade
Transport nec
Water transport
Air transport
Communication
Financial services nec
Insurance
Business services nec
Recreational and other services
Public Administration, Defense, Education, Health
Dwellings

Primary Food
Primary Food
Primary Food
Primary Food
Primary Food
Primary Food
Primary Food
Primary Food
Primary Food
Primary Food
Primary Food
Primary Food
Extraction
Extraction
Extraction
Extraction
Extraction
Extraction
Beef
Processed Food
Processed Food
Processed Food
Processed Food
Processed Food
Processed Food
Processed Food
Manufactures
Manufactures
Manufactures
Manufactures
Manufactures
Manufactures
Manufactures
Manufactures
Manufactures
Manufactures
Manufactures
Manufactures
Manufactures
Manufactures
Manufactures
Manufactures
Services
Services
Services
Services
Services
Services
Services
Services
Services
Services
Services
Services
Services
Services
Services

Notes: FH: Firm heterogeneity, PC: Perfect Competition (Armington).

Market Structure
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
FH
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
PC
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